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Dissociative identity disorder (DID), formerly called multiple personality 
disorder, is considered to be the most chronic and severe manifestation of 
dissociative phenomena. In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (4th ed., DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994), DID 
is characterized by the presence of two or more distinct identities or 
personality states that recurrently take control of the individual’s behavior 
accompanied by an inability to recall important personal information that is 
too extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness. The disturbance is 
not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or a general 
medical condition. The majority of the identified patients are female (Kluft, 
1991a), and the prevalence of DID in inpatient psychiatric populations is 
estimated to be between 4% and 12%, with the most studies showing a rate 
around 5% (Boon & Draijer, 1993b; Horen, Leichner, & Lawson, 1995; 
Latz, Kramer, & Hughes, 1995; Ross, Anderson, Fleisher, & Norton, 1991; 
Saxe et al., 1993; for a review see Kluft, 1999). 
 DID is believed to develop from a self-protecting reaction to severe 
and persistent childhood abuse (Kluft, 1999; Freyd, 1996; Putnam, 1997; 
Van der Hart, van der Kolk, & Boon, 1998). Between 89% and 97% of DID 
patients report instances of sexual, physical, and/or psychological childhood 
abuse (Boon & Draijer, 1993a; Boon & Draijer, 1993b; Coons, Bowman, & 
Milstein, 1988; Putnam, Guroff, Silberman, Barban, & Post, 1986; Ross et 
al., 1990a, 1990b; Ross, Norton, & Wozney, 1989). From an attachment 
point of view, the conflict that a child experiencing abuse has to solve is the 
irreconcilable experience of the caregiver as an essential source of 
nourishment and safety and at the same time as a source of pain and danger 
(Fonagy, 1999; Liotti, 1999). To cope with these incompatible experiences, 
DID essentially is thought to involve the split between identity states in 
which patients experience trauma over and over again and identity states in 
which they experience partial or total amnesia for the abuse (cf. Nijenhuis & 
Van der Hart, 1999). The assumed function of the amnesic barriers between 
identities is thus to “contain” traumatic memories, so as to reduce the global 
effects of exposure to severely aversive stimuli, as well as to minimize the 
impact of these traumata on daily life (Dorahy, 2001). The basic split 
between an identity that contains memories of abuse and the amnesia 
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experienced in another identity is illustrated by Mollon (2002), who 
describes the behavior of one of his patients in a therapy session. Note that 
the DID patient, as is usually the case in DID, not only reports amnesia for 
the memories of abuse held by an identity, but also reports amnesia for the 
identity and her behavior: 
 
Some years ago, a patient, Rebecca, came to her usual psychotherapy session, 
curled up in her chair and appeared very frightened. She seemed to be trying to 
fight off someone who was hurting her. My attempts to communicate and enquire 
with words evoked only a gasping whisper of “hide!” and “get hurt”. After a few 
minutes she got up from the chair and hid on the floor behind it. She did not utter 
any more words that session. Despite this odd presentation, which appeared very 
removed from the present reality, she was able to leave when I indicated it was the 
end of the session… Following this session, Rebecca telephoned later in the day to 
apologize for not coming that morning. She “explained” that although she had 
come to the hospital she had not felt able to attend her session because she had 
been feeling so upset about certain events during the week. I tried to tell her that 
she had in fact come to her session. She seemed to presume I was misunderstanding 
her and repeated her explanation…When I tried to present her with the reality of 
her attendance, she appeared puzzled and confused, and said I must be lying but 
she could not understand why I would want to tell her this lie. (pp. 177-178) 
 
The mechanism of dissociation may become a characterological 
disposition with a more elaborate fragmentation of identities and 
compartmentalization of memories. The extent of further fragmentation 
and compartmentalization is thought to depend on the severity of the 
traumatization in terms of developmental age at trauma onset, chronicity 
and intensity of the traumatization, and factors such as the relationship to 
the perpetrator and lack of support and social recognition of the trauma 
(Ogawa, Sroufe, Weinfield, Carlson, & Egeland, 1997). In full-blown DID, 
dissociation becomes a fundamental response to all sources of exogenous 
and endogenous stress, with more identities being created not only to deal 
with experiences of abuse, but also to perform different daily activities in 
the adult patient’s life (Van der Kolk, Van der Hart, & Marmar, 1996).  
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Interidentity Amnesia 
Between 95 and 100 % of DID patients report experiences of blank spells 
for periods of time when other identities are in control of their behavior 
(Boon & Draijer, 1993a; Boon & Draijer, 1993b; Coons et al., 1988; Putnam 
et al., 1986; Ross et al., 1990a, 1990b; Ross et al., 1989). These experiences 
have a discrete onset and ending and may vary from seconds to days or even 
years. Patients often report that they come out of a blank spell in another 
location, for example in a bar in the company of strangers. They report that 
strangers claim to know them, or call them by a different name. Friends tell 
them about things they have done, which they don’t remember. The patient 
may state that objects are frequently missing, including money. Alternatively, 
objects may be present in her environment that she can’t remember having 
bought (Ross, 1996). An example of such a blank spell is also taken from 
Mollon (1998), which is about another patient who is in therapy, and who 
has an identity called Alicia:  
 
Some weeks later, Alicia again returned temporarily during a session. She looked 
around the room… She also looked out of the window, appearing puzzled, and 
asked what had happened to the snow. When Alicia had last appeared it had 
been winter and there was snow everywhere outside; now it was summer. She also 
remarked that the therapist had changed his clothes. Thus, in these various ways 
she was assuming the time was when she had last appeared and was oblivious to 
the changes that had taken place since then; she thought she was still in the 
room… in the middle of winter. (p.65) 
 
The blank spells may be either complete, or instead may consist of periods 
of partial recall. Also, instances of interidentity amnesia may be either 
symmetrical (i.e., “two-way”: both identities claiming amnesia for each 
other’s experiences) or asymmetrical (i.e., “one-way”: one identity claiming 
amnesia whereas the other does not) (Ellenberger, 1970; Janet, 1907; Peters, 
Uyterlinde, Consemulder, & van der Hart, 1998).  
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Interidentity amnesia is regarded a core phenomenon in DID 
(Putnam et al., 1986). Cardeña (1994) emphasized the temporal continuity, 
essential for personal identity, which memory provides. He stated that the 
memory discontinuities characteristic of DID “produce a lack of self-
integration, experienced by DID patients as the coexistence of diverse 
identities that exist more or less independently from the stream of 
consciousness and bank of memories of the presenting identity or alter” (p. 
20). The central role that interidentity amnesia plays in the diagnosis of DID 
is reflected by the large number of items about amnesia in screening and 
diagnostic instruments. For example, the DES-T, a widely used screening 
instrument for dissociative disorders (Waller, Putnam, & Carlson, 1996), 
contains the following items of a total of eight inquiring after amnesia: (1) 
Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and 
having no idea how they got there, (2 Some people have the experience of 
finding new things among their belongings that they do not remember 
buying, (3) Some people are told that they sometimes do not recognize 
friends or family members. In the Structured Clinical Interview for the 
DSM-IV Dissociative disorders (SCID-D), the most important diagnostic 
tool for the DSM-IV dissociative disorders (Steinberg, 1993), amnesia is 
indexed by the following items: (1) have you ever felt as if there were large 
gaps in your memory? (2) Have there ever been hours or days that seemed 
to be missing, or that you couldn’t account for? (3) Has there ever been a 
time in which you had difficulty remembering your daily activities? (4) Have 
you ever found yourself in a place and been unable to remember how or 
why you went there? (5) Have you ever traveled away from your home 
unexpectedly and been unable to remember your past? (6) Have you ever 
found yourself in a place away from home and been unable to remember 
who you were? (7) Have you ever been unable to remember your name, 
address, or other important personal information? Also, the interviewer has 
to score intra-interview amnesia, i.e., amnesia for previous replies during the 
interview, the purpose of talking to the interviewer, or in extreme cases, 
remembering who the interviewer is, where the patient is, or even the 
patient’s own identity. 
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Debates in the Field of Dissociation 
The concept of dissociation should not be confused with the concept of 
repression, in which material is supposed to be repressed into the 
“unconscious” where it is bound up with affective impulses and not directly 
available for consciousness. In the dissociative mind, instead of 
consciousness and unconsciousness, what is found is a distributed 
consciousness with (sometimes semi-permeable) amnesic barriers dividing 
experiences and memories (Braun, 1988; Hilgard, 1992). It is not claimed 
that memories of past events, that patients claim not to know, are lost 
forever, but that different identities each remember different aspects of 
what has happened in the patient’s life (Mollon, 2002; Putnam, 1997).  
Although most DID experts agree on the conceptual difference 
between dissociation and repression, they do not agree on the precise nature 
of the process of dissociation. Some consider dissociation to be an 
intentional act by the person, like Ross (1997), who described dissociation as 
“a little girl imagining that the abuse is happening to someone else” (p. 92; 
see also Kluft, 1991b). In contrast, dissociation sometimes is considered a 
more automatic process (see Segall, 1996). When confronted with an 
ongoing danger or threat, a dissociative mechanism is initiated to safeguard 
the individual’s psychological integrity. This more “mechanistic” view of 
dissociation is—among others—held in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994), where dissociation is described as a failure to integrate 
various aspects of identity, memory, and consciousness. In this 
conceptualization, the process of dissociation is happening to the person, 
whereas the previous conceptualization of dissociation explained by the 
citation of Ross is “agentic” in that the person is an agent imaging the abuse 
is happening to someone else (Watkins, 1996; see also Cardeña, 1996; Orne 
& Bauer-Manley, 1991; Sarbin, 1995; Van der Hart, 1996).  
Much debate also exists concerning the etiological cause of DID, that 
is, whether dissociation starts in childhood as a means of coping with severe 
physical or sexual abuse, or in adulthood with psychological needs such as 
attention-seeking as the most important motivation for behavior. The latter 
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is argued by proponents of the so-called sociocognitive model, that argues 
that DID consists of multiple role enactments used by emotionally needy 
patients, legitimized and maintained by social reinforcement (Lilienfeld et 
al., 1999; Spanos, 1994, 1996; for related accounts see Aldridge-Morris, 
1989; Hacking, 1995; Merskey, 1992, Sarbin, 1995). The model is not very 
well delineated, except that patients are thought to synthesize identity roles 
by drawing on a wide variety of sources, including the print and broadcast 
media, (unintentional) cues provided by therapists who believe in the 
childhood trauma model of DID (iatrogenesis), and observations of other 
individuals who enact multiple identities. Possibly, the idea of multiple 
identities provides patients characterized by a weak self-consolidation with a 
structure around which to organize otherwise conflicting experiences and 
feelings. Also, care-giving from significant others (therapists, friends etc.), 
elicited by the status of DID patient, may compensate for a fragile self-
esteem. The enactment of DID may form a quasi-adaptive function for 
patients. Historically, DID is considered to be a variant of a broader 
constellation of multiple identity enactments, including for example 
demonic possession and mass hysteria, that transcend societal and historical 
boundaries (Lilienfeld et al., 1999). 
Memory Systems and Memory Processes 
Before presenting ideas as to which memory systems and/or memory 
processes are supposed to be impaired in DID and explanations for 
interidentity amnesia based on cognitive memory theory, some clarification 
of terms relating to different expressions of memory, memory systems, and 
memory processes, is provided. 
Explicit and implicit memory are different expressions of memory: 
“explicit” refers to intentional or conscious recollection of past episodes, 
whereas “implicit” refers to unintentional, nonconscious use of previously 
acquired information (Schacter & Tulving, 1994). Besides the distinction 
between the explicit and implicit expression of memory, Tulving (1985, 
2002) proposed a further division in state of consciousness during retrieval, 
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namely the distinction between autonoetic, noetic, and anoetic 
consciousness. Anoetic consciousness refers to memory retrieval without 
conscious awareness. Noetic consciousness makes possible conscious 
introspective awareness, such as awareness of the meaning of retrieved 
material, but not self-awareness. The latter is specifically characteristic for 
autonoetic consciousness, which allows an individual to retrieve events with 
a subjective feeling of experiencing the events, i.e., it makes a retrieved event 
feel personal. In a recognition test, the qualitatively different states of noetic 
and autonoetic awareness accompanying the identifying of test items are 
described as either “know”, referring to noetic awareness and described to 
subjects as just eliciting a feeling of familiarity, without remembering 
specific contextual elements, and “remember”, referring to autonoetic 
awareness and described as a recognition state in which you have a 
conscious recollection of aspects of the original encounter with the 
particular item (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Gardiner & Java, 1993; 
Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Postma, 1999). 
In terms of memory systems, short-term memory is concerned with 
retention across delays of seconds and minutes, and long-term memory is 
concerned with traces that last longer. The latter can be classified into four 
underlying memory systems (Schacter & Tulving, 1994), the first of which is 
the episodic memory system, which is responsible for the remembering of 
prior episodes embedded in the context (time and place) and including self-
awareness, the experience of the self as actor in the episode. Episodic 
information relates new information to our environment and ourselves, i.e., 
representations in episodic memory carry information about the relations of 
represented events to the rememberer’s personal identity (Baddeley, 1997). 
Semantic memory, the second memory system in Schacter and Tulving’s 
(1994) classification, contains factual knowledge about the world in the 
broadest sense, without an autobiographical reference. The third memory 
system is the perceptual representation system (PRS), which operates at a 
presemantic level and plays an important role in identifying the physical 
form of words and objects. Finally, the procedural memory system is 
responsible for the acquisition of various kinds of behavioral and cognitive 
skills.  
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Memory processes, like encoding, rehearsal, activation, and retrieval, 
underlie the different memory systems and thus participate in the operations 
of more than one memory system. A distinction in memory processing that 
is often made is the distinction between data driven versus conceptually 
driven processing. These concepts are central in the so-called transfer 
appropriate theory (TAP; Bransford, Franks, Morris, & Stein, 1979; 
Roediger, 1990; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989), which proposes that 
learning will be most effectively when the processes at retrieval coincide 
with those at learning. In this approach, learning is viewed less as a process 
of accessing an earlier mnemonic record, than as the re-performance of an 
earlier act. Data driven processing involves the operation of various 
perceptual systems at a pre-conceptual level. Conceptually driven processing 
involves conceptual processing and is relatively insensitive to factors such as 
changing the presentation modality between presentation and test 
(Baddeley, 1997). 
Hypothesized Memory Impairments in DID 
A review from the literature on interidentity amnesia in DID shows that 
there is no agreement on the memory systems and/or processes that are 
supposed to be impaired in DID, with some arguing that only conscious 
memory processes are impaired whereas others claim more nonconscious 
processes are also damaged (Merckelbach, Devilly, & Rassin, 2001). Cardeña 
(2000), for example, stated that “even though conscious recollection may be 
absent, the information that cannot be recalled may still affect behavior (a 
deficit of explicit, but not of implicit, memory)” (p. 55) and “in dissociative 
amnesia, the individual loses explicit memory for personal experience, 
although implicit memory for general knowledge, skills, habits and 
conditioned responses is usually unimpaired”(p. 57). Also, the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) definition of amnesia in DID, the 
“inability to recall important personal information that is too extensive to be 
explained by ordinary forgetfulness” (p. 487) seems to pertain only to the 
episodic memory system, given it’s use of the term “recall” in the 
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description (see also Kihlstrom & Schacter, 1995; Kihlstrom, Tataryn, & 
Hoyt, 1993; Peters et al., 1998). In contrast, Spiegel, Frischholz, and Spira 
(1993) stated that amnesia between identities suggests the existence of 
distinct memory storage structures that are functionally independent of one 
another. “Episodic memory developed by one personality is often not 
accessible by another. In many cases, even implicitly stores procedural 
memory is discrete” (p. 767) (see also Nijenhuis & Van der Hart, 1999; 
Prince, 1917; Putnam, 1997).  
Sometimes, the discussion on the issue is hampered by the incorrect 
or at least slipshod use of concepts borrowed from cognitive memory 
theory without adhering to their theoretical significance in the field. This is 
illustrated by Putnam’s discussion of the following case example (1997): 
 
Carla, an electroencephalographic (EEG) technician with MPD, would suddenly 
be unable to recall how to wire up patients-a task she usually excelled at. When 
this happened, she was adept at getting other technicians to help her without 
revealing the nature of the problem. On occasion, she was forced to fake the wiring 
or to feign an asthma attack to excuse herself. She lost one job after the 
neurologist, made suspicious by the bizarre quality of the EEG, inspected the 
pattern of electrodes. (p. 83) 
 
Putnam (1997) mentioned in relation to this quote, that “fluctuations in the 
level of basic skills, in habits, and in recall of knowledge are classic forms of 
memory dysfunction in dissociative patients. Typically, dissociative patients 
describe suddenly ‘drawing a blank’ when asked to do something that they 
are familiar with. Paradoxically, it seems as if overlearned information and 
skills are especially susceptible to intermittent failures of memory 
retrieval”(pp. 82-83). In this description, it remains however unclear if 
Putnam meant that the patient’s procedural knowledge is impaired or her 
conscious recall of that knowledge.  
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Explanations from Cognitive Memory Theory 
Which cognitive memory theories are candidates for explaining the memory 
impairments reported in DID? One theory eligible for explaining the 
reported amnesia between identities in DID is context dependent learning 
and memory retrieval, the idea that what has been learned in a certain 
external and /or internal context is most expressible in that same context. 
Context-dependent memory implies that when events are represented in 
memory, contextual information is stored along with memory targets; the 
context can therefore cue memories containing that contextual information 
(Smith, 1994).  
In a classic experiment of the importance of matching external 
context for memory performance, members of a diving club learned a 
wordlist while they were either on the shore or under water. They were then 
tested for their ability to recall the words, again on shore or under water. 
Those who had learned the words under water performed better when 
tested under water and those who had learned them on shore performed 
better on shore (Godden & Baddeley, 1975). Internal states, like being 
drunk or sober, also provide context-dependent memory effects. For 
example, an alcoholic may have to get drunk to remember where he hid a 
bottle the last time he was drinking. Sober, he can’t remember (Ross, 1997). 
In DID, the temporary mood states that characterize identities, like some 
identities who are passive, dependent, guilty, and depressed and others who 
are hostile, controlling, and self-destructive (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994), have been suggested to provide the internal context that 
causes context-dependent memory effects (Braun, 1984; Freyd, 1996; Kluft, 
1984). Bower (1994) noted that identity splitting usually occurs along 
affective lines, with each identity dealing with a related set of conflicts and 
feelings. Just as the amnesia between identities in DID often is not 
symmetric, i.e., one-way amnesia, some evidence of asymmetric amnesia has 
also been found in laboratory studies with internal context changes instilled 
by drugs, medication, and alcohol, and mood changes induced by films, 
music, and thought. Studies performed by Eich, Weingartner, Stillman, and 
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Gillin (1975) and Jensen and Poulsen (1982), for example, showed that 
transfer of information is often less complete in the direction of substance 
to substance-free than in the reverse direction.  
Important to note is that mood dependent memory research has 
shown that in normal subjects, memory from one state to another seems to 
vary dramatically, according to which memory indicator is used. The 
memory indicator that shows the greatest loss, or amnesia, is free recall, in 
which no memory cues are given to the subject. Amnesia appears far less 
severe if tests are used with more cues, prompts, and reminders, like forced 
recognition. (Eich, 1995; Spiegel et al., 1993). On implicit memory measures, 
there is some recent evidence that mood dependent memory effects can also 
be found, but only on conceptually driven tasks (Eich & Forgas, 2003; 
Kihlstrom, Eich, Sandbrand, & Tobias, 2000; Ryan & Eich, 2000).  
Another theory eligible for the reported amnesia between identities in 
DID is the Headed Records (HR) model, presented by Morton (1991, 
1994). The basis of the HR model is that our memory is divided into 
discrete records, each linked to a separate heading. In a memory search, the 
first thing that happens when memory is interrogated is that a description is 
formed, which is then used to search the headings in parallel. If a match 
between description and heading is found, then the linked record is made 
available. Morton suggests that in DID, records are headed differently for 
the separate identities. If a task requires self-verification, the description 
contains a self-reference to the identity performing the search. If the 
headings of appropriate records only contain references to other identities, 
no match between description and headings is found. 
Aim and Outline of the Thesis 
In sum, although DID patients report instances of dense amnesia between 
identities, no complete cognitive memory account of the reported memory 
problems is available and experts do not agree on the memory processes 
and memory systems involved. In this thesis, the fundamental question of 
whether objective evidence for the reported interidentity amnesia in DID 
 21
 
can be found under rigorous experimental conditions is addressed. The aim 
of the thesis is to provide a systematic exploration of interidentity amnesia 
in DID for both neutral as well as trauma-related information. For that 
purpose, a large variety of different encoding and retrieval tasks will be 
discussed. In order to provide an unequivocal measure of memory 
performance, much attention is given to the use of tasks on which 
simulation of amnesia-symptoms is expected to be very difficult. To 
ascertain that simulation isn’t possible on the measures used, a control 
group instructed to simulate DID is included in all the experiments 
discussed. 
In chapter two, episodic memory transfer for neutral stimulus 
material is tested. Both tests of recall (interference-paradigm) and 
recognition are presented to establish the memory performance within as 
well as between identities. Also, the subject’s state of awareness during 
recognition is considered, which can be characterized as either remembering, 
referring to autonoetic awareness, or knowing, referring to noetic awareness. 
Chapters three and four focus on implicit memory transfer for neutral 
material in DID. Chapter three deals with priming, the benefit in accuracy 
and/or speed accrued to recently encountered stimuli (Vriezen, Moscovitch, 
& Bellos, 1995). With perceptual priming, the studied item is reinstated in 
whole or in part at test and perceptual identification is required, such as 
visual word form, auditory word form, and structural descriptions of 
objects. With conceptual priming, participants have to produce studied 
items in response to test cues that are meaningfully related to the studied 
item. In chapter four, the last chapter to deal with neutral stimulus material, 
implicit procedural memory performance is tested in a serial reaction time 
task. In chapters five and six, tasks are described in which we included 
trauma-related, i.e., sexual and physical abuse-related, material. Chapter five 
describes an episodic memory task establishing recall as well as recognition 
performance. In the last empirical chapter, an evaluative conditioning 
procedure is combined with an implicit affective priming procedure. In the 
evaluative conditioning procedure, previously neutral stimuli acquire a 
negative or positive connotation. The affective priming procedure is used to 
test the transfer of this acquired valence to an identity reporting interidentity 
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amnesia. Finally, in chapter seven, the results of the studies presented in this 
thesis will be summarized and discussed. 
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Abstract  
Interidentity amnesia is considered a hallmark of dissociative 
identity disorder (DID) in clinical practice. In this study, 
objective methods of testing episodic memory transfer 
between identities were used. Tests of both recall 
(interference-paradigm) and recognition were used. A sample 
of 31 DID patients was included. Additionally, 50 control 
subjects participated, half functioning as normal controls and 
the other half simulating interidentity amnesia. Twenty-one 
patients subjectively reported complete one-way amnesia for 
the learning episode. However, objectively, neither recall nor 
recognition scores of patients were different from those of 
normal controls. It is suggested that clinical models of 
amnesia in DID may be specified to exclude episodic 
memory impairments for emotionally neutral material. 
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Introduction  
Dissociative identity disorder (DID; formerly multiple personality disorder) 
is regarded as the most severe of the dissociative disorders and is 
characterized by the presence of two or more distinct identities or 
personality states that recurrently take control of the individual’s behavior 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed., DSM-IV; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994). A key diagnostic criterion of DID 
is amnesia, described in the DSM-IV as “the inability to recall important 
personal information that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary 
forgetfulness” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p.487). However, in 
the clinical and research literature on DID, there is disagreement whether 
amnesia in DID is a naturalistic phenomenon.  
Gleaves (1996) has summarized the views and findings of clinicians 
and clinical researchers working with DID patients under the heading of the 
posttraumatic model. In this model, dissociation is regarded as a 
compartmentalization of the personality, serving as a naturally occurring, 
protective reaction to overwhelming trauma, in which memories of 
traumatic events are stored in one or more dissociated states (Putnam, 1997; 
Ross, 1997; Spiegel & Cardeña, 1991; Van der Hart, Boon, & Op den Velde, 
1991). In a state in which patients can remember traumatic events, they have 
a prevailing affect, repertoire of behaviors, and sense of self (including 
body-image) different from a state in which they cannot remember these 
events (e.g., Putnam, 1989). The posttraumatic model therefore views the 
dissociative states as separate identities, with amnesia between these 
dissociative identities called interidentity amnesia. A longitudinal study 
spanning two decades suggested that age of onset, chronicity, and severity 
of trauma predict level of dissociation (Ogawa, Sroufe, Weinfield, Carlson, 
& Egeland, 1997). Not all dissociative identities within a patient are 
considered to be totally amnesic for each other’s (traumatic or trauma-
related) memories. Some identities experience total amnesia, some partial 
amnesia and some no amnesia at all. As noted a century ago, interidentity 
amnesia may be either symmetrical (i.e., “two-way”: both identities claiming 
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amnesia for each other’s experiences) or asymmetrical (i.e., “one-way”: one 
identity claiming amnesia and the other not; Ellenberger, 1970; Janet, 1907; 
Ludwig, Brandsma, Wilbur, Benfeldt, & Jameson, 1972). Whatever its form, 
reported amnesia implies that some dissociative identities partly or 
completely fail to voluntarily retrieve memories that other identities are able 
to retrieve. That is, at the most, dissociated memories are unavailable to 
other identities, and at the least, they are not voluntarily accessible for 
conscious awareness.  
An alternative perspective on DID is offered by the sociocognitive 
model, which regards DID to be unrelated to childhood trauma. Instead, 
role enactment is believed to be the principal feature of DID, wherein 
multiple identities are established, legitimized, maintained, and altered as a 
consequence of therapist influences, media portrayals, and sociocultural 
expectations. This role enactment is adopted by emotionally needy clients as 
a way of communicating their distress and gaining and maintaining attention 
of significant others1 (Lilienfeld et al., 1999; Spanos, 1996). With regard to 
DID patients reporting or manifesting amnesia, the sociocognitive model 
does not predict objective evidence for this phenomenon.  
In harmony with the DSM-IV definition of amnesia in DID, most 
experimental cognitive research on interidentity amnesia in DID has 
focused on episodic memory impairment. Episodic memory is the memory 
system involved in the conscious recollection of personal events (Schacter, 
1996). It is the memory system on which most patients with neurological 
damage are severely impaired (e.g., Goshen-Gottstein, Moscovitch, & Melo, 
2000; Moscovitch, 1982). All of the experimental cognitive studies of 
interidentity amnesia for episodic events to date have made use of 
emotionally neutral material, and the number of studies is very limited 
(Dick-Barnes, Nelson, & Aine, 1987; Eich, Macaulay, Loewenstein, & Dihle, 
1997; Ludwig et al, 1972; Nissen, Ross, Willingham, Mackenzie, & Schacter, 
1988; Peters, Uyterlinde, Consemulder, & Van der Hart, 1998; Silberman, 
Putnam, Weingartner, Braun, & Post, 1985; for a thorough overview, see 
                                                     
1 According to Draijer and Boon (1999), this description is not the key feature of genuine DID 
but the characteristic of some imitated DID cases who—mainly unconsciously—simulate DID. 
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Dorahy, 2001). Moreover, the studies suffer from several methodological 
drawbacks. First, in one of the studies, the patient who was tested did not 
claim amnesia between the participating identities in the first place (Dick-
Barnes et al., 1987). Second, only three studies have included more than one 
patient (Eich et al.,1997; Peters et al., 1998; Silberman et al., 1985). Third, 
with just one exception, no studies included a control group matched in 
mean age and mean years of education. Fourth, all studies but one did not 
include a control group instructed to mimic DID, a prerequisite given the 
characterization of DID by the sociocognitive model. Fifth and very 
important, the memory tests used did not always constitute objective 
measurements of memory. In the procedure followed by Eich et al. (1997) 
and Peters et al. (1998), for example, an identity claiming amnesia was 
informed that another identity had previously learned stimulus material. 
Memory was tested by asking the identity claiming amnesia to consciously 
retrieve the material learned by the other identity. Patients reported virtually 
no explicit memory. This result was taken by the authors as evidence of 
interidentity amnesia. However, we argue that the patients’ denying 
knowledge of stimulus material learned by another identity should be taken 
not as objective evidence for an episodic memory impairment in DID but 
rather as a representation of the patients’ subjective experience of amnesia. 
The only study of episodic memory in DID that did include both a 
more objective memory test and a control group instructed to simulate 
interidentity amnesia was performed by Silberman et al. (1985). In this 
study, 9 DID patients were tested in an interference paradigm in which 
recall of a given body of material is influenced by prior learning (called 
proactive interference) and subsequent learning (called retroactive interference). The 
interference paradigm provided a more objective memory task because 
simulating controls were not able to stop the interference of competing 
material learned by another “identity” and thereby unable to simulate 
interidentity amnesia. Silberman et al. concluded that overall, the 
performance of patients and controls was similar. Although it is the best 
study up to date on episodic memory functioning in DID, several 
methodological problems exist in the study by Silberman et al., of which the 
limited number of patients is one. Second,  although processes of 
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interference were the main focus of the study, it is not clear whether 
proactive and retroactive interference were active at all and to what degree 
they were both active in the study, because recall of the two lists used in the 
study was established only after both lists were learned. Furthermore, the 
procedure for patients and controls was not kept equal, with patients having 
two readings of material in one of the study conditions, which was 
incomparable to the one reading patients and controls received in other 
conditions. Finally, the formal recognition measures of sensitivity and 
response bias were not provided. Sensitivity refers to the ability to 
distinguish target items from distractor items. Response bias refers to the 
tendency to favor “yes” or “no” responses regardless of stimulus type. 
Especially in the context of investigating a disputed criterion like amnesia in 
DID, it seems important to discriminate between the actual memory 
performance measure and response bias. 
The Present Study  
In the present study, we tried to overcome many of the methodological 
drawbacks present in earlier studies of interidentity amnesia in DID. We 
included a sample of 31 DID patients reporting one-way amnesia as well as 
a normal control group (n = 25) and a control group instructed to enact the 
role of DID patient and simulate interidentity amnesia (n = 25). The 
simulating control group was included to detect the possibility of simulation 
on the memory measures used. If simulation proved impossible, the tasks 
would constitute truly objective measures of memory. If, in contrast, 
simulation proved possible, a simulation profile could be established and 
compared with the memory performance of DID patients, thereby 
evaluating the sociocognitive theory’s role-playing claim. Patients and 
control subjects were matched on gender, mean age, and mean education 
level. Patients’ subjective report of one-way amnesia was assessed twice 
during the experiment, and patients who reported any knowledge of the 
learning phase in the test phase were analyzed separately.  
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We made use of several memory tests in determining the objective 
episodic memory performance of subjects independent of patients’ 
subjective reports; in all tests, procedures were kept equal between patients 
and control subjects. An improved interference test was designed, consisting 
of two lists (A and B) made up of words from the same semantic categories, 
denoted shared categories. List A was read by one identity, after which recall 
of List A was established. Retroactive interference could thus not play a role 
in the recall of List A. Then, List B was read by a second identity claiming 
total amnesia, and again recall was determined. To assess the level of 
proactive interference of List A on recall of List B, we added an unshared 
word category to both lists as a control measure (cf. The California Verbal 
Learning Test; Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Ober, 1987). For controls, we 
hypothesized that the recall of the shared categories of List B would be 
impaired by proactive interference, that is, the tendency for words from List 
A to intrude on the recall of words from List B. The recall of the unshared 
category on List B was expected to show release from interference (i.e., 
causing no impairment in recall). Additionally, normal control subjects were 
expected to recall word intrusions from the shared categories of List A 
during recall of List B. Simulators were supposed to show a performance 
pattern equal to normal controls, because simulation of amnesia on an 
interference task is believed to be impossible (e.g., Bower, 1994). For the 
DID patients, on the other hand, a pattern of proactive interference and 
release from interference was not expected. We believed that their recall of 
the shared categories of List B would be unimpaired because the learned 
material of List A was supposed to be unavailable to the amnesic identity. 
Therefore, recall of words of List B would be equal for the shared categories 
and the unshared category. Patients were expected to recall no intrusions 
from List A during recall of List B when amnesia between identity states 
was present.  
After a 1-week interval, the amnesic identity was also tested for 
recognition and list discrimination of material learned by both identities. 
The formal measures of sensitivity and response bias were calculated for 
recognition. On the recognition test, normal control subjects were 
hypothesized to show nearly equivalent recognition for both lists. List 
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discrimination was expected to be difficult for normal controls, especially 
after a 1-week interval. We predicted that  patients, on the other hand, 
would recognize far more words from List B (learned by the same identity) 
in comparison with List A (learned by another identity). Recognition of List 
A should be next to nothing, reflecting the amnesia for this list reported by 
the identity tested. Patients were also expected to perform superiorly on list 
discrimination as compared with controls, because the test identity saw 
words only from List B and thus should easily be able to discriminate 
between words seen (List B) and words unseen (List A).  
Finally, a question was added on the state of awareness during 
recognition. According to Cardeña (2000), episodic memories may be more 
semantic in nature when retrieved by an identity that did not undergo the 
events, as if the patient had observed them rather than experienced them. 
The state of awareness can be characterized as either remembering or knowing. 
Remembering is a recollective experience based on associative, contextual 
information of the learning event. Knowing is retrieval by a feeling of 
familiarity without specific knowledge of the original event (Gardiner & 
Java, 1993; Knowlton, 1998; Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Tulving, 1985), 
resembling the impersonal recollection mentioned by Cardeña (2000). 
Because “switching” to another identity involves an internal state-shift (e.g., 
Bower, 1994), recognition of events learned by the same identity may be 
characterized more by a remember state of awareness, whereas recognition 
of events learned by another identity may evoke primarily knowing 
responses.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 118 clinicians treating dissociative disorders in the Netherlands 
and Belgium were approached to invite patients to participate. Conditions 
for participation were described as follows: (1) The DID diagnosis was 
made by the referring clinician by administration of the Structured Clinical 
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Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders (SCID-D; Boon & Draijer, 
1994; Steinberg, 1993); (2) at least one of the identities is completely 
amnesic for the events experienced by the other participating identity during 
the experiment; (3) identities are able to perform the tasks without 
interference of other identities; (4) they are able to perform the tasks 
without spontaneous switches to other identities; and (5) they are all able to 
switch between identities on request. In the Netherlands, the SCID-D was 
validated by Boon and Draijer (1993). The interrater reliability in their 
sample—as expressed in kappa—was .96 for presence versus absence of a 
dissociative disorder and .70 for type of dissociative disorder. Ten 
approached clinicians did not respond or stated they had no time or did not 
want to participate. Fifty-one clinicians stated they had no DID patients in 
treatment. Of the 57 clinicians that did have one or more DID patients, 8 
stated patients were not able to switch between identities upon request, and 
5 judged participation would interfere with treatment. Forty-four clinicians 
did ask one or more patient to participate2, of which 17 found their patients 
(25 in total) unwilling to participate. Eventually, 27 clinicians provided one 
or more patient (31 patients in total) willing to participate. The mean 
number of years since diagnosis of DID for patients was 4.42 years (range = 
3 months to 11 years), and DID was always the main reason for patients to 
be in treatment. Patients were informed that the aim of the study was to 
understand more about the memory problems often reported by patients 
with DID. They self-selected two identities that would participate in the 
experiment. 
In addition, 50 female nonpsychiatric control subjects participated. 
They were university staff and community volunteers and received a small 
payment. They did not report any relevant memory, visual, or attentional 
problems or psychiatric disorders; all were Caucasian. Control subjects were 
assigned randomly to either the control group or the simulating group. 
Groups were matched on age (M = 37.71, SD = 8.41 for patients [n = 21]; 
M = 37.72, SD = 11.29 for normal controls; and M = 32.48, SD = 10.31 for 
                                                     
2 We excluded 2 male patients from participation because we felt the benefit of including them 
did not outweigh the work of gathering additional male control groups. 
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simulators) and education3 (M = 5.67, SD = 0.80 for patients (n = 21); M = 
5.88, SD = 1.13 for normal controls; and M = 5.84, SD = 1.14 for 
simulators). Subjects in the simulating group were instructed to mimic DID. 
They were shown a documentary about a DID patient and were given 
additional written information about DID. They were subsequently asked to 
make up an imaginary, amnesic identity and come up with detailed 
characteristics of this identity. Following Silberman et al.’s (1985) procedure, 
they were given a 17-item data sheet for the identity on which they were 
asked to assign name, age, gender, physical description, personal history, and 
personality style. Examination of the completed data sheets confirmed that 
subjects had spent considerable effort inventing an identity. Finally, they 
were asked to practice during the week preceding the test in switching to 
their “identity” and taking on its state of mind. Subjects in the normal 
control group were told only that they would participate in a memory 
experiment. No information was provided on the DID-related aspects of 
the study. 
All control subjects completed both the Dissociative Experiences 
Scale (DES; Carlson & Putnam, 1993) and the Creative Experience 
Questionnaire (CEQ; Merckelbach, Rassin, and Muris, 2000). The DES is a 
28-item self-report questionnaire with scores ranging from 0 to 100. Scores 
above 20, or more conservatively, above 30 are thought to be indicative of 
pathological dissociation (Carlson & Putnam, 1993). The CEQ is a Dutch 
25-item self-report questionnaire with scores ranging from 0 to 25. Scores 
are thought to be indicative of “fantasy proneness”, that is, the inclination 
to be immersed in daydreams and fantasies. The normal control group (M = 
6.31, SD = 4.10) and the simulating control group (M = 6.54, SD = 3.93) 
did not differ significantly on the DES, t(48) = -.21, p = .837, d = .059. The  
normal control group (M = 5.48, SD = 3.24) and the simulating control 
group (M = 4.20, SD = 2.58) also did not differ significantly on the CEQ, 
t(48) = 1.54, p = .129, d = .437. Subjects did not show a pathological level of 
dissociation as measured by the DES. Written informed consent was 
obtained from patients as well as all control subjects prior to participation.  
                                                     
3 Education was assessed in categories ranging from 1(low) to 7 (high) (Verhage, 1964). 
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Materials 
Two word lists (A and B) were constructed. List A contained 8 names of 
vegetables, 8 names of animals, and 8 names of flowers. List B contained 8 
new names of vegetables, 8 new names of animals, and 8 names of pieces of 
furniture. Therefore, the lists shared the categories animals and vegetables, 
but they did not share the categories flowers (List A)  and furniture (List B). 
Additionally, a recognition list was developed including all the words from 
Lists A and B and an equal number of distractor words (new words from 
the same semantic categories), adding up to 96 words.  
Word lists were matched as closely as possible with respect to mean 
frequency of occurrence per million (range from 0 to 284) and mean 
number of letters per word (range from 3 to 12; CELEX, 1990). 
Furthermore, to ensure that subjects’ differences in recall could not be due 
to differences in list difficulty, we performed a pilot study. In this study, 32 
psychology students served as subjects (mean age = 21.41 years, SD = 2.99). 
Students were randomly assigned to one of two groups, and list order (AB 
or BA) was counterbalanced. The study revealed no differences in recall 
between list orders AB and BA, F(1, 33) = 1.54, p = .223, η2 = .045.  
 
Procedure 
The study was part of a larger investigation on memory (dis)abilities in DID. 
The present study consisted of two sessions separated by 1 week (Table 1). 
In Session 1, the 24 words of List A were presented to the patient’s Identity 
1 in random order on a computer screen for 2 s with a 2-s interval. Subjects 
were told that they should try to encode the words to the best of their ability 
in order to recall them subsequently. Following the presentation, subjects 
were tested for free recall of the studied words (Trial 1). Subsequently, the 
presentation and free recall test of List A were repeated twice, with the 
subject instructed to encode more words each successive time (Trials 2 and 
3).  
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Table 1. Procedure Followed by Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) 
Patients, Controls, and Simulators 
Session DID patients Controls Simulators 
Session 1:    
Recall List A 
 
   
Trial 1 identity 1 normal 
identity 
normal identity 
 
 
Trial 2 identity 1 normal 
identity 
normal identity 
 
 
Trial 3 identity 1 normal 
identity 
normal identity 
Recall List B 
 
   
Trial 1 amnesic identity 2 normal 
identity 
simulated amnesic 
identity 
 
Trial 2 amnesic identity 2 normal 
identity 
simulated amnesic 
identity 
 
Trial 3 amnesic identity 2 normal 
identity 
simulated amnesic 
identity 
Session 2:    
Recognition 
 
amnesic identity 2 normal 
identity 
simulated amnesic 
identity 
 
Remember/know 
 
amnesic identity 2 normal 
identity 
simulated amnesic 
identity 
 
List discrimination 
 
amnesic identity 2 normal 
identity 
simulated amnesic 
identity 
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After this, patients were requested to switch to the amnesic identity (Identity 
2). The switching process was supervised either by their own clinician or by 
one of the authors (R.H. or O.V.). The switching process was always 
accomplished in less than 2 min. When the presence of Identity 2 was 
confirmed by the patient, this identity was directly asked whether and what 
she knew of the learning phase and the material Identity 1 had seen. Patients 
answered with either “yes” or “no”. If they answered with “yes”, they were 
asked what they knew (e.g., instructions, stimulus material) and whether they 
knew either “directly” by coconsciousness or “indirectly” by way of other 
participating identities. Then, the words of List B were presented to Identity 
2 three times in the same way as in Trial 1, and the subject was tested for 
free recall after each presentation. List A was presented repeatedly (three 
times) because this increases proactive interference. List B was presented 
repeatedly to ensure equal procedures for both lists. 
After 1 week, Session 2 took place in which Identity 2 was tested for 
recognition. Because of physical illness, 5 subjects were tested after a longer 
interval: 1 patient after 9 days, 1 control subject after 8 and 1 after 14 days, 
and 1 simulating control subject after 10 and 1 after 12 days. The 
recognition test had not been announced in Session 1. The words of the 
recognition list were presented one at a time and the patients had to state 
whether they recognized the words as old (i.e., from Session 1). If they 
recognized a word, they additionally had to state whether their recognition 
was a remember or a know recognition. Subjects received extensive 
instructions about the remember and know responses resembling 
instructions described by Gardiner (1988; see also Gardiner & Parkin, 1990). 
Remember responses were described as recognition states in which one has 
a conscious recollection of some aspect of the original encounter with the 
particular item. Know responses just elicit a feeling of familiarity, without, 
however, remembering specific contextual elements (Postma, 1999). 
After completion of the recognition test for all the words, list 
discrimination was determined. Identity 2 was informed that Identity 1 had 
seen a different word list called List A. It was not mentioned that List A 
included a different, unshared category. Then Identity 2 was told that she 
would now see a new set of words and that each word had originated from 
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either her own List B or from List A, seen by Identity 1. Patients were asked 
to state for each word whether it had originated from their own List B. It 
was explained that if they had not seen the word, it had originated from List 
A. However, the set of words that patients saw actually was not a new set of 
words from List A and B but rather the words patients previously had 
“recognized” (both correctly and incorrectly). 
Subjects in the simulating control group learned and were tested for 
List A while being in their normal identity state and List B after having 
switched to their imagined “amnesic” identity. The recognition test also had 
to be performed by this imagined identity. Before “switching” to their other 
identity, they were instructed to pretend that they did not know their normal 
identity had seen a list called A and so they had no remembrance of the 
words and no practice in remembering. Subsequently, they were given 2 min 
to take on the other identity’s state of mind.  
Subjects in the control group performed the task without switching. 
Instead, they had a 2-min break to keep the length of procedures equal 
between groups.  
 
Measures and Statistical Analysis 
Recall. To assess the development of proactive interference, we 
contrasted the number of recalled shared category words on Trial 1 of List 
A with the number of recalled shared category words on Trial 1 of List B. 
We established release from interference by comparing the number of 
words from unshared categories from the first trials of both lists; when List 
B was recalled equivalently to or better than List A, release was present. 
Instead of raw word count, a weighted average of shared and unshared 
category members was computed for Trial 1 of List A according to the 
method suggested by Kramer and Delis (1991). A second measure was the 
number of word intrusions from the shared categories of List A into the 
recall of shared categories of List B (Trials 1, 2 and 3). 
Recognition. First and most interesting for the claim of interidentity 
amnesia, list-dependent recognition hit rates were determined for List A and 
List B. Furthermore, to gain an impression of the general performance of 
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the subjects, overall recognition hit rate (i.e., for both lists together), false 
alarm rate, sensitivity, and response bias were determined. The measures of 
sensitivity and response bias were calculated from z scores, as described by 
MacMillan and Creelman (1991). Sensitivity is expressed in the measure of d’ 
and includes the number of old words recognized as old while correcting for 
the number of distractor words falsely recognized. Response bias is 
expressed in the measure of C and refers to the tendency to favor “old” or 
“new” responses. 
List Discrimination. The List discrimination hit rate was calculated as 
the number of words correctly assigned to List A and List B divided by the 
number of ‘old’ words recognized correctly. Response bias was determined 
as the List A hit rate divided by the List B hit rate. 
Remember and Know Responses. The remember and know rate for each 
list was determined by the number of words correctly recognized as 
originating from that list that was assigned either a remember or know 
quality. 
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. All multiple-
comparison procedures described were Tukey’s honestly significantly 
difference (HSD) tests. 
Results 
Of the 31 DID patients tested, 8 subjectively reported knowledge of some 
sort of the learning phase after their switch to Identity 2. Some patients 
reported knowledge as a result of  co-consciousness: the simultaneous presence 
of both Identity 1 and Identity 2 during the learning episode. Other patients 
reported knowledge by way of a third identity. Data of these patients were 
analyzed separately. Data of 2 additional patients were not included because 
emotional problems unrelated to the study interfered with the testing. The 
results described here therefore pertain to the 21 patients who subjectively 
reported complete one-way amnesia for the learning phase including the 
words presented in List A. Recognition data of 1 patient were missing owing 
to errors in the experimental software. Discrimination bias of one control 
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participant could not be calculated because her List B hit rate was 0. The 
power of F tests to detect medium effect sizes (given a mean sample size of 
24) is .45 (dfb = 2) (Cohen, 1988). 
 
Recall 
Recall mean scores are shown in Table 2. We analyzed the pattern of 
proactive interference and release from interference using repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with list (List A, Trial 1 vs. List B, 
Trial 1) and category (shared vs. unshared) as within-subjects factors and 
diagnosis (patients, controls, or simulators) as between-subjects factor. Of 
central interest are the two-way interaction List x Category, which reflects 
the existence of a proactive interference/release from interference pattern, 
and the three-way interaction List x Category x Diagnosis, which reflects the 
difference in pattern between the diagnosis groups. Results indicated that 
the List x Category interaction was significant, F(1 ,68)  =  42.82, p < .001, 
η2 = .386,  whereas the List x Category x Diagnosis interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 68) = 0.20, p = .818, η2 = .006. In other words, the pattern 
of proactive interference for shared categories and release from interference 
for unshared categories was found for both control groups and patients. 
Patients thus did not show the expected absence of proactive interference. 
A main effect of diagnosis was observed,  F(2, 68) = 8.42, p = .001, η2 = 
.199. Multiple-comparison procedures showed that patients (M = 3.65, SE 
= 0.22) demonstrated a significantly overall lower recall than controls (M = 
4.86, SE = 0.20)  and simulators (M = 4.42, SE = 0.20), p < .001 and p = 
.030, respectively. Simulators did not differ significantly from normal 
controls on overall performance, p = .279. 
Patients did recall intrusions from List A from the shared categories 
during all trials of recall of List B, and a corresponding ANOVA showed 
that their mean sum of intrusions did not differ significantly from normal 
controls and simulators (M = 0.57, SD = 0.81, for patients; M = 0.80, SD = 
1.26, for normal controls; M = 1.04, SD = 1.34, for simulators, F(2, 68) = 
0.91, p = .408, η2 = .026. 
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Table 2. List-Dependent Recall for Shared and Unshared Categories for  
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) Patients (n = 21), Controls (n = 25), 
and Simulators (n = 25) 
 
Recall score 
DID 
patients 
Controls Simulators 
List A weighted scores on Trial 1    
Shared categories 3.90 (0.84) 4.64 (1.12) 4.66 (1.12) 
Unshared category 3.82 (1.05) 4.84 (1.09) 4.60 (1.22) 
    
List B raw scores on Trial 1    
Shared categories 2.93 (1.40) 4.18 (1.22) 3.66 (1.40) 
Unshared category 3.95 (1.56) 5.76 (1.30) 4.76 (1.36) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
Recognition 
All recognition memory scores are shown in Table 3. The most important 
finding in the list-dependent hit rates was that the patients’ List A 
recognition hit rate was not 0, as would be expected if patients were 
completely amnesic. They recognized a considerable number of words 
(50%) from the list learned by another identity. A repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed a significant increase in list-dependent hit rate from List 
A (M = 0.70, SE = 0.02) to List B (M = 0.80, SE = 0.02) for all subjects, 
F(1, 67) = 16.98, p <.001, η2 = .202. However, this is not surprising, because 
List B was the list most recently learned. More important, the increase did 
not differ significantly between groups, F(2, 67) = 2.16, p = .123, η2 = .061. 
A significant difference between groups would have been expected if 
patients were to have a significantly lower score on hit rate for List A than 
on List B in comparison with other groups. 
Diagnosis groups differed significantly on overall sensitivity, F(2, 67) 
= 24.93, p < .001, η2 = .427, and overall response bias, F(2, 67) = 19.49, p < 
.001, η2 = .368. Multiple-comparison procedures revealed that patients 
scored significantly lower on overall sensitivity than normal control groups 
 45
 
(p < .001). Simulators scored significantly lower on overall sensitivity than 
normal controls (p < .001). Patients and simulators did not differ 
significantly (p = 179). Thus, overall recognition scores of both patients and 
simulators were significantly lower than those of normal controls. Patients 
also scored significantly higher on overall response bias in comparison with 
normal controls, so they were overall more conservative, that is, less 
inclined to recognize words (p < .001). Simulators scored significantly lower 
on response bias in comparison with patients, so they were significantly 
more liberal (p = .026). In comparison with normal controls, they were 
significantly more conservative (p = .001).  
 
Table 3. Overall and List-Dependent Recognition and List Discrimination 
for  Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) Patients (n = 20), Controls (n = 
25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
 DID patients Controls Simulators 
List-dependent recognition    
Hit rate List A .50 (.26) .91 (.10) .69 (.23) 
Hit rate List B .65 (.25) .94 (.07) .80 (.15) 
    
Overall recognition    
Hit rate .57 (.22) .92 (.08) .74 (.15) 
False alarm rate .14 (.12) .22 (.12) .18 (.12) 
Sensitivity 1.45 (0.49) 2.40 (0.47) 1.70 (0.47) 
Response bias 0.49 (0.56) -0.35 (0.39) 0.13 (0.41) 
    
List discriminability    
Hit rate .63 (.10) .66 (.12) .64 (.12) 
Response bias 0.58 (0.52) 0.91 (0.26) 0.60 (0.34) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
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List Discrimination 
In contrast to the hypothesis of patient superiority in list discrimination, an 
ANOVA on list discrimination hit rate revealed that diagnosis groups did 
not differ significantly, F(2, 67) = 0.60,  p = .549, η2 = .018. Patients were 
thus not better able to discriminate between words seen by their own 
identity and words seen by the other identity. 
The discrimination response bias is smaller than 1 for all diagnosis 
groups, reflecting an inclination to assign words to List B. This is not 
surprising, since List B was the last list to learn. An ANOVA did show a 
significant diagnosis main effect, F(2, 66) = 5.42, p = .007, η2 = .141. 
Control participants scored significantly higher compared to patients, p = 
.015, and simulators, p = .018. Patients did not differ significantly from 
simulators, p = .969. The lower score of patients and simulators indicates 
their inclination to assign more words to List B compared to controls. 
Combining the recognition and discrimination results, we conclude 
that patients did not show a superior list discrimination performance. 
Furthermore, although patients as well as simulating controls did recognize 
words from List A, they assigned them relatively less to List A. Instead, they 
assigned them to the list they had seen as the same identity, List B.  
 
Remember and Know Responses 
The mean remember and know response rates (with standard deviations in 
parentheses) for List A were Mremember = .19 (.20), .38 (.22), .28 (.19); Mknow 
= .30 (.19), .53 (.23), .41 (.26) for patients, normal controls, and simulators, 
respectively. Mean response rates for List B were Mremember = .37 (.25), .44 
(.27), .42 (.24); Mknow = .28 (.22), .50 (.27), .38 (.24) for patients, normal 
controls, and simulators, respectively. Normal controls characterized their 
recognitions from both lists more as know responses. In contrast, both 
patients and simulators characterized their recognitions from their own list 
(List B) more as remember responses, whereas they characterized their 
recognitions from the list learned by the other identity (List A) more as 
know responses. This difference, however, reflected in the three-way 
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interaction List x Diagnosis x Quality (remember vs. know), proved not 
significant, F(2, 67) = 0.87, p = .423, η2 = .025, whereas the two-way 
interaction List x Quality did prove significant, F(1, 67) = 19.43, p < .001, η2 
= .225, reflecting the decreased remember responses on List A (M = 0.28, 
SE = 0.02) compared with the know responses on List A (M = 0.41, SE = 
0.03), and the remember (M = 0.41, SE = 0.03) and know (M = 0.39, SE = 
0.03) responses on List B. The interaction Diagnosis x Quality proved not 
significant, F(2, 67) = 0.32, p = .725, η2 = .010. The main effect of quality 
also proved not significant, F(1, 67) = 1.23, p = .271, η2 = .018. We thus did 
not find a significant difference between diagnosis groups in remember and 
know responses for information learned in the same versus other identity. 
 All analyses described were also performed including the 8 patients 
who reported some knowledge of the learning episode. These analyses 
yielded equivalent results. 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to assess the transfer of episodic, neutral 
information between identities in DID. When directly asked to recall the 
learning episode of another participating identity, 21 patients subjectively 
reported complete one-way amnesia for this episode. However, more formal 
testing showed no objective evidence for this reported amnesia. The 
proactive interference/release from interference pattern, mean intrusions, 
and the list-dependent recognition hit rates of patients all were not 
significantly different from those of normal controls matched on age and 
education. Also, patients did not perform superiorly in list discrimination. 
Moreover, we found  no significant differences in remember and know 
responses in recognition of List A and List B. This indicates that patients 
did not use qualitatively different ways of retrieving material learned in 
another identity versus material learned in the same identity. Our results 
contrast with the reasoning of Eich et al. (1997) and Peters et al. (1998), 
who claimed that amnesic barriers between identities do show up in explicit 
memory tests using neutral material. However, we wish to emphasize that 
 48 
the memory measures used in the studies by Eich et al. and Peters et al. 
should be taken primarily as a representation of the patients’ subjective 
report of interidentity amnesia, whereas the measures used in this study 
index objective memory performance. Interestingly, our findings are in 
harmony with those of Silberman et al. (1985), the only study to date that 
has included more objective memory measures. 
It is debatable precisely what memory systems are involved in the 
performance of the tasks we used. With regard to the interference task, it 
may be argued that this should be considered to be a task showing implicit 
transfer of explicit material instead of a pure task of explicit recall. The 
recognition task, however, is a clear measure of explicit recognition, 
requiring conscious recognition of previously studied words. Most 
important, regardless of the precise nature of the memory tasks, there was 
no indication of noticeable amnesia between identities.  
Although our findings do not support the hypothesis generated by 
the posttraumatic model—that is, the inability of a dissociated identity to 
voluntarily retrieve memories learned by another identity—they are more 
concordant with that of the sociocognitive model, which states that no 
objective evidence for interidentity amnesia in DID is to be expected. 
However, although our results are in harmony with the sociocognitive 
model’s specific hypothesis about the absence of interidentity amnesia in 
DID, the crucial claim of DID as a role-enactment syndrome indigenous to 
the sociocognitive model cannot be inferred from our findings. We included 
simulating control subjects who received detailed instruction on how to 
enact the role of DID patient and how to feign interidentity amnesia. 
Despite this instruction, they proved unable to simulate interidentity 
amnesia. This demonstrates that the tasks in this study were malingering-
proof. Therefore, it cannot be concluded whether patients were or were not 
simulating interidentity amnesia. 
What we did find was that DID patients showed a reduced general 
capacity to recall and recognize previously learned words in comparison 
with controls. Simulating controls also showed a reduced overall 
performance on recognition, that is, in their imagined identity. Finally, both 
simulators and patients showed a more conservative List A discrimination 
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response bias than controls, which indicates that although they did 
recognize words from the list learned by another identity, they rarely 
assigned them to that list. Instead, they assigned these words to their own 
list.  
The performance of simulators parallels some of the findings of 
Silberman et al (1985), in which simulators showed deteriorated 
performance when learning was done by different “identities” compared 
with when it was done without switching. The reduced performance of 
simulators may be the result of simultaneously having to perform the 
memory task and the role playing, which also uses up cognitive resources. 
For patients, the issue of comorbidity must be taken into account in 
explaining their overall reduced performance. Baddeley, Wilson, and Watts 
(1995) suggested both depressed and anxious patients have diminished 
processing resources available for memory tasks as a result of their 
emotional preoccupation. In the present study, we had no information 
about comorbidity. However, the diagnostic categories of both depression 
and anxiety are often diagnosed comorbid disorders in DID (Boon & 
Draijer, 1993; Kluft, 1996). Second, the reduced overall memory 
performance of patients may also be due to specific medication treatments, 
on which we also had no sample information. Data on both comorbidity 
and medication treatment should thus be gathered in future studies.  
It should also be noted that in this study, the establishment of 
psychiatric, memory, visual, and attentional problems in our control group 
was based solely on self-report. Also, the study staff didn not confirm the 
patients’ diagnoses, and interrrater reliability for administrating the SCID-D 
was not determined for the current sample. Most importantly, even the 31 
patients included in this study gave us only adequate power to detect large 
differences: Future studies ideally should include large patient samples. 
Furthermore, our sample constituted a subsample of DID patients, possibly 
limiting the generalizability of our findings. Patients were all in therapy for a 
longer period (a mean period of more than 4 years) and had to meet specific 
entrance criteria (i.e., identities were able to perform the tasks without 
interference of other identities, they were able to perform the tasks without 
spontaneous switches to other identities, and they were all able to switch 
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between the participating identities upon request). Also, not all identities of 
a patient were tested. Finally, the inclusion of a DID control group not 
switching between identities would aid in the interpretation of the patients’ 
reduced performance on overall recall and recognition. 
In sum, this study shows that reports of interidentity amnesia, 
although possibly reflecting the patient’s subjective experience, should not 
be taken as evidence for objective episodic memory impairment for neutral 
material. Although the subjective experience of patients is always an 
important starting point for therapeutic treatment, more attention may be 
given to the insight patients seem to lack in the nature of their memory 
complaints. The specific prediction of the posttraumatic model of 
interidentity amnesia was not supported by formal memory testing, 
indicating that, at least, the model should be specified to exclude episodic 
impairments for neutral material. However, the model emphasizes the 
traumatic origins of the symptoms of DID and the function of 
compartmentalization of memories as a coping mechanism to deal with 
traumatic experiences (Nijenhuis & Van der Hart, 1999). This study, as well 
as previous experimental studies of interidentity amnesia in DID, does not 
deny or confirm the reality of traumatic experiences of DID patients, and as 
yet, it cannot be concluded from the present experimental studies that DID 
patients do not suffer amnesia for emotional material or trauma-related 
material. Future studies should combine an emphasis on objective memory 
testing with the use of material more closely related to reported trauma of 
DID patients.  
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Perceptual and Conceptual Priming in 
Patients with Dissociative Identity 
Disorder 
Abstract  
The present study examined implicit memory transfer in 
patients with dissociative identity disorder (DID). To 
determine priming impairments in DID, we included both 
several perceptual priming tasks and a conceptual priming 
task using neutral material. We tested a large sample of DID 
patients (n = 31), in addition to 25 controls and 25 DID 
simulators, comparable on gender, age, and education. 
Controls replicated conceptual priming results of Vriezen, 
Moscovitch, and Bellos (1995) by showing that conceptual 
priming seems to require the formation of domain-specific 
semantic representations, denoting either sensory or 
functional object attributes. We extended a study performed 
by Schacter, Cooper, and Delaney (1990) by demonstrating 
priming for impossible objects by using the sensitive priming 
index of response times. The simulators in the study were 
not able to simulate interidentity amnesia on the implicit 
memory tasks employed. Partly in contrast to participants in 
previous studies, DID patients showed evidence of 
perceptual priming as well as conceptual priming comparable 
to that of controls. DID patients thus displayed normal 
implicit memory performance.  
 
 
Huntjens, R. J. C., Postma, A., Hamaker, E. L., Woertman, L., Van der Hart, 
O., & Peters, M. (2002). Memory & Cognition, 30, 1033-1043.  
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Introduction 
Dissociative identity disorder (DID; formerly multiple personality disorder) 
is the most severe form of the dissociative disorders and is considered to be 
a pathological reaction to overwhelming, chronic childhood trauma (Spiegel 
& Cardeña, 1991). In particular, sexual and physical abuse in association 
with emotional neglect in the first years of life have been found to correlate 
with dissociative symptoms in adulthood (Chu & Dill, 1991; Draijer & 
Langeland, 1999). DID is characterized by the presence of several distinct 
personality states, each of whom may be experienced as if it has a distinct 
personal history, self-image, and identity, including a separate name. In a 
review of 100 cases, Putnam, Guroff, Silberman, Barban, and Post (1986) 
reported a mode of three personality states or identities per patient. At least 
two identities recurrently take control of the person’s behavior (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994).  
Episodes of interidentity amnesia, in which one identity claims 
amnesia for events experienced by other identities, are reported in 95% – 
100% of DID patients (Boon & Draijer, 1993; Coons, Bowman, & Milstein, 
1988; Putnam et al., 1986; Ross et al., 1990; for a review see Gleaves, May, 
& Cardeña, 2001). Several experimental studies have been performed on 
interidentity amnesia in DID (for reviews see Dorahy, 2001; Peters, 
Uyterlinde, Consemulder, & Van der Hart, 1998), most of them focusing on 
alleged explicit memory impairments. In addition, clinical accounts have 
reported a lack of implicit memory transfer in DID, which is the expression 
of information without conscious or deliberate recollection (Schacter, 1987). 
Putnam (1995), for example, considers “fluctuations in skills, habits, and 
implicit knowledge” to be very common in DID (p. 593). These reports of 
implicit memory impairments contrast with the normal implicit memory 
performance usually found in brain-damaged amnesic patients  (e.g., 
Roediger, 1990; Shimamura, 1986). 
The procedure for testing implicit memory performance is as follows. 
In the study phase, a participant is shown a set of stimuli. In the subsequent 
test phase, the participant is tested for implicit transfer of that material. 
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Positive priming is the facilitation or change in speed or accuracy with 
which participants perform a task using recently studied stimuli in 
comparison with unstudied stimuli (e.g., Schacter, 1987; Shimamura, 1986; 
Squire, 1986). With perceptual priming tasks, such as word fragment 
completion, the study material is reinstated in whole or in part in the test 
phase, and perceptual identification of the target or some aspect of it is 
required. With conceptual priming tasks, such as category generation, 
participants produce the studied item in response to test cues that are 
meaningfully or conceptually related to the studied item. According to the 
memory systems view, the two types of priming are mediated by different 
memory systems—that is, perceptual priming by the perceptual 
representation system (PRS) and conceptual priming by the semantic 
memory system (Schacter & Tulving, 1994). According to the memory 
processing view, priming is based on the principle of transfer-appropriate 
processing—the overlap between study and test processing operations as 
either both data driven or both conceptually driven (Roediger, Weldon, & 
Challis, 1989). Combining and extending the memory system view and the 
memory processing view, Vriezen, Moscovitch, and Bellos (1995) have 
suggested that perceptual and conceptual priming may be linked to different 
sequential stages in information processing; that is, perceptual identification 
is followed by semantic analysis. Priming occurs only when study and test 
involve at least the same sequential stage of processing. Conceptual 
encoding of the stimulus material thus does enhance priming on a 
perceptual priming task, whereas perceptual encoding does not enhance 
priming on a conceptual priming task.  
In DID, to our knowledge, only five experimental studies have 
examined implicit memory transfer between identities (Dick-Barnes, 
Nelson, & Aine, 1987; Eich, Macaulay, Loewenstein, & Dihle, 1997a, 1997b; 
Nissen, Ross, Willingham, Mackenzie, & Schacter, 1988; Peters et al., 1998). 
These studies have obtained mixed results, which Nissen et al. and Eich et 
al. (1997b) have explained in terms of the influence of what they called 
identity-specific factors at the time of encoding and retrieval—that is, the 
identity-specific interpretation of material during encoding and the identity-
specific selection of responses during retrieval. In terms of the identity-
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specific interpretation of material during encoding, evidence of amnesia in 
DID was obtained on conceptually driven tasks that make use of 
semantically rich materials that might be interpreted in different ways by 
different identities. In contrast, evidence of transfer between identities was 
obtained on data driven tasks, because this type of encoding leaves little 
room for identity-specific interpretation. In terms of identity-specific 
selection of responses during retrieval, transfer of information was obtained 
on tasks allowing for only a single response on each trial, like word 
fragments (e.g., a—a—in, which can only be completed to form the word 
assassin). Evidence of amnesia was obtained on tasks allowing a wide range 
of responses (i.e., word stems that could be completed to form 10 or more 
words) whose selection could vary from one identity to the next. 
One serious shortcoming of the previous studies of implicit memory 
in DID is that they have tested a very limited number of patients. Two were 
single-case studies (Dick-Barnes et al., 1987; Nissen et al., 1988), one study 
included 4 patients (Peters et al., 1998), one included 7 patients (Eich et al., 
1997a), and one included 9 patients (Eich et al., 1997b). Moreover, only two 
studies have included control participants: Peters et al. used normal controls, 
whereas Eich et al. (1997a) included controls instructed to simulate DID. 
The inclusion of simulators is important given that the so-called 
sociocognitive model considers DID to be a syndrome of role enactment 
adopted by emotionally needy clients as a way of communicating their 
distress and gaining and maintaining the attention of therapists and others 
(Lilienfeld et al., 1999; Spanos, 1996).  
The goal of the present study was to systematically test interidentity 
implicit memory transfer in DID while overcoming some of the 
methodological drawbacks of previous studies. We included a larger sample 
of female DID patients (n = 31) as well as a normal control group 
comparable on gender, mean age, and education level (n = 25). We made 
use of indirect memory tasks on which we expected malingering to be very 
difficult—through the use of speeded priming tasks and a 1-week interval 
between the encoding and retrieval phases in one task. Moreover, to ensure 
that malingering was not possible on the tasks employed, we included a 
control group instructed to simulate DID (n = 25). Following Silberman, 
 59
 
Putnam, Weingartner, Braun, and Post (1985), the DID simulators were 
asked to make up an imaginary, “amnesic” identity and to “switch” upon 
request to this amnesic identity during the experiment. Also, they were given 
informative instructions about how to simulate interidentity amnesia in the 
memory tasks used.  
Three implicit memory tasks were included to examine the 
explanation of implicit memory performance in DID suggested by Eich et 
al. (1997b) and Nissen et al. (1988). The influence of identity-specific 
interpretation of material during encoding was tested by contrasting a task 
using perceptual encoding with a task using conceptual encoding. The 
influence of identity-specific selection of responses during retrieval was 
tested in a task using perceptual encoding, contrasting trials with only 1 
possible response in the retrieval phase with trials with 10 or more possible 
responses in the retrieval phase.  
To explore perceptual priming in DID, we included a task 
determining priming of novel, visual objects. The task uses three-
dimensional drawings that depict unfamiliar structures (for an example, see 
Schacter, Cooper, & Valdiserri, 1992). Some of the drawings are structurally 
possible objects that can exist in the three-dimensional world. The others 
are impossible objects whose surfaces and edges contain ambiguities and 
inconsistencies that would prohibit them from existing as actual three-
dimensional objects. Participants first performed a study phase that is 
considered to promote encoding of the three-dimensional object structure. 
In the test phase, they were given an indirect memory test, in which studied 
and unstudied objects were flashed briefly on the screen, and the 
participants’ task was to decide whether each object was possible or 
impossible. Priming effects in the object decision task are thought to 
depend on a subsystem of the perceptual representation system, the so-
called structural-description memory system (Schacter & Tulving, 1994). A 
structural description of an object refers to the mental representation of 
relations among components of an object that specifies its global or three-
dimensional form and structure in contrast to local or two-dimensional 
object features. Performance on the object decision task is facilitated by 
access to structural descriptions of target objects. Therefore, if a study task 
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promotes the acquisition of a three-dimensional structural description of a 
target object, the availability of such knowledge at the time of test facilitates 
object decision performance. Priming, indicated by an increased proportion 
of accurate object decisions for studied objects in comparison with 
unstudied objects, has been observed only for possible objects and not for 
impossible objects, because participants are thought to have some 
difficulties forming mental images of structural impossibility (Cooper, 
Schacter, Ballesteros, & Moore, 1992; Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990; 
Schacter, Cooper, Delaney, Peterson, & Tharan, 1991).  
Conceptual priming was measured by a semantic classification 
procedure (see Vriezen et al., 1995, Experiments 1 and 6). Semantic memory 
contains factual information—both concrete and abstract—about the world 
in the broadest sense, without an autobiographical reference (Schacter & 
Tulving, 1994). Semantic domain-specific impairments have been observed 
in brain-damaged patients for either sensory or functional attributes of 
objects (Damasio, 1990; Patterson & Hodges, 1995; Warrington & Shallice, 
1984). Sensory attributes describe physical (mainly visual) properties of an 
object such as color or shape. Functional attributes describe the function of 
an object—for example, the function of a wheelbarrow as an object used by 
people to carry material (Schacter, 1996). The task we used involves 
classifying visually presented words as quickly as possible with respect to 
some specified criterion. Priming is observed across different semantic 
classification tasks only if the study and test phases require access to 
information of the same semantic attributes—that is, either of sensory 
attributes or of functional attributes (Vriezen et al., 1995). In the study 
phase, subjects responded to a question pertaining to sensory attributes (a 
question about an item’s overall size in the real world). In the test phase, 
they had to respond to a second question pertaining to sensory attributes 
(about an item’s relative dimensions) and a question pertaining to functional 
attributes (whether an item is man-made or not). The sensory attribute 
question in the test phase is denoted the related question, and the functional 
attribute question is denoted the unrelated question. 
Finally, a word stem completion task was added to investigate the 
influence of identity-specific selection of responses during retrieval. The 
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task was a Dutch equivalent of tasks that are frequently referred to in the 
literature on amnesic patients as the “juice task” and the “motel task” (Graf, 
Squire, & Mandler, 1984; Squire, Shimamura, & Graf, 1987). In the task 
used, half of the word stems could only be completed with one word or a 
variation of the word (e.g., jui with juice or juicy as completion). These were 
designated the single completion word stems. The other half had 10 or more 
completions (i.e., motel or motive for mot) and were denoted the multiple 
completion word stems.  
In the object decision task we used a 1-week interval between the 
study and test phases, instead of the test phase immediately following the 
study phase, as in the procedure employed by Cooper et al. (1992) and 
Schacter et al. (1990; Schacter et al., 1991 ; Schacter et al., 1992). Also, in all 
three tasks, we instructed participants to react as fast as possible and 
repeated this instruction after the practice trials to ensure high-speed 
performance. Both measures were taken to prevent malingering by 
decreasing the explicit memory traces of the studied objects available for 
participants in the test phase. We expected these measures as well as the 
encoding instructions in the implicit task to result in the absence of explicit 
recollection of stimulus material in the test phase. Consequently, we 
expected simulators to perform at about the same level as controls. If 
explicit recollection of the studied items was still available and applicable, 
simulators might use their recollection of studied items to decrease the 
proportion of correct responses and to slow down their responses to 
studied items.  
Controls were expected to reveal a priming effect on the possible 
objects in the perceptual priming task and on the related question in the 
conceptual priming task, and no priming effect on the impossible objects 
and the unrelated question. They also were expected to show evidence of 
priming on both single- and multiple-completion word stems. Following 
Eich et al. (1997b) and Nissen et al. (1988), DID patients were expected to 
perform equally to controls on the perceptual priming task but to show 
evidence of interidentity amnesia on both the related and the unrelated 
questions of the conceptual priming task due to the task’s conceptual 
encoding in the study phase. Evidence of transfer was expected on the 
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single completions, and evidence of interidentity amnesia was expected on 
the multiple completions in the word stem completion task. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Thirty-one female DID patients participated in the study. Patients were 
recruited with the help of clinicians in the Netherlands and Belgium. To be 
eligible for participation, patients had to meet the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria and the criteria of the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders (SCID-D), a 
semistructured interview used to diagnose the DSM-IV dissociative 
disorders (Boon & Draijer, 1994; Steinberg, 1993). The mean number of 
years since diagnosis of DID for patients was 4.42 years (range 3 months to 
11 years), and DID was always the main reason for patients to be in 
treatment. Participants were informed that the aim of the study was to 
understand more about the memory problems often reported by DID 
patients. Patients self-selected two identities that would participate in the 
experiment. Borrowing terms prevalent in DID clinical practice, we 
described conditions for participation as follows: (1) at least one of the 
identities is completely amnesic for the events experienced by the other 
participating identity during the experiment; (2) these two identities are able 
to perform the tasks without interference from other identities; (3) these 
two identities are able to perform the tasks without spontaneous switches to 
other identities; (4) the patient is able to switch between these two identities 
on request. The selected identities could be either female or male. 
In addition, 50 female controls participated. Groups were comparable 
on age and education (Table 1). Control participants did not report any 
relevant memory, visual, or attentional problems or psychiatric disorders. 
Control participants were divided into two groups, the controls and the 
simulators. Simulators were instructed to imitate DID. They were shown a 
documentary about a DID patient and were given additional written 
information about DID. They were subsequently asked to make up an 
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imaginary, amnesic identity and come up with detailed characteristics of this 
identity. Following Silberman et al. (1985), they were given a 17-item data 
sheet for the identity on which they were asked to assign name, age, gender, 
physical description, personal history, and personality style. Examination of 
the completed data sheets confirmed that participants had invested 
considerable effort inventing an identity. Finally, they were asked to practice 
during the week preceding the experiment switching to their new identity 
and taking on it’s state of mind. 
 
Table 1. Participant Characteristics for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) 
Patients (n = 31), Controls (n = 25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
 Age  Education DES CEQ 
DID patients  38.48 (8.68) 5.39 (1.20) - - 
 
Controls  37.72 (11.29) 5.88 (1.13) 6.31 (4.10) 5.48 (3.24) 
 
Simulators  32.48 (10.31) 5.84 (1.14) 6.54 (3.93) 4.20 (2.58) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). Education was assessed in categories ranging from 1(low) to 7 
(high) (Verhage, 1964); The DES is the Dissociative Experiences Scale with 
score range from 0 to 100, and the CEQ is the Creative Experiences 
Questionnaire with score range from 0 to 25. 
 
Both the controls and the simulators completed the Dissociative 
Experiences Scale (DES; Carlson & Putnam, 1993) and the Creative 
Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ; Merckelbach, Muris, Schmidt, Rassin, & 
Horselenberg, 1998) (Table 1). The DES is a 28-item self-report 
questionnaire with scores ranging from 0 to 100. Scores above 20 or, more 
conservatively, above 30, are thought to be indicative of pathological 
dissociation. The CEQ is a 25-item self-report questionnaire with scores 
ranging from 0 to 25. Scores are thought to be indicative of fantasy 
proneness—that is, the inclination to be immersed in daydreams and 
fantasies. The controls and the simulators did not differ significantly on 
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DES scores or CEQ scores. Neither controls nor simulators showed 
pathological levels of dissociation as measured by the DES. Written 
informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to participation.  
 
Design  
Participants were tested in two sessions separated by a 1-week interval. 
Because of illness, 5 participants were tested after a longer interval: one 
patient after 9 days, 1 control subject after 8 and 1 after 14 days, and 1 
simulator after 10 and 1 after 12 days.  In the first session, participants 
initially completed the study and test phases of the word stem completion 
task. Subsequently, they performed the study phase of the perceptual 
encoding task. In the second session, they performed the test phase of the 
perceptual encoding task, after which they completed the study and test 
phases of the conceptual encoding task. Participants performed the priming 
tasks as part of a larger study on reported memory impairments in DID 
(Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Woertman, & Van der Hart, 2003). There was no 
overlap in study material between tasks. The encoding and retrieval phases 
of all of the studies described were performed by different identities, with 
the retrieval phase performed by an identity subjectively reporting complete 
amnesia for the encoding phase. At the beginning of each retrieval phase, 
the identity reporting amnesia was asked if she knew anything about the 
encoding phase performed by the other participating identity and/or of the 
material presented in the encoding phase. She was asked to answer with 
“yes” or “no”. If she answered with “yes”, she was asked what she knew 
exactly (e.g., instructions, stimulus material).  
In the laboratory, many DID patients can alternate or “switch” 
between identities on demand, although this is not always under their 
control. Switches typically occur in seconds to minutes and are manifested 
by changes in facial expression, quality and quantity of speech, attentional 
focus, reported cognitive capacities, and affect (Putnam, 1997). As 
mentioned in the conditions for participation, patients in this study were 
able to switch between the two participating identities on request and were 
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able to perform the tasks without spontaneous switches to other identities. 
Patients made the switch to and from the participating identities at the 
beginning and end of both sessions and between participating identities 
before each test phase. The transition was initiated by asking the patient to 
let an identity “come forward” and take control of the patient’s 
consciousness and behavior. Also, the patient was asked to let the other 
participating identity “step back”, thereby moving out of consciousness. The 
switching process was assisted either by the patients’ own clinician or by one 
of the authors (R.H. or O.V.). The switching process was always 
accomplished in less than 2 min. Controls performed the tasks without 
switching; instead, they had a 2-min break to keep the length of procedures 
equal between groups. Simulators performed the study phase of all three 
tasks in their normal identity state and the test phase in their imagined 
amnesic identity. 
 
Materials 
Line drawings representing objects were used in the perceptual priming task. 
Like all stimuli in this study, they had a neutral affective meaning. Object 
drawings were obtained from Schacter et al. (1990). Four sets of drawings 
were constructed on the basis of a pilot study in which 35 psychology 
students (mean age = 21.41 years, SD = 2.99) were shown object drawings 
and were asked to classify each object as possible or impossible. On the 
basis of the participants’ scores, four sets of drawings were assembled, two 
sets depicting possible objects and two sets depicting impossible objects. 
The two sets depicting possible objects were matched according to 
proportion-correct object decisions, t(34) = 0.35, p = .73, and mean 
response time, t(34) = -1.03, p = .31, one to function as a studied set and 
one to function as an unstudied set. Because it did not prove possible to 
construct sets of 10 drawings of impossible objects that did not differ in 
mean proportion-correct object decisions, sets of 9 drawings were used. 
These were also matched according to proportion-correct object decisions, 
t(34) = -0.78, p = .44, and mean response time, t(34) = 0.02, p = .98. The 
measurement of response times was not part of the original studies 
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developed by Schacter et al. (1992); response time was used as an additional 
index of priming.  
  For the conceptual priming task, four sets of 16 Dutch words 
representing objects were assembled. Words in each of two sets were 
matched with respect to the response times of 38 pilot participants to the 
question “Is it taller than it is wide?” (the dimension question). These 
matched sets are called Set A and Set C. Words in each of the other two sets 
were matched with respect to the response times of the pilot participants to 
the question “Is it man-made?”(the man-made question). These matched 
sets are called Set B and Set D. In a second pilot study (n = 20), some 
adjustments were made to the sets, and in a third pilot study (n = 35; mean 
age = 21.41 years, SD = 2.99), the final sets were tested for mean response 
times. The difference in mean response time between Sets A and C was 
non-significant, F(1, 33) = 3.05, MSe = 1167.02, p = .09. Also, the 
difference in mean response time between Sets B and D was non-
significant, F(1, 33) = 0.02, MSe = 2066.39, p = .89. The pilot study was also 
used to test order of questions. Half of the participants (n = 18) answered 
the dimension question first and the other half (n = 17) answered the man-
made question first. No significant effects of order were found. 
Subsequently, three lists were made, each for a different classification task. 
List 1 was used in the study phase and consisted of Set A and Set B. List 2 
was used for the related categorization question and consisted of Set A and 
Set C, and List 3 was used for the unrelated categorization question and 
consisted of Set B and Set D. Three additional lists of four words served as 
practice items preceding Lists 1, 2, and 3. 
 For the word stem completion task, four sets of word stems were 
constructed on the basis of a pilot study in which 33 psychology students 
(mean age = 21.48 years, SD =  3.01) served as participants. They were 
shown 40 three-letter word stems sequentially and were asked to say aloud 
the first word that popped into mind that would complete the word stem. 
On the basis of the proportion of word stem completions and response 
times, two sets of single-completion word stems were constructed, one to 
function as a studied set and one as an unstudied set. Because it did not 
prove possible to construct sets of 10 word stems that did not differ in 
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priming measures, we made sets of 9 word stems. These single-completion 
word stem sets did not differ in mean correct completions, t(32) = -1.11, p 
= .28, nor did they differ in mean response time, t(32) = 0.82, p = .42. Two 
sets of 10 multiple-completions word stems were composed that did not 
differ in mean correct completions, t(32) = -0.82, p = .42, nor in mean 
response time, t(32) = -.51, p = .61. 
 
Procedure 
In the perceptual priming task, patients were informed in Identity State 1 
that they would see complicated drawings of objects and that the 
experiment was concerned with short-term memory for objects. Patients 
were instructed to study each object for 5 s and then to decide how they 
would divide it in two equal halves (i.e., to look for the plane of symmetry). 
They were instructed to study the entire object, not just parts of it. After 5 s, 
the drawing disappeared and participants had to indicate with their hands 
how they would divide the object in two equal halves. After the presentation 
of five practice items, participants were shown a set of possible and a set of 
impossible object drawings, all presented in a different random order for 
each participant. The symmetry task was meant to ensure the encoding of 
the three-dimensional object structure.  
In the second session, patients were told that they would be exposed 
to a series of briefly displayed drawings. They were informed that some of 
the drawings represented valid, possible three-dimensional objects that 
could exist in the real world, whereas other drawings represented impossible 
objects that could not exist as actual objects in the real world. It was 
explained that their task was to decide whether each object was possible or 
impossible. One practice object of each type was then shown. They were 
informed that all possible objects must have volume and be solid, need not 
be familiar, could be made out of stone or clay, and that they could not see 
through them. Participants were instructed to respond by pressing the “M” 
key in response to possible objects and the “Z” key in response to 
impossible objects. They were asked to do this as quickly and as accurately 
as possible. The object decision task then began with the presentation of 10 
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practice items. Subsequently, participants were informed that the critical test 
would now begin and the instruction to react as fast as possible was 
repeated. The critical test consisted of the sequential presentation of 40 
drawings in a different random order for each participant. Each drawing was 
presented for 100 ms, preceded by a fixation point for 500 ms and followed 
by a dark screen. The intertrial interval was 2,000 ms. Before switching to 
their amnesic identity in Session 2, simulators were told that they would be 
asked to perform a task that would involve both drawings they had already 
seen in Session 1 and unstudied, new drawings. They were instructed to 
pretend that they did not know their normal identity had performed the 
object-dividing task and thus to pretend to have no memory of the 
drawings. Subsequently, they were given 2 min to take on their amnesic 
identity’s state of mind. 
In the conceptual priming task, participants were informed that the 
purpose of the experiment was to see how quickly people have access to 
knowledge about words. Patients were first instructed to categorize objects 
as fast as possible by overall size (“Is it larger than a television set?”) in 
Identity State 1. They performed four practice items on which they received 
feedback, after which List 1 was presented. They were instructed to respond 
by pressing the “M” key if their answer was “yes” and the “Z” key if their 
answer was “no”. Each word was shown until a response was made. Once a 
response was made, the word was removed and the screen remained blank 
for 2,000 ms; then the next word appeared. Subsequently, patients 
performed the related categorization trials (the dimension question) in 
Identity 2. They again started with four practice items, and then they were 
shown List 2. Finally, patients performed the unrelated categorization trials 
(the man-made question), also in Identity 2. They again started with four 
practice items, followed by List 3. Simulators performed the size 
categorization question in their normal identity state. They performed the 
related dimension question and the unrelated man-made question after 
having switched to their imagined amnesic identity. Before being given 2 
min to take on their amnesic identity’s state of mind, they were told that 
they would be asked to answer two similar questions with both words they 
had already seen and unstudied words. They were instructed to pretend that 
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they did not know that their normal identity had performed the size 
question and thus to pretend to have no memory of the words. They were 
also instructed to respond as fast as possible but not faster to words they 
had seen in their normal identity state.  
In the study phase of the word stem completion task, 23 nouns were 
presented sequentially to the patient’s Identity 1 in random order on a 
computer screen. Patients were asked to count the number of letters that 
either had a “stick” (e.g., “b” or “f”) or a “tail”(e.g., “g” or “j”). Each word 
was shown for 2 s. Then, a question mark appeared on the screen and 
participants had a maximum of 10 s to press the correct key. This task was 
to ensure that patients encoded the words without being told that the words 
would be referred to in a stem completion phase later on. The 23 words 
were the possible completions of one set of single completions and one set 
of multiple completions together with four items to prevent primacy and 
recency effects. Then, after four practice trials, all 38 word stems of the 
studied and unstudied single- and multiple-completion sets were presented 
to Identity 2 in random order without making reference to having been 
studied by Identity 1. The procedure in this phase was the same as the 
procedure followed in the pilot study. The participants’ response time was 
determined using a voicekey. The experimenter scored their verbal response. 
Participants were allowed a maximum of 3 s to provide an answer. 
Simulators were told that they would now be asked to perform a word stem 
task in which half of the stems could be completed with a word they had 
just studied. They were instructed to pretend that they did not know their 
normal identity had performed the study phase and thus had no memory of 
the words.  
Results 
Of the 31 DID patients tested, a number of patients reported some explicit 
knowledge of the study phase in the test phase—namely 6 patients in the 
perceptual priming task, 2 patients in the conceptual priming task, and 5 
patients in the word stem completion task. These patients were left out of 
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the analyses. Data of 1 other patient in the perceptual priming task, 3 
patients in the conceptual priming task, and 2 patients in the word stem 
completion task were not included because emotional problems unrelated to 
the study interfered with the testing. Data of 2 additional patients in the 
word stem completion task were not included because of software errors. 
The results described therefore pertain to 24 DID patients in the perceptual 
priming task, 26 in the conceptual priming task, and 22 in the word stem 
completion task. 
In the analyses reported, response times more than 2 SD from the 
mean per participant per word set were excluded. However, because it could 
be argued that removal of scores more than 2 SD from the mean excludes 
extreme scores, reducing the mean response times for studied words of 
simulators in particular, all analyses were repeated with the inclusion of 
response times that were more than 2 SD from the mean. These analyses, 
however, yielded equivalent priming results for simulators. 
 
Perceptual Priming 
Mean proportion-correct object decisions and mean response times for 
correct object decisions for possible and impossible objects are presented in 
Tables 2 and 3. Consider first the mean proportion-correct object decisions 
for possible objects. A 2 x 3 Object Repetition [studied vs. unstudied] x 
Diagnosis [patients vs. controls vs. simulators] analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) revealed a significant repetition effect, F(1, 71) = 62.95, MSe = 
0.015, p < .001. The Object Repetition x Diagnosis interaction proved 
nonsignificant, F(2, 71) = 1.78, MSe = 0.015, p = .18, indicating that the 
repetition effect did not differ between the diagnosis groups. There was no 
significant main effect of diagnosis, F(2, 71) = 1.39, MSe = 0.022, p = .26. 
For the mean response times for possible objects, a corresponding ANOVA 
revealed a significant repetition effect, F(1, 71) = 6.25, MSe = 80,182.61, p = 
.015. The Object Repetition x Diagnosis interaction again proved 
nonsignificant, F(2, 71) = .94, MSe = 80,182.61, p = .40, indicating that the 
repetition effect did not differ between the diagnosis groups. The main 
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effect of diagnosis was not significant, F(2, 71) = 2.84, MSe = 196,851.46, p 
= .065. 
 
Table 2. Perceptual Priming: Proportion-Correct Object Decisions for 
Possible and Impossible Objects for  Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) 
Patients (n = 24), Controls (n = 25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
Object type DID patients Controls Simulators 
Possible objects    
Studied .75 (.17) .85 (.18) .85 (.13) 
Unstudied .64 (.21) .65 (.15) .68 (.17) 
    
Impossible objects    
Studied .66 (.18) .74 (.15) .80 (.18) 
Unstudied .66 (.18) .67 (.21) .76 (.16) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
For the mean proportion-correct object decisions for impossible objects, 
the corresponding ANOVA showed no significant repetition effect, F(1, 71) 
= 2.23, MSe = 0.018, p = .14. The Object Repetition x Diagnosis interaction 
was not significant either, F(2, 71) = 0.70, MSe = 0.018, p = .50, indicating 
that this was the case for all the diagnosis groups. There was, however, a 
significant main effect of diagnosis, F(2, 71) = 3.90, MSe = 0.022, p = .025. 
Tukey’s honestly significant difference (HSD) pairwise comparison 
procedures indicated that patients had significantly smaller proportions of 
correct decisions than did simulators (p = .020).  Patients did not score 
differently from controls (p =.60). Neither did simulator’s proportion of 
correct decisions differ from controls’ (p = .18). For mean response times 
for impossible objects, the corresponding ANOVA revealed a significant 
repetition effect, F(1, 71) = 4.81, MSe = 84,520.65, p = .032. The Object 
Repetition x Diagnosis interaction was not significant, F(2, 71) = .52, MSe = 
84,520.65, p = .60, indicating that the repetition effect did not differ 
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between the diagnosis groups. There was no significant main effect of 
diagnosis, F(2, 71) = 2.11, MSe = 279,583.23, p = .13. 
 
Table 3. Perceptual Priming: Response Times (in Milliseconds) for Correct 
Object Decisions for Possible and Impossible Objects for  Dissociative 
Identity Disorder (DID) Patients (n = 24), Controls (n = 25), and Simulators 
(n = 25) 
Object type DID patients Controls Simulators 
Possible objects    
Studied 1098 (413) 865 (292) 930 (603) 
Unstudied 1295 (752) 977 (272) 970 (417) 
    
Impossible objects    
Studied 1209 (643) 956 (271) 990 (497) 
Unstudied 1359 (628) 1085 (533) 1027 (725) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
Conceptual Priming 
Proportion-incorrect responses on the related and unrelated questions was 
very low  (M = .039, SD = .041). No main effect or interaction reached 
significance. As in the Vriezen et al. (1995) study, this measure could not be 
used as an index of priming. Mean response times for the related and 
unrelated trial condition are presented in Table 4. We excluded incorrect 
responses. On the related question, a 2 x 3 Word Repetition [studied vs. 
unstudied] x Diagnosis [patients vs. controls vs. simulators] ANOVA 
showed a significant repetition effect, F(1, 73) = 23.09, MSe = 13,709.66, p 
< .001. The Word Repetition x Diagnosis interaction was not significant, 
F(2, 73) = 1.43, MSe = 13,709.66, p = .25, indicating that the repetition 
effect did not differ between the diagnosis groups. There was a significant 
main effect of diagnosis, F(2, 73) = 14.35, MSe = 154,835.29, p < .001. 
Tukey’s HSD pairwise comparison procedures indicated that patients 
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reacted significantly more slowly than controls (p <.001) and more slowly 
than simulators (p =.001). Simulators’ response times did not differ from 
controls’ (p =.31).  
On the unrelated question, the corresponding ANOVA revealed no 
significant repetition effect, F(1, 73) = 0.04, MSe = 19,314.72, p = .85. The 
Word Repetition x Diagnosis interaction was not significant, F(2, 73) = 
0.17, MSe = 19,314.72, p = .85, indicating that this was the case for all of the 
diagnosis groups. There was a significant main effect for diagnosis, F(2, 73) 
= 5.61, MSe = 97,674.23, p = .005. Tukey’s HSD pairwise comparison 
procedures indicated that patients reacted significantly more slowly than 
controls (p = .005). The difference between DID patients and simulators 
was marginally significant (p =.051). Simulators’ response times did not 
differ from controls’ (p =.69). 
 
Table 4. Conceptual Priming: Response Times (in Milliseconds) for Correct 
Responses for Semantically Related and Unrelated Classification Questions 
for  Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) Patients (n = 26), Controls (n = 
25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
Question type DID patients Controls Simulators 
Semantically related    
Studied 1346 (534) 786 (104) 976 (333) 
Unstudied 1471 (647) 887 (147) 1024 (326) 
    
Semantically unrelated    
Studied 1080 (387) 806 (179) 888 (283) 
Unstudied 1100 (539) 811 (153) 876 (243) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
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Word Stem Completion with One or More Possible Responses 
For the single-completion stems, the proportion correctly completed 
studied and unstudied word stems was calculated. For the multiple-
completion stems, the proportion correctly completed word stems was 
calculated as the proportion of word stems completed to a studied word or 
another correct completion. For single- and multiple-word stems, the mean 
studied and unstudied response times were calculated as the mean response 
time of the word stems that were correctly completed. Mean proportions of 
correctly completed word stems and mean response times are presented in 
Tables 5 and 6.  
 
Table 5. Word Stem Completion: Proportions of Correct Single- and 
Multiple-Completion Word Stems for  Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) 
Patients (n = 22), Controls (n = 25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
Word stem type DID patients Controls Simulators 
Single-completion stems    
Studied .67 (.23) .84 (.18) .79 (.16) 
Unstudied .52 (.26) .66 (.18) .66 (.16) 
    
Multiple-completion stems    
Studied .89 (.12) .92 (.08) .92 (.09) 
Unstudied .87 (.16) .92 (.07) .94 (.07) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
Consider first the proportions of correctly completed single-completion 
word stems. A repeated measures analysis revealed a significant word 
repetition effect, F(1, 69) = 63.01, MSe = 0.013, p < .001. The interaction of 
Word Repetition x Diagnosis, however, did not prove significant, F(2, 69) = 
0.82, MSe = 0.013, p = .45, indicating that the repetition effect did not differ 
between diagnosis groups. There was a significant main effect of diagnosis, 
F(2, 69) = 5.24, MSe = 0.032, p = .008. Pairwise comparisons indicated that 
patients completed significantly fewer studied and unstudied word stems 
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than did controls (p = .009) or simulators (p = .038). Simulators did not 
differ from controls (p = .84). For single-completion mean response times, a 
repeated measures analysis revealed a significant word repetition effect, F(1, 
69) = 15.62, MSe = 59,429.22, p < .001. The interaction of Word Repetition 
x Diagnosis, was not significant, F(2, 69) = 1.18, MSe = 59,429.22, p = .31, 
indicating that the repetition effect did not differ between diagnosis groups. 
There was a significant main effect of diagnosis, F(2, 69) = 4.31, MSe = 
80,569.46, p = .017. Pairwise comparisons indicated that response times of 
patients were significantly increased compared with those of controls (p = 
.014). Simulators did not differ significantly in response time from patients 
(p = .55). The difference in response time between simulators and controls 
also did not reach significance (p = .15). 
 
Table 6. Word Stem Completion: Response Times (in Milliseconds) for 
Correctly Completed Single- and Multiple-Completion Word Stems for  
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) Patients (n = 22), Controls (n = 25), 
and Simulators (n = 25) 
Word stem type DID patients Controls Simulators 
Single-completion stems    
Studied 1234 (354) 985 (218) 1206 (394) 
Unstudied 1428 (422) 1199 (295) 1281 (280) 
    
Multiple-completion stems    
Studied 1304 (348) 958 (151) 1122 (251) 
Unstudied 1286 (354) 1051 (192) 1242 (324) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
For proportions of correctly completed multiple-completion word stems, a 
repeated measures analysis revealed no significant word repetition effect, 
F(1, 69) = 0.02, MSe = 0.0062, p = .89. The interaction between word 
repetition and diagnosis was not significant either, F(2, 69) = 1.04, MSe = 
0.0062, p = .36. There was no significant main effect of diagnosis, F(2, 69) = 
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2.50, MSe = 0.0071, p = .09. Additionally, t tests were performed to compare 
multiple-completion proportions of word stems completed to a studied word 
to a chance rate of .10. This chance level of .10 reflects the 10 or more 
possible completions in this set of word stems (e.g., Nissen et al., 1988). The 
mean proportions of studied word stems that were completed to a studied 
word (i.e., excluding word stems completed to another correct completion) 
indicated evidence of repetition (M = .26, SD = .14 for controls; M = .18, 
SD = .12 for patients; M = .17, SD = .094 for simulators). T tests 
comparing the scores with the chance proportion of .10 indicated evidence 
of repetition in all participants (t(21) = 3.25, p = .004, for patients, t(24) = 
5.91, p < .001, for controls, and t(24) = 3.85, p = .001, for simulators). An 
ANOVA revealed that diagnosis groups differed significantly in the 
proportion of studied word stems completed to a studied word, F(2, 69) = 
4.19, MSe = 0.014, p = .019. Pairwise comparisons revealed that simulators 
scored significantly lower than controls (p = .026). Although patients also 
scored lower than controls, this did not reach significance (p = .066). 
Patients did not differ from simulators (p = .96). A repeated measures 
analysis on mean studied and unstudied multiple-completion response times 
revealed a significant repetition effect, F(1, 69) = 5.85, MSe = 26,001.91, p = 
.018. Although response times for patients were equivalent for studied and 
unstudied words, the interaction of Word Repetition x Diagnosis proved 
nonsignificant, F(2, 69) = 2.35, MSe = 26,001.91, p = .10. There was a 
significant main effect of diagnosis, F(2, 69) = 7.91, MSe = 64,137.09, p 
=.001. Pairwise comparisons indicated that patients had significantly longer 
response times than controls (p = .001). The difference between simulators 
and controls also was significant (p = .041); patients did not differ from 
simulators (p = .29). 
In summary, although participants did not complete more studied 
than unstudied multiple-completion word stems with a correct completion in 
the word stem completion task, they did complete more multiple-
completion stems with studied words than would be expected on a chance 
level of 10%. Also, they showed decreased response times to studied words 
relative to unstudied word stems. On the single-completion stems, priming 
was also evident from the increased proportion of correct completions for 
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studied words and the decreased response times of studied words in 
comparison with unstudied words. Participants thus showed clear evidence 
of priming on both types of word stems. 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to assess the transfer of implicit memory between 
identities in DID. In agreement with studies performed by Eich et al. 
(1997a, 1997b) and Nissen et al. (1988), we obtained evidence of priming 
for DID patients comparable to that of controls on a data driven task (the 
perceptual encoding task) and on a task allowing for only a single response 
on each trial (word stem completion task). Moreover, and in contrast to 
studies by Eich et al. (1997b), Nissen et al. (1988), and Peters et al. (1998), 
we also observed priming effects on a conceptually driven task and a task 
allowing for a range of responses (word stem completion task). Patients thus 
showed evidence of  transfer of information between identities on all 
implicit memory tasks employed. It should be noted that despite not 
differing from controls with respect to implicit memory effects, patients did 
show a generally impaired performance on the conceptual encoding task and 
the word stem completion task, as is  evident from their significantly longer 
response times to both studied and unstudied items. They also produced 
fewer correct word stem completions. The DID patients’ less efficient and 
slower performance could have been the result of their having fewer 
processing resources available for memory tasks because of an emotional 
preoccupation, as also reported in depressed and anxious patients (Baddeley, 
Wilson, & Watts, 1995). 
It can be argued that interidentity amnesia was not expected in the 
first place on the word stem completion task with multiple completions due 
to its data driven encoding (i.e., the counting of “sticks” and “tails”). 
However, both the related and unrelated conceptually driven tasks also 
allowed for multiple—although only two—response alternatives while 
requiring conceptual encoding of an object’s sensory and functional 
attributes. Although the identity-specific interpretation of material at the 
 78 
time of encoding and the identity-specific selection of responses during 
retrieval has been considered the crucial distinctive factor in finding 
interidentity amnesia in DID (Eich et al., 1997b; Nissen et al., 1988), we did 
not obtain evidence for this. At the perceptual stage of information 
processing, the formation of new structural object representations and the 
activation of existing word representations in the encoding phase appears to 
extend to the retrieval phase performed by another identity in DID patients. 
Similarly, at the conceptual stage, the representation of objects’ sensory 
attribute information seems to transfer to another identity, indicating that 
very specific encoding and retrieval operations persist even when DID 
patients switch between identities.  
The different findings of this study to previous studies of priming in 
DID (Eich et al., 1997a, 1997b; Nissen et al., 1988; Peters et al., 1998) could 
be due to the higher power resulting from the larger sample in this study (31 
patients tested with results pertaining to a mean of 24 patients reporting no 
recall for encoding phases). Further, we added measures of response times 
to index priming, whereas all previous studies on implicit memory 
performance in DID have relied only on accuracy scores. Response times 
may be a more sensitive measure of priming, as is indicated by our results 
on the impossible objects perceptual encoding task, where priming is 
indicating by response times but not by the proportions of correct object 
decisions.  
A third factor that may account for the different findings is that in all 
of the previous studies of implicit memory functioning in DID that 
obtained evidence of interidentity amnesia, explicit references were made to 
the studied stimulus material encoded by another identity. In the study by 
Peters et al. (1998), the test identity was instructed to complete word stems 
to words that had been learned by another identity. Eich et al. (1997b) 
presented a free recall task to the test identity of the words encoded by 
another identity immediately preceding the word stem completion task. In 
the study by Nissen et al. (1988), no direct reference was made to the 
studied material, but the task was performed in the context of other tasks 
that did. Explicit reference to the study phase and the material studied may 
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have caused patients to misconceive the implicit memory task as an explicit 
measure of memory and complete the task as such.  
In the present study, however, no explicit reference was made to the 
studied material. Also, by incorporating a group of DID simulators, it was 
shown that whatever explicit knowledge was available in the test phase, it 
could not be put to use to influence implicit memory performance and 
simulate a pattern of interidentity amnesia. Simulators did differ from 
controls in the proportion of stem completions and the response times of 
the multiple word stem completion task; that is, they showed generally 
impaired performance both on studied and unstudied word stems. This may 
have been because they had to divide attention between role playing and 
performing the memory task. Importantly, however, priming scores of 
simulators were comparable to those of controls, indicating that task 
performance could not be influenced by strategies using explicit 
recollections of studied material, even after specific instructions regarding 
how to simulate interidentity amnesia in DID. This inability to simulate 
amnesia seemingly contrasts with findings in other studies using participants 
instructed to simulate amnesia (e.g., Davis et al., 1997; Eich et al., 1997a; 
Horton, Smith, Barghout, & Connolly, 1992).  
Our primary goal, however, in designing the memory tasks used in 
this study was not to detect but to exclude malingering. To this end we used a 
1-week interval between the encoding and retrieval phases in the perceptual 
encoding task. Also, in all tasks, we instructed participants to react as fast as 
possible. This direction was given in the initial instruction and repeated after 
the practice trials. This instruction contrasts with instructions used in studies 
designed to detect malingering, in which no high-speed response instructions 
were given. We should note that in a word stem completion task performed 
by Davis et al. (1997), participants were instructed to immediately say aloud 
the first word that popped into mind and that would complete the word 
stem. However, given the mean response times of 2 to 4 s reported in this 
study, these instructions should not be considered high-speed instructions. 
Noteworthy is that when simulators in the present study were asked about 
their simulation strategy, they stated that they found it hard to simulate 
because they either felt they did not recognize any material from the study 
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phase or that they did recognize material, but felt unable to simulate due to 
the time constraint. Note that it cannot be inferred that explicit memory 
traces were absent. It can, however, be concluded that whatever explicit 
knowledge was available in this study, it could not be put to use to influence 
implicit memory performance. Also note that it cannot be inferred whether 
patients have tried to simulate or not. It can only be said that had they tried 
to simulate interidentity amnesia, they would not have succeeded. 
We replicated Vriezen et al. (1995) in demonstrating that the simple 
repetition of stimulus material at study and test was not a sufficient 
condition for priming. A priming effect was found on the related question, 
and no evidence of priming was found on the unrelated question. We 
obtained evidence of attribute-specific priming (i.e., when encoding and 
retrieval both pertained to sensory attributes). Conceptual priming thus 
seems to require the formation of domain-specific semantic representations. 
As noted by Vriezen et al., these findings of domain-specific priming call for 
a refinement of existing theoretical accounts of conceptual priming. 
Performance on conceptual priming tasks is not completely accounted for 
by the memory systems view because priming was not found on all tasks 
pertaining to a specific underlying memory system (i.e., the semantic 
memory system). Instead, memory performance appears to depend on both 
the involvement of the critical memory system and the overlap between 
encoding and retrieval processing operations. The observed domain-specific 
priming calls for the specification of the semantic memory system, 
characterized by attribute-specific processing operations at encoding and 
retrieval (see also Cabeza, 1994). Domain-specific conceptual priming 
requires the specification of separate semantic memory subsystems 
characterized by either mainly sensory or mainly functional processing.  
We replicated Schacter et al. (1990; Schacter et al., 1991; Schacter et 
al., 1992) and Cooper et al. (1992) by demonstrating evidence of perceptual 
priming selectively on possible objects when considering proportions of 
correct object decisions. Importantly, however, we extended their findings 
by demonstrating priming for both possible and impossible objects by 
including response times, a priming index thye did not include. Because the 
task developed by Schacter et al. included novel, unfamiliar objects, 
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perceptual priming was argued not to depend on, or reflect, the activation of 
preexisting memory representations, but rather to rely on the formation of 
new representations in the encoding phase (Schacter et al., 1990). They 
reasoned that the absence of priming for impossible objects was due to 
participants’ inability to encode the three-dimensional object structure of 
impossible objects. However, the results of the present study show that it 
might be possible to form global mental representations of impossible 
objects. Priming of these representations may be visible only in the more 
sensitive priming measure of response times. Alternatively, priming of 
unfamiliar objects may be brought about by the repetition of lower level 
nodes of object characteristics. In that case, representations of unfamiliar 
objects that produce priming need not form a coherent global, three-
dimensional object structure, but instead need only consist of lower-level 
representations formed in an earlier stage of information processing. 
In conclusion, the main findings of the present study are that DID 
patients displayed normal implicit memory performance on both data driven 
and conceptually driven tasks. These findings have theoretical significance 
for current views on memory dysfunction in DID. One possible implication 
is that amnesia for implicit information between the two identity states does 
not extend to neutrally valenced material, but, if it exists, is involved only in 
emotional information processing. This possibility seems to make sense 
given the etiology of DID as a pathological reaction to childhood trauma. In 
other words, the particular coping mechanisms that create identity-isolated 
implicit memory traces only work for information considered to be 
emotionally threatening or directly linked to past traumatic experiences. 
Future research thus should attempt to include trauma-related stimuli in 
implicit memory tests.  
An alternative implication of the present results is that the presumed 
amnesic symptoms in DID never include implicit memory, neither 
emotionally significant nor emotionally neutral, but are limited to explicit 
memory. In other words, the hypothesized coping mechanisms work to 
isolate conscious recollection of traumatic experiences, but fail to prevent 
information transfer between identities at an implicit level. The current 
study does not bear on the distinction between explicit and implicit memory 
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functioning, since we did not include an objective explicit memory task. 
However, in other work (Huntjens et al., 2003), we have obtained evidence 
of normal explicit memory performance in DID patients for neutral 
material, which argues against the possibility of amnesic symptoms being 
limited to explicit memory. What we did find in both our implicit and 
explicit memory studies was a dissociation between objective memory 
performance and patients’ subjective reports; that is, although patients 
indicated no subjective recollection of the encoding phase performed by a 
different identity state at all, their test scores indicated normal memory 
functioning.  
A third possible implication is thus that the reported amnesic 
symptoms in DID include neither implicit nor explicit memory, for either 
emotionally significant or emotionally neutral material. Instead, the reported 
amnesic symptoms are related to an identity’s lack of subjective awareness 
of events experienced by another identity. Patients’ subjective reports of 
interidentity amnesia may reflect their genuine phenomenological 
experiences, but their intact memory traces for an event may go without 
their being aware of ownership of that memory; that is, they suffer a lack of 
so-called meta-awareness. Dissociative amnesia may thus not be the correct 
term to describe perceived memory problems in DID (e.g., Read & Lindsay, 
2000). Instead, the presence of intact memory performance combined with 
the absence of memory meta-awareness may be at the core of dissociative 
amnesia. 
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Procedural Memory in Dissociative 
Identity Disorder: When Can 
Interidentity Amnesia Be Truly 
Established? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
In a serial reaction time task, procedural memory was 
examined in dissociative identity disorder (DID). Thirty-one 
DID patients were tested for interidentity transfer of 
procedural learning and their memory performance was 
compared with 25 normal controls and 25 controls instructed 
to simulate DID. Results of patients seemed to indicate a 
pattern of interidentity amnesia. Simulators, however, were 
able to mimic a pattern of interidentity amnesia, rendering 
the results of patients impossible to interpret as either a 
pattern of amnesia or a pattern of simulation. It is argued 
that studies not including DID-simulators or simulation-free 
memory tasks, should not be taken as evidence for (or 
against) amnesia in DID. 
 
 
 
 
 
Huntjens, R. J. C., Postma, A., Peters, M. L., Woertman, L., & Van der Hart, 
O. (2003). Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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Introduction 
Overactive, underactive, obsessive, or avoidant utilizations of memory 
characterize numerous psychopathologies (Spiegel, Frischholz, & Spira, 
1988). A disorder in which a functional failure of memory is considered to 
be a core phenomenon is dissociative identity disorder (DID), previously 
referred to as multiple personality disorder (MPD). In the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994), DID is characterized by the presence of two 
or more distinct identities or personality states, who recurrently take control 
of the person’s behavior and who each have their own relatively enduring 
pattern of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and 
self. DID patients very frequently report episodes of interidentity amnesia, 
in which an identity claims amnesia for events experienced by other 
identities (Boon & Draijer, 1993; Coons, Bowman, & Milstein, 1988; 
Putnam, Guroff, Silberman, Barban, & Post, 1986; Ross et al., 1990; for a 
review see Gleaves, May, & Cardeña, 2001). However, this does not mean 
that patients report a dense amnesia between all identities. Different degrees 
of amnesia may exist between various identities and reported amnesia may 
either be mutual or one-way, i.e., identity A reports awareness of the 
experiences of identity B, whereas B reports no knowledge of the 
experiences of identity A (Ellenberger, 1970; Janet, 1907; Peters, Uyterlinde, 
Consemulder, & Van der Hart, 1998).  
Whereas most clinical DID experts agree that DID is accompanied 
by a disturbance in episodic memory, they seem to disagree as to whether 
identities share implicit memory, such as priming and procedural memory 
(cf. Merckelbach, Devilly, & Rassin, 2001), i.e., the expression of 
information without conscious recollection (Schacter, 1987). Putnam (1997), 
for example, stated that “fluctuations in the level of basic skills, in habits, 
and in recall of knowledge are classic forms of memory dysfunction in 
dissociative patients” (p. 82) and “paradoxically, it seems as if overlearned 
information and skills are especially susceptible to intermittent failures of 
memory retrieval” (p. 83). On the other hand, Cardeña (2000) stated “in 
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dissociative amnesia, the individual loses explicit memory for personal 
experience, whereas implicit memory for general knowledge, skills, habits, 
and conditioned responses is unimpaired” (p. 57).  
Six experimental studies have examined implicit memory transfer 
between identities, most of them focusing on interidentity priming (Dick-
Barnes, Nelson, & Aine, 1987; Eich, Macaulay, Loewenstein, & Dihle, 
1997a, 1997b; Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Hamaker, Woertman, & Van der 
Hart, 2002; Nissen, Ross, Willingham, Mackenzie, & Schacter, 1988; Peters 
et al., 1998). Priming studies have yielded mixed results, which Eich et al. 
(1997b) and Nissen et al. (1988) ascribed to the influence of what they called 
identity-specific factors at the time of encoding and retrieval. In terms of 
encoding, evidence of amnesia in DID was obtained on conceptually driven 
tasks that make use of semantically rich materials that they argued was 
interpreted in different ways by different identities. In contrast, evidence of 
transfer between identities was obtained on data driven tasks, in which, 
according to their reasoning, encoding leaves little room for identity-specific 
interpretation. In terms of retrieval, transfer of information was obtained on 
tasks allowing for only a single response on each trial and evidence of 
amnesia was obtained on tasks allowing a wide range of responses. 
However, in the most recent study on interidentity priming in DID, which 
was performed by our group, we found no objective evidence for 
interidentity amnesia on a variety of priming tasks including both 
conceptually driven and perceptually driven tasks, and both tasks with single 
and multiple responses (Huntjens et al., 2002).   
Of the above mentioned, only two studies have included tasks that 
pertain to the procedural memory system, i.e., the memory system that is 
involved is learning skills and “knowing how” to do things: riding a bicycle, 
typing words on a keyboard, or solving a jigsaw puzzle (Schacter, 1996).  
The first study on procedural memory in DID was performed by 
Dick-Barnes, Nelson, and Aine (1987), who used a pursuit-rotor task 
designed to assess the transfer of perceptual-motor training. Results 
indicated a practice effect, i.e., transfer of procedural knowledge learning 
across the three identities tested. In this study, however, no information was 
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given about the a-priori reported amnesia between the participating 
identities, making the results inapt as a case against interidentity amnesia.  
Nissen, Ross, Willingham, MacKenzie, and Schacter (1988) 
performed the second study on procedural memory in DID. Two identities 
were tested, both reporting amnesia for experiences of the other identity. 
The authors made use of the serial reaction time (SRT) task introduced by 
Nissen and Bullemer (1987) that has become a standard task to assess the 
acquisition and retention of new procedural associations. We will discuss 
this task in more detail because in the present study we also used a SRT 
task. Participants are asked to respond as quickly as possible to a stimulus 
(e.g., a light, an asterisk) that is presented at one of four horizontally aligned 
locations on a computer screen. Four keys are spatially mapped to the four 
locations, and participants are asked to press the key in response to the 
stimulus as quickly as possible without making errors. Each response 
triggers the presentation of the next stimulus, which in turn requires a new 
response, etc. The critical experimental variation lies in the sequence of 
stimuli.  Subjects respond either to a cyclically repeating sequence (resulting 
also in a cyclically repeating sequence of responses) or to a random 
sequence, the constraint being that the same position cannot be used on 
successive trials.  
In the Nissen et al. (1988) study, first one identity was given three 
blocks of trials in a random-sequence condition. Then, the other identity 
was given four blocks of trials in a 10-trial repeating sequence and a fifth 
block consisting of a random sequence instead of the repeating sequence. 
Response time (RT) decreases more when a repeating sequence is presented 
than when a random sequence is presented, and RT increases when the 
stimulus presentation switches from a repeating to a random sequence. 
These sequence-specific RT effects indicate sequential learning. This identity 
showed some learning of the sequence. Finally, the first identity performed 
three blocks of the repeating sequence blocks and then one random block. 
Results indicated this identity’s performance was facilitated by the other 
identity’s acquisition of the sequence.  
The Nissen et al. (1988) study has some limitations. Similar to the 
Dick-Barnes et al. (1987) study, only 1 patient was tested. Furthermore, no 
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statistical tests were applied, which makes the interpretation of the data 
somewhat difficult. The assessment of the degree of the patient’s learning 
was also complicated by the omission of a normal control group. Finally, no 
measures to prevent or detect simulation were included, which seems 
important given that the so-called “sociocognitive” model considers DID to 
be a syndrome of social creation or iatrogenesis in the treatment of 
suggestible individuals (Allen & Movius, 2000; Lilienfeld et al., 1999; 
Spanos, 1996).  
 The purpose of the present study was to examine procedural 
memory in DID, while  overcoming some of the limitations of the previous 
two studies of procedural learning in DID, by including a relatively large 
sample of female DID patients (n = 31) as well as a normal control group 
comparable on gender, mean age, and education-level (n = 25).  
 To diminish the possibility of simulation of interidentity amnesia by 
conscious influencing of task performance, we took several measures to 
discourage explicit memory processing and encourage implicit memory 
processing. First, following Pascual-Leone, Wasserman, Grafman, and 
Hallett (1996), we told participants that the location of the stimulus on each 
successive trial was random and we used a 12-trial instead of a 10-trial 
sequence to prevent recognition of the repeating sequence of stimuli. For 
the same reason, we instructed participants to react as accurately, but above 
all, to react as quickly as possible, and we repeated this instruction several 
times to ensure high-speed performance. Finally, and also to prevent 
recognition of the sequence, we used a sequence of stimuli with less 
statistical structure than the sequence used by Nissen et al. (1988). As 
statistical structure increases, there are fewer unique runs of trials of a given 
size, and specific runs are repeated more often. An example of a low 
structure sequence is BDBCABADAC, in which no run of two or more 
trials is repeated. 
 Finally, to detect if simulation of interidentity amnesia indeed was 
not possible on the task use, we included a second control group instructed 
to simulate DID (n = 25). The DID simulators were asked to make up an 
imaginary, “amnesic” identity and to “switch” upon request to this amnesic 
identity during the experiment. 
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Method 
Participants  
Thirty-one female DID patients participated in the study. Patients were 
recruited with the help of clinicians in the Netherlands and Belgium. To be 
eligible for participation, patients had to meet the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria and the criteria of the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders (SCID-D), a semi-
structured interview used to diagnose the DSM-IV dissociative disorders 
(Boon & Draijer, 1994; Steinberg, 1993). The mean number of years since 
diagnosis of DID for patients was 4.42 years (range 3 months to 11 years), 
and DID was always the main reason for patients to be in treatment. 
Participants were informed that the aim of the study was to understand 
more about the memory problems often reported by DID patients. Patients 
self-selected two identities that would participate in the experiment. 
Borrowing terms prevalent in DID clinical practice, conditions for 
participation were described as follows: (1) at least one of the identities is 
completely amnesic for the events experienced by the other participating 
identity during the experiment; (2) the two identities are able to perform the 
tasks without interference from other identities; (3) the two identities are 
able to perform the tasks without spontaneous switches to other identities; 
(4) the patient is able to switch on request between the two identities. The 
selected identities could be either of the female or of the male perceived 
gender type. The switching process was assisted either by the patients’ own 
clinician or by one of the authors (R.H. or O.V.). The transition was 
initiated by asking the patient to let an identity “come forward” and take 
control over the patient’s consciousness and behavior. Also, the patient was 
asked to let the other participating identity “step back,” and move out of 
consciousness. 
In addition, 50 female control participants participated. Groups were 
comparable on age and education (Table 1). Control participants did not 
report any relevant memory, visual, or attentional problems, or psychiatric 
disorders. Control participants were divided into two groups, called the 
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“controls” and the “simulators”. Simulators were instructed to imitate DID. 
They were shown a documentary about a DID patient and were given 
additional written information about DID. They were subsequently asked to 
make up an imaginary, amnesic identity and come up with detailed 
characteristics of this identity. Following Silberman, Putnam, Weingartner, 
Braun, and Post (1985), they were given a 17-item data sheet for the identity 
on which they were asked to assign name, age, gender, physical description, 
personal history, and personality style. Examination of the completed data 
sheets confirmed that participants had invested considerable effort 
inventing an identity. Finally, they were asked to practice during the week 
preceding the experiment switching to their new identity and taking on its 
state of mind.  
 
Table 1. Participant Characteristics for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) 
Patients (n = 31), Controls (n = 25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
 Age  Education DES CEQ 
DID patients  38.48 (8.68) 5.39 (1.20) - - 
 
Controls  37.72 (11.29) 5.88 (1.13) 6.31 (4.10) 5.48 (3.24) 
 
Simulators  32.48 (10.31) 5.84 (1.14) 6.54 (3.93) 4.20 (2.58) 
 Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). Education was assessed in categories ranging from 1(low) to 7 
(high) (Verhage, 1964); The DES is the Dissociative Experiences Scale with 
score range from 0 to 100, and the CEQ is the Creative Experiences 
Questionnaire with score range from 0 to 25. 
 
Both the controls and the simulators completed the Dissociative 
Experiences Scale (DES; Carlson & Putnam, 1993) and the Creative 
Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ; Merckelbach, Muris, Schmidt, Rassin, & 
Horselenberg, 1998) (Table 1). The DES is a 28-item self-report 
questionnaire with scores ranging from 0 to 100. Scores above 20 or, more 
conservatively, above 30, are thought to be indicative of pathological 
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dissociation. The CEQ is a 25-item self-report questionnaire with scores 
ranging from 0 to 25. Scores are thought to be indicative of fantasy 
proneness, i.e., the inclination to be immersed in daydreams and fantasies. 
The controls and the simulators did not differ significantly on DES-scores 
and CEQ scores. Neither controls nor simulators showed pathological levels 
of dissociation as measured by the DES. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all participants prior to participation. 
 
Stimuli and apparatus 
Participants performed a Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task. On each trial, 
four locations arranged horizontally on a computer monitor were 
underscored, and a small rectangle appeared above one of them. The 
stimulus was a yellow character on a black background and 0.5 cm wide by 1 
cm high. All four locations were easily discriminable and 5 cm from the 
bottom of the monitor screen and separated horizontally by 7 cm. 
Participants responded by pressing the z, x, n, and m keys on the computer 
keyboard, which was positioned below and in front of the monitor such that 
the four keys were approximately aligned with the four stimulus locations. 
The four keys were marked and the z key was the correct key for the 
leftmost position, the x key for the position second from left, and so on. 
The stimulus remained on the screen until the participant pressed the 
correct key, upon which the next stimulus appeared without an interstimulus 
delay. If the subject pressed the incorrect key, the stimulus changed color to 
gray and the correct key had to be pressed before the next trial was 
presented. No feedback was given regarding response latency. 
 Each block consisted of 120 trials, which was followed by a short 
break of 30 s, after which subjects initiated the next block by pressing a key 
when they were ready. The blocks consisted either of a random sequence, 
the only constraint being that the same event could not occur on two 
successive trials, or of an ordered sequence, in which the location of the 
stimulus followed a particular 12-trials sequence. Designating the four 
locations A, B, C, and D from left to right, the sequence was as follows: B-
D-B-C-A-B-A-D-A-C-D-C. Each block comprised 10 repetitions of this 12-
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trial sequence, but the end of one 12-trials sequence and the beginning of 
the next was not marked in any way. Thus, in the absence of knowledge of 
the sequence itself, each block would seem to be a continuous series of 120 
trials.  
 
Procedure 
This study was part of a larger study on explicit and implicit memory 
functioning in DID (see Huntjens et al., 2002, and Huntjens, Postma, 
Peters, Woertman, & Van der Hart, 2003). The task was presented in 8 
blocks of 120 trials each and two practice blocks of 12 trials, one preceding 
block 1 and one preceding block 5. Participants were instructed to respond 
by pressing the key that corresponded to the location in which the stimulus 
appeared. They responded to locations A, B, C, and D with their left middle, 
left index, right index, and right middle fingers, respectively, and were asked 
to rest their fingers lightly on the keys as they performed the task. Subjects 
were told to respond as accurately and as quickly as possible and the 
instruction to respond as quickly as possible was repeated at the beginning 
of each block. Participants were told that the location of the stimulus on 
each successive trial was random. However, for all participants, blocks 2 to 
7 followed a repeating sequence, whereas blocks 1 and 8 followed a random 
sequence. Block 1 functioned as a baseline measure of performance.  
 Patients performed a practice block and block 1 to 4 in one identity. 
After this, they were requested to switch to the identity claiming amnesia for 
experiences in the present of the identity performing the first series of 
blocks. The switching process was always accomplished in less than 2 min. 
When the patient confirmed the presence of the second identity, this 
identity was directly asked if and what she knew of the learning phase and 
the material the other identity had seen. Patients answered with either “yes” 
or “no”. The identity subsequently performed a practice block and blocks 5 
to 8. So although at this stage, the procedure allows for the acquisition of 
new associations by Identity 2, what is critical is the activation (or not) of 
existing procedural memory structures learned by Identity 1 in the 
performance of Identity 2. Normal controls performed all blocks 1 to 8 
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including the practice blocks in the same order with a 2-min break between 
series of blocks to keep the procedure equal. Simulating controls performed 
block 1 to 4 without simulating, after which they received the following 
instruction: “You have now performed a task as yourself. We are now 
asking you to switch to your imagined identity, which will perform the same 
task you did just now. However, your identity doesn’t know you have 
performed the same task so he or she doesn’t know you saw small blocks on 
the screen and pressed corresponding keys. Your identity thus has no 
practice in performing this task. So try to start all over again, at the same 
speed and with the proportion of errors you responded when you started 
this task as yourself. Your identity has no other difficulties in performing the 
task. He or she remembers what he/she does and learns and performs as 
well as any other person. Your identity just doesn’t profit from the practice 
you have had as yourself. Now take a few minutes to let your imagined 
identity come forward. We will then explain the task to him/her.” Subjects 
then performed blocks 5 to 8.  
 At the end of the experiment, we questioned participants about the 
sequence. We asked them whether they had noted a repeating sequence at 
any point during the experiment. If they responded positively, we asked 
them to type the sequence on the keyboard.  
Results 
Of the 31 DID patients tested, the three patients who reported some 
explicit knowledge of the study phase in the test phase, either of the material 
used or of the instructions given to the other participating identity, were left 
out of the analyses. Two control participants and one patient were left out 
of the analyses because of extreme high error scores (mean percentage 
correct responses lower than 80%). The results described therefore pertain 
to 27 DID patients, 23 control participants and 25 simulators. The subjects’ 
mean percentage of correct responses and mean RT were calculated for 
each block, including only those trials in each block on which the subject 
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responded correctly in the RT measure. Results are presented in Figure 1 
and Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Percentages Correct Responses (with standard deviations in 
parentheses) in each Block for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) 
Patients (n = 27), Controls (n = 23), and Simulators (n = 25) 
Block DID patients Controls Simulators 
1 97.75 (2.93)  98.37 (1.32)  97.67 (2.38) 
2 95.59 (4.11)  95.98 (3.58)  94.03 (4.30) 
3 94.57(3.58)  95.00 (2.85)  91.80 (4.33) 
4 94.23 (5.66)  93.44 (3.94)  89.67 (5.79) 
5 96.67 (4.63)  93.48 (4.91)  98.23 (1.58) 
6 96.48 (3.21)  92.43 (4.40)  95.37 (4.00) 
7 95.71 (4.88) 91.70 (5.19)  93.50 (4.29) 
8 93.83 (6.50)  88.99 (6.15)  86.83 (8.93) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
In control subjects, the gradual decrease in mean RT over blocks 2 to 6 and 
the increase in RT from blocks 7 to 8 indicated learning of the sequence. 
Mean RT decreased from 572 ms in block 2 to 453ms in block 6. 
Unexpectedly, response times then increased by 9 ms in block 7, possibly 
reflecting a fatigue effect. As expected, mean response times increased by 52 
ms to block 8, when the random sequence was introduced. The mean 
percentage of correct responses in controls gradually decreased from blocks 
2 to 7 (except from blocks 4 to 5, Table 2) and also decreased from blocks 7 
to 8. The decrease in response times compared with the increase in 
percentage of correct responses in blocks 2 to 6 is indicative of a accuracy-
speed trade-off, i.e., participants respond faster to stimuli but trade this 
increase in speed for a decrease in accuracy. 
  In patients, response times decrease from blocks 2 to 4 by 53 ms. 
Then, after having made the switch to their imagined amnesic identity, their 
response times increased by 201 ms, after which they again decreased by 137 
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ms to 668 ms in block 7. Finally, response times again increased by 31 ms 
from blocks 7 to 8 indicating a learning effect. Mean percentages of correct 
responses decreased from blocks 2 to 4, then increased after the switch, and 
again decreased from block 5 onwards.  
 Simulators’ RTs and percentages of correct responses showed a 
pattern comparable to patients. Their response pattern shows a decrease in 
response times in blocks 2 to 4, then an increase from blocks 4 to 5 by 168 
ms and again a decrease from blocks 5 to 7. Finally, they also showed an 
increase from blocks 7 to 8 that is indicative of sequence learning. 
 A 8 Block x 3 Diagnosis [patients vs. controls vs. simulators] 
MANOVA on the mean response times revealed a significant block main 
effect F(7, 66) = 32.15, p < .001. Within-subjects contrasts, which compare 
the mean response times in each block except the first block to the mean 
response times in the preceding block, revealed that mean response times 
decreased significantly over blocks (all p’s < .001). However, the MANOVA 
also revealed a significant Block x Diagnosis interaction F(14, 134) = 3.97, p 
< .001. The interaction proved significant only in block 4 vs. block 5 (p < 
.001), block 5 vs. block 6 (p < .001), and block 6 vs. block 7 (p = .001), the 
blocks containing a repeating sequence after the switch. Whereas controls 
thus gave evidence of continuous learning over blocks, patients and 
simulators started all over again after their switch to the amnesic identity. 
The diagnosis main effect was also significant, F(2, 72) = 13.60, p < .001, 
indicating that diagnosis groups differed significantly in overall mean 
response times. Tukey’s honestly significant difference (HSD) pairwise 
comparison procedures indicated that patients differed significantly from 
control participants (p < .001), and from simulators (p < .001) with slower 
responses overall. Controls participants did not differ from simulators (p = 
.961).  
 A corresponding MANOVA on the mean percentages of correct 
responses revealed a significant block main effect F(7, 66) = 21.11, p < .001. 
Within-subjects contrasts revealed that the mean percentage of correct 
responses significantly decreased over blocks (p <= .002 for all 
comparisons). The analysis also revealed a significant Block x Diagnosis 
interaction F(14, 134) = 4.78, p < .001. The Block x Diagnosis interaction 
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proved significant only for block 4 vs. block 5 (p < .001), block 5 vs. block 6 
(p = .011), and block 7 vs. block 8 (p = .001), the blocks after the “switch”, 
indicating the difference between the continuous decrease in correct 
responses of control subjects and the sudden increase in correct responses 
after the switch for patients and simulators. The diagnosis main effect did 
not reach significance, F(2, 72) = 3.11, p =.051.  
 
Awareness of the sequence 
To the question whether they had noted a repeating sequence at any point 
during the experiment, 17 out of 23 controls, 10 out of 25 simulators, and 
10 out of 27 patients responded “yes”. However, participants were not able 
to describe the procedure used. They differed very much in the number and 
designation of blocks they thought consisted of sequences. For example, 
one participant said she thought every block contained a different sequence 
and another participant thought the first block contained a sequence, while 
actually this block consisted of a random sequence. Also, several 
participants thought the sequence only consisted of 2 or 3 trials that were 
repeated amongst random trials. Two control participants were able to type 
in a maximum substring of 6 trials in a row out of the 12-trials sequence in 
among other incorrect trials. Four controls, 5 simulators, and 3 patients 
were able to type in a maximum substring of four correct trials in a row; 7 
controls, 5 simulators, and 2 patients were able to type in 3 trials in a row; 
and 4 controls and 5 patients were only able to type in 2 trials.  
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to objectively test procedural memory 
functioning in DID. Results of control subjects in this study showed the 
expected decrease in response times over blocks containing a repeating 
sequence and the expected increase in response times when the stimulus 
presentation switched from a repeating to a random sequence. Admittedly, it 
is somewhat difficult to establish what exactly was learned due to a possible 
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accuracy-speed tradeoff. Rather than revealing the learning of better 
predictions of the expected stimulus and response in a repeating sequence 
trial, a distinctive feature of procedural learning, the pattern may reflect the 
learning of a faster motor response to the stimulus. 
 The results of patients showed they responded slower overall as is 
evident from their increased response times when compared to normal 
controls and simulators. Secondly, the results of patients seemed to indicate 
a pattern of interidentity amnesia, i.e., a decrease in response times after 
their “switch” to their amnesic identity. However, the most important 
finding in this study is that despite of their lack of explicit processing of the 
sequence learned in the SRT task, simulators were able to mimic the 
patient’s pattern. The measures we took to promote implicit memory 
processing, i.e., the speeded performance instruction, telling the participants 
the sequence of the trials was random, the 12-trial sequence instead of the 
more usual 10-trial sequence, and the increased statistical structure of the 
sequence, did result in making most of the participants unaware of the 
nature of the repeating sequence. And those participants who did report 
noticing a sequence, did not even come close to typing in the correct 
sequence. Explicit knowledge of the nature of the repeating sequence was 
thus often completely absent. Importantly, even without this explicit 
knowledge, simulators were able to slow down their responses comparable 
to the pattern of interidentity amnesia that was explained to them as 
expected in DID. Because of the ability of simulators to mimic interidentity 
amnesia, the results of patients cannot be interpreted unambiguously. Their 
pattern of performance can both indicate interidentity amnesia or simulation 
of interidentity amnesia.  
 In our previous study on implicit memory functioning in DID 
(Huntjens et al., 2002), which contained simulation-resistant implicit 
memory tasks, no objective evidence of interidentity amnesia was found. 
The results of this previous study concur with the two previous studies on 
procedural memory in DID performed by Dick-Barnes et al. (1987) and 
Nissen et al. (1988). It would thus be unlikely to expect amnesia on the SRT 
task use in this study, also because the SRT task is data driven and therefore, 
given the reasoning of Eich et al. (1997b) and Nissen et al. (1988), the least 
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expected memory system for amnesia in DID. Speaking against the 
possibility of amnesia-simulation by patients is a study performed by Eich et 
al. (1997a), in which simulation of interidentity amnesia was possible on a 
picture fragment completion task. On this task, results indicated that 
patients did not try to simulate interidentity amnesia.  
 In sum, this study shows that even if measures are taken to reduce 
or exclude explicit stimulus knowledge, simulation on implicit memory tasks 
is possible. This conclusion is very important in interpreting results of 
previous studies and for designing new studies on the subject. Results of all 
studies on memory in DID not including tasks which are known to be 
simulation-resistant or not including a control group of DID simulators, 
cannot be taken as evidence for or against interidentity amnesia in DID. 
Simply providing statements that simulation is unlikely on the tasks used 
certainly does not constitute convincing evidence.  
 Future studies should thus include memory tasks which are 
simulation-resistant in order to be able to make definite claims about 
interidentity amnesia in DID. Furthermore, tasks on which simulation is 
easy, and therefore allow a clear simulation profile to be established, should 
be used in future studies to shed light on the question as to whether patients 
with DID are simulating their reported memory phenomena. The present 
results indicate that even without awareness of exactly what is learned 
procedurally, simulation is possible if subjects possess an advanced enough 
simulation strategy, that is, detailed knowledge about the amnesia profile 
that is expected of patients. 
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Memory Transfer for Trauma-Related 
Words between Identities in Dissociative 
Identity Disorder 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The present study aimed to objectively determine 
interidentity amnesia for trauma-related, i.e., sexual and 
physical abuse-related, material in dissociative identity 
disorder (DID). Twenty-two DID patients participated 
together with 25 normal controls and 25 controls instructed 
to simulate DID. Two wordlists A and B were constructed 
with neutral, positive and trauma-related material. List A was 
shown to one identity, while List B was shown to another 
identity claiming total amnesia for the first identity. The 
identity claiming amnesia was tested for intrusions from List 
A words into the recall of words from List B and recognition 
of the words learned by both identities. Test results indicated 
no objective evidence for total interidentity amnesia for 
trauma-related material in DID.  
 
 
 
 
 
Huntjens, R. J. C., Postma, A., Peters, M. L., Woertman, L., & Van der Hart, 
O. (2003). Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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Introduction 
Dissociative amnesia is a major symptom of dissociative identity disorder 
(DID). In the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, dissociative amnesia is described as “an inability to recall 
important personal information that is too extensive to be explained by 
ordinary forgetfulness” (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 
p. 477). The DID patient’s reported inability to recall information is 
predominantly thought to derive from the compartmentalization of 
memories in separate identity states. The assumed function of these amnesic 
barriers between identity states is to “contain” traumatic memories, so as to 
reduce the global effects of exposure to severely aversive stimuli, as well as 
to minimize the impact of these traumata on daily life (Dorahy 2001).  
Despite the claims listed above, the methodologically best designed 
experimental studies, i.e., studies including more than one patient, an 
objective memory tests, and a control group, found no objective evidence of 
interidentity amnesia (Allen & Movius, 2000; Eich, Macaulay, Loewenstein, 
& Dihle, 1997; Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Hamaker, Woertman, & Van der 
Hart, 2002; Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Woertman, & Van der Hart, 2003; 
Silberman, Putnam, Weingartner, Braun, & Post, 1985). However, all 
previous memory studies on interidentity amnesia in DID have made use of 
neutrally valenced stimuli (for reviews see Dorahy, 2001, and Peters, 
Uyterlinde, Consemulder, & Van der Hart, 1998; see also Allen & Movius, 
2000). Given the traumatic origins of dissociative amnesia and the supposed 
function of amnesic barriers between identity states to ward off painful 
memories, it is surprising that experimental memory studies on between-
identity amnesia in DID have not used trauma-related stimuli. The purpose 
of the present study was to objectively test memory transfer between 
identity states for trauma-related material. DID patients as well as a normal 
control groups and a control group instructed to simulate DID were 
included. The inclusion of a simulating control group is important in order 
to exclude the possibility of simulation given that the so-called 
sociocognitive model considers DID to be a syndrome of role enactment 
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(Lilienfeld et al., 1999). Two wordlists A and B were composed of trauma-
related words, positive words, and neutral words. The traumatic material 
was chosen to reflect the severe physical and sexual childhood abuse 
frequently experienced by dissociative patients (Lewis, Yeager, Swica, 
Pincus, & Lewis, 1997). Neutral words were added as a baseline measure 
and positive words to control for the general effect of emotional valence. 
List A was shown to one identity, and the identity was asked to recall the 
List A words. List B was shown to another identity claiming total amnesia. 
This identity was asked to recall the List B words. The first objective 
memory measure consisted of testing the identity claiming amnesia for 
intrusions from List A words into the recall of words from List B. The 
second measure was taken after a two-hour interval, when the amnesic 
identity was tested for recognition of the words learned by both identities.  
If DID involves dissociation of emotionally loaded information, 
interidentity amnesia was expected for the trauma-related words for 
patients. Thus, in recall patients were expected to recall no List A trauma-
related words as intrusions during the recall of List B. In recognition, they 
were hypothesized to recognize far more trauma-related words from List B 
(learned by the same identity) in comparison with List A (learned by another 
identity). More specifically, recognition of List A trauma-related words 
should be next to nothing, reflecting the amnesia for this list reported by the 
identity tested.  
Finally, a question was added on the state of awareness during 
recognition to provide information on the qualitative aspects of 
remembering in case of transfer of trauma-related material between 
identities. According to Cardeña (2000), episodic memories may be more 
semantic in nature when retrieved by an identity that did not undergo the 
events, as if the patient had observed them rather than experienced them. 
The state of awareness can be characterized as either remembering or 
knowing. Remembering is a recollective experience based on associative, 
contextual information of the learning event. Knowing is retrieval by a 
feeling of familiarity without specific knowledge of the original event 
(Gardiner & Java, 1993; Knowlton, 1998; Knowlton & Squire, 1995; 
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Tulving, 1985), i.e., resembling the impersonal recollection as suggested by 
Cardeña (2000).  
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-two DID patients participated. They were recruited from 18 
treatment settings in the Netherlands and Belgium by asking clinicians to 
invite patients to participate. Conditions for participation were described as 
follows: (1) The DID diagnosis was made by the referring clinician by 
administration of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative 
Disorders (SCID-D; Steinberg, 1993; Dutch version validated by Boon & 
Draijer, 1993); (2) at least one of the identities is completely amnesic for the 
events experienced by the other participating identity during the experiment; 
(3) identities are able to perform the tasks without interference of other 
identities; (4) they are able to perform the tasks without spontaneous 
switches to other identities; (5) they are all able to switch between identities 
on request. The mean number of years since diagnosis of DID for patients 
in the present sample was 6 years and DID was always the main reason for 
patients to be in treatment. Twelve patients reported one or more prior 
diagnoses: major depressive disorder (n = 6), borderline personality disorder 
(n = 4), posttraumatic stress disorder (n = 3), anorexia nervosa (n = 3), 
schizophrenia (n = 3), dissociative disorder not otherwise specified (n = 2), 
epilepsy (n = 1), obsessive compulsive disorder (n = 1), personality disorder 
not otherwise specified (n = 1), bipolar disorder (n = 1), and avoidant 
personality disorder (n = 1). Seven patients reported present comorbid 
disorders: major depressive disorder (n = 2), posttraumatic stress disorder (n 
= 2), anorexia nervosa (n = 1), obsessive compulsive disorder (n = 1), 
bipolar disorder (n = 1), personality disorder not otherwise specified (n = 1), 
and avoidant personality disorder (n = 1). 
Patients were informed that the aim of the study was to understand 
more about the memory problems often reported by patients with DID. 
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They self-selected two identities that would participate in the experiment. As 
mentioned in the conditions for participation, patients in this study were 
able to switch between the two participating identities on request, and were 
able to perform the tasks without spontaneous switches to other identities. 
The transition was initiated by asking the patient to let an identity “come 
forward” and take control over the patient’s consciousness and behavior. 
Also, the patient was asked to let the other participating identity “step 
back”, thereby moving out of consciousness. The switching process was 
assisted either by the patients’ own clinician or by one of the authors (R.H. 
or O.V.). 
In addition, 50 female non-psychiatric control participants 
participated. They were community volunteers and received a small 
payment. They did not report any relevant memory, visual, attentional 
problems or psychiatric disorders, and no history of sexual abuse. Control 
participants were assigned randomly to either a control group or a 
simulating group. Groups were matched as closely as possible on age (M = 
39.95, SD = 8.81 for patients [n = 22], M = 37.40, SD = 8.00 for normal 
controls, and M = 36.72, SD = 7.88 for simulators) and education4 (M = 
5.36, SD = 1.59 for patients [n = 22], M = 5.72, SD = 1.14 for normal 
controls, and M = 5.68, SD = 1.18 for simulators). Participants in the 
simulating group were instructed to mimic DID. They were shown a 
documentary about a DID patient and were given additional written 
information about DID. They were subsequently asked to make up an 
imaginary, amnesic identity and come up with detailed characteristics of this 
identity. Following Silberman et al.’s (1985) procedure, they were given a 17-
item data sheet for the identity on which they were asked to assign name, 
age, gender, physical description, personal history, and personality style. 
Examination of the completed data sheets confirmed that participants had 
spent considerable effort inventing an identity. Finally, they were asked to 
practice during the week preceding the test switching to their “identity” and 
taking on its state of mind. Participants in the normal control group were 
                                                     
4 Education was assessed in categories ranging from 1(low) to 7 (high) (Verhage, 1964). 
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only told that they participated in a memory experiment. No information 
was provided on the DID-related aspects of the study. 
All participants completed both the Dissociative Experiences Scale 
(DES; Carlson & Putnam, 1993) and the Creative Experience Questionnaire 
(CEQ; Merckelbach, Rassin, & Muris, 2000). The DES is a 28-item self-
report questionnaire with scores ranging from 0 to 100. Scores above 20, or 
more conservatively, above 30 are thought to be indicative of pathological 
dissociation (Carlson & Putnam, 1993). The CEQ is a Dutch 25-item self-
report questionnaire with scores ranging from 0 to 25. High scores are 
thought to be indicative of “fantasy proneness”, i.e., the inclination to be 
immersed in daydreams and fantasies. Mean scores on the DES were M = 
52.19 (SD = 16.41) for patients, M = 9.61 (SD = 8.20) for normal controls, 
and M = 8.11 (SD = 4.71) for simulators. Scores on the CEV were M = 
9.70 (SD = 4.50) for patients, M = 6.32 (SD = 3.22) for normal controls, 
and M = 6.64 (SD = 4.02) for simulators. Control participants did not show 
a pathological level of dissociation as measured by the DES. The normal 
control group and the simulating control group did not differ significantly 
on DES, t(48) = 0.79, p = .43. They also did not differ significantly on 
CEQ, t(48) = -0.31, p = .76. Patients, on the other hand, differed 
significantly from normal controls both on the DES, t(45) = 11.46, p < .01, 
and the CEQ, t(45) = 2.99, p < .01. Written informed consent was obtained 
from patients as well as all control participants prior to participation.  
 
Materials 
Two word lists (A and B) were constructed. List A and list B both contained 
8 different trauma-related words such as “vagina” and “pain”, 8 positive 
words such as “music” and “blossom”, and 8 neutral words such as 
“branch” and “bag”. Additionally, a recognition list was developed including 
all the words from Lists A and B and an equal amount of trauma-related, 
positive, and neutral distractor words (new words) adding up to a total of 96 
words. Trauma-related words were generated by two of the authors (L.W. 
and O.V.). Word lists and word categories did not differ significantly with 
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respect to mean frequency of occurrence per million5 and mean number of 
letters per word6. Furthermore, to ensure that participants’ differences in 
recall could not be due to differences in list difficulty, a pilot study was 
performed, with 19 psychology students serving as participants. Students 
were randomly assigned to one of two groups and list order (AB or BA) was 
counterbalanced. The study showed no differences in recall between list 
orders AB and BA, F(1,17) = 0.30, p = .59. 
As a material manipulation check, participants rated all words on a 
paper-and-pencil version of the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; see 
Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992), used to rate affective valence. 
The scale ranges from 1 (happy/positive) to 9 (unhappy/negative). Two 
patients did not complete the rating session, because the test session proved 
too long and taxing for them. Mean rating scores for controls were M = 
6.90 (SD = .89) for trauma-related words, M = 2.82 (SD = 1.03) for positive 
words, and M = 4.46 (SD = .71) for neutral words; mean scores for patients 
were M = 7.70 (SD = .99) for trauma-related words, M = 3.41 (SD = .83) 
for positive words, and M = 4.49 (SD = .47) for neutral words; mean scores 
for simulators were M = 6.97 (SD = .61) for trauma-related words, M = 
2.69 (SD = .54) for positive words, and M = 4.31 (SD = .44) for neutral 
words.  
 
Procedure 
The study was part of a larger investigation on memory (dis)abilities in DID. 
The present study consisted of two sessions separated by a two-hour 
interval. In Session 1, the 24 words of List A were presented to the patient’s 
Identity 1 in random order on a computer screen for 2 s with a 2-s interval. 
                                                     
5 37.38 for trauma-related words, List A; 39.00 for positive words, List A; 35.88 for neutral 
words, List A; 36.25 for trauma-related words, List B; 40.88 for positive words, List B; 35.75 for neutral 
words, List B; 36.88 for trauma-related words, Recognition List; 33.75 for positive words, Recognition 
List; 37.06 for neutral words, Recognition List (CELEX, 1990) 
6 6.00 for trauma-related words, List A; 5.63 for positive words, List A; 5.88 for neutral words, List A; 
6.50 for trauma-related words, List B; 6.38 for positive words, List B; 6.00 for neutral words, List B; 6.25 
for trauma-related words, Recognitio -List; 6.25 for positive words, Recognition List; 6.19 for neutral 
words, Recognition List (CELEX, 1990) 
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Participants were told that they should try to encode the words to the best 
of their ability in order to recall them subsequently. Following the 
presentation, participants were tested for free recall of the studied words. 
After this, patients were requested to switch to the amnesic Identity 2. 
When the patient confirmed the presence of Identity 2, this identity was 
directly asked if and what she knew of the learning phase and the material 
Identity 1 had seen. They answered with either “yes” or “no”. Then, the 
words of List B were presented to Identity 2, and the participant was tested 
for free recall. After a two-hour interval, Session 2 took place in which 
Identity 2 was tested for recognition. The recognition test had not been 
announced in Session 1. The words of the recognition list were presented 
one at a time and the patients had to state whether they recognized the 
words as old, i.e., from Session 1. If they recognized a word, they 
additionally had to state if their recognition was a remember or a know 
recognition. Participants received extensive instructions about the remember 
and know responses resembling instructions described by Gardiner (1988; 
see also Gardiner & Parkin, 1990). Remember responses were described as 
recognition states in which you have a conscious recollection of some aspect 
of the original encounter with the particular item. Know responses just elicit 
a feeling of familiarity, without however remembering specific contextual 
elements (Postma, 1999). 
Participants in the simulating control group learned and were tested 
for List A while being in their normal identity state and List B after having 
switched to their imagined “amnesic” identity. The recognition test also had 
to be performed by this imagined identity. Before “switching” to their other 
identity, they were instructed to pretend that they did not know their normal 
identity had seen a list called A and so they had no remembrance of the 
words and no practice in remembering. Subsequently, they were given 2 min 
to take on the other identity’s state of mind. Participants in the control 
group performed the task without switching. Instead, they had a 2-min 
break to keep the length of procedures equal between groups.  
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Results 
Of the 22 DID patients tested, three patients reported, after their switch to 
Identity 2, knowledge of some sort of the learning phase. These patients 
were not included. The data thus pertain to 19 DID patients who 
subjectively reported complete one-way amnesia for the learning phase 
including the words presented in List A.  
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests and all tests 
described were two-tailed. All multiple-comparison procedures described 
were Bonferroni tests. 
 
Recall 
Although not crucial for the claim of interidentity amnesia, except for the 
intrusions of words from List A into the recall of List B, recall scores are 
presented to give a detailed account of the participants’ overall memory 
performance for trauma-related material. The mean number of recalled 
trauma-related, positive and neutral words of List A and List B for patients, 
controls and simulating controls is presented in Table 1. Analysis was 
accomplished by repeated measures analysis of variance with list [List A vs. 
List B] and word category [trauma-related vs. positive vs. neutral] as within-
subjects factors, and diagnosis [patients vs. controls vs. simulators] as a 
between-subjects factor. A significant word category main effect was found, 
F(2, 65) = 43.28, p < .01. Within-subjects contrasts indicated that 
participants recalled significantly more trauma-related words than positive 
words, F(1, 66) = 50.19, p < .01, and significantly more trauma-related 
words than neutral words, F(1, 66) = 83.47, p < .01. Positive words were 
not recalled significantly more than neutral words, F(1, 66) = 0.97, p = .33. 
Importantly, the Word Category x Diagnosis interaction proved not 
significant, F(4, 132) = 0.89, p = .47, indicating that all diagnosis groups, 
including DID patients, recalled more trauma-related words in comparison 
with positive and neutral words. Furthermore, a main effect of diagnosis 
was observed, F(2, 66) = 5.33, p < .01. A multiple-comparison procedure 
showed that patients demonstrated a significantly overall lower recall than 
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controls, p < .01. The difference between patients and simulators did not 
reach significance, p = .06, whereas simulators clearly did not differ from 
normal controls in overall recall, p = 1.00. 
 
Table 1. List-Dependent Recall for Trauma-Related, Positive, and Neutral 
Words for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) Patients (n = 19), Controls 
(n = 25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
List DID patients Controls Simulators 
List A    
Trauma-related words 4.47 (1.26) 5.12 (1.17) 5.00 (1.32) 
Positive words 2.68 (1.83) 3.40 (1.78) 4.12 (1.69) 
Neutral words 2.63 (1.42) 3.08 (1.47) 3.44 (1.47) 
    
List B    
Trauma-related words 3.79 (2.15) 4.48 (1.83) 3.92 (1.53) 
Positive words 2.16 (1.07) 3.68 (1.44) 2.96 (1.49) 
Neutral words 2.53 (1.61) 3.72 (1.46) 2.68 (1.52) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
Important for the hypothesis of interidentity amnesia in DID is the number 
of word-intrusions from List A into the recall of List B. Overall, 7 patients 
recalled one or more intrusions from List A when recalling words from List 
B, compared to 10 controls and 7 simulators. More specifically, three 
patients compared to three controls and three simulators recalled a trauma-
related intrusion from List A when recalling words from List B, a result not 
expected for patients in the case of interidentity amnesia for trauma-related 
material.  
 
Recognition 
First and most interesting for the claim of interidentity amnesia for trauma-
related material, list-dependent recognition hit rates were determined for 
List A and List B. Additionally, to gain an impression of the general memory 
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performance of the participants, overall recognition hit rate (that is for both 
lists together), false alarm rate, sensitivity and response bias were 
determined. The measures of sensitivity and response bias were calculated 
from z scores, as described by MacMillan and Creelman (1991). Sensitivity is 
expressed in the measure of d’ and includes the number of targets (old 
words recognized as old) while correcting for the number of distractor 
words falsely recognized. Response bias is expressed in the measure of C 
and refers to the tendency to favor “old” or “new” responses. All 
recognition memory scores are presented in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
Table 2. List-Dependent Recognition for Trauma-Related, Positive, and 
Neutral Words  for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) Patients (n = 19), 
Controls (n = 25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
 DID patients Controls Simulators 
Hit rate List A    
Trauma-related words .38 (.32) .73 (.22) .45 (.31) 
Positive words .31 (.23) .68 (.17) .38 (.28) 
Neutral words .30 (.25) .62 (.21) .36 (.24) 
    
Hit rate List B    
Trauma-related words .54 (.30) .72 (.20) .62 (.24) 
Positive words .42 (.23) .72 (.18) .57 (.22) 
Neutral words .42 (.23) .72 (.20) .50 (.24) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
The most important finding in the list-dependent hit rates was that the 
patients’ mean List A recognition hit rate for trauma-related words was not 
0, as would be expected if patients were completely amnesic (Table 2). In 
their amnesic identity state, they recognized 38% of the trauma-related 
words learned by the other identity, compared to 54% of the trauma-related 
words learned in the same identity state. They also recalled 31% of the 
positive words and 30% of the neutral words learned by the other identity, 
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compared to 42% of the positive and neutral words learned in the same 
identity state. 
 
Table 3. Overall Recognition, Sensitivity, and Response Bias for Trauma-
Related, Positive, and Neutral Words  for Dissociative Identity Disorder 
(DID) Patients (n = 19), Controls (n = 25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
 DID patients Controls Simulators 
Hit rate     
Trauma-related words .46 (.27) .72 (.18) .53 (.23) 
Positive words .37 (.21) .70 (.15) .47 (.21) 
Neutral words .36 (.21) .67 (.17) .43 (.18) 
    
False alarm rate    
Trauma-related words .12 (.19) .12 (.18) .06 (.08) 
Positive words .08 (.14) .11 (.12) .05 (.07) 
Neutral words .08 (.14) .13 (.13) .05 (.08) 
    
Sensitivity    
Trauma-related words 1.20 (0.74) 2.01 (0.85) 1.65 (0.57) 
Positive words 1.09 (0.66) 1.91 (0.73) 1.52 (0.48) 
Neutral words 1.09 (0.63) 0.73 (0.79) 1.45 (0.43) 
    
Response bias    
Trauma-related words 0.75 (0.71) 0.33 (0.47) 0.72 (0.48) 
Positive words 0.98 (0.51) 0.36 (0.35) 0.85 (0.45) 
Neutral words 0.97 (0.52) 0.38 (0.32) 0.91 (0.42) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
A corresponding repeated measures analysis showed a significant word 
category main effect, F(2, 65) = 4.22, p = .02. Within-subjects comparisons 
revealed that the trauma-related words mean hit rate was significantly higher 
than the mean positive words hit rate, F(1, 66) = 5.44, p = .02, and the mean 
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neutral words hit rate, F(1, 66) = 8.26, p = .01. Importantly, however, the 
List x Word Category x Diagnosis interaction was not significant, F(4, 132) 
= 1.00, p = .41, which would be expected if patients showed interidentity 
amnesia for trauma-related words on List B, learned in the same identity, 
compared to List A, learned in another identity.  
On overall sensitivity (Table 3), there was no significant word 
category main effect, F(2, 65) = 2.42, p = .10, nor a significant Word 
Category x Diagnosis interaction, F(4, 132) = 0.28, p = .89. There was, 
however, a significant diagnosis main effect, F(2, 66) = 11.18, p < .01. A 
multiple-comparison procedure revealed that patients scored significantly 
lower on overall sensitivity than normal control groups, p < .01, and 
simulators, p = .04. Simulators did not differ significantly from normal 
controls, p = .07. 
On overall response bias, there was a significant word category main 
effect, F(2, 65) = 3.73, p = .03. Within-subjects contrasts revealed that the 
trauma-related words response bias was more liberal than the positive words 
response bias, F(1, 66) = 5.54, p = .02, and the neutral words response bias, 
F(1, 66) = 7.16, p = .01. The positive words response bias did not differ 
significantly from the neutral words response bias, F(1, 66) = 0.31, p = .58. 
This word category main effect did not differ between diagnosis groups, 
F(4, 132) = 0.64, p = .63. Finally, there was a significant diagnosis main 
effect, F(2, 66) = 12.23, p < .01. A multiple-comparison procedure revealed 
that patients as well as simulators scored significantly more conservative 
than normal controls, p < .01 for both comparisons. Patients did not differ 
significantly from simulators, p  = 1.00. 
 
Remember and Know Responses 
The remember and know rate for each list was determined as the number of 
words correctly recognized and assigned either a remember or know quality 
divided by the total number of words on the list of origin. The mean 
proportions remember and know responses are presented in Table 4.  
Controls characterized their recognitions on both lists more as 
remembering. In contrast, both patients and simulators characterized their 
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recognitions from their own list (List B) more as remembering, whereas they 
characterized their recognitions from the list learned by the other identity 
(List A) more as knowing. This difference however, reflected in the 
interaction List x Diagnosis x Quality (remember vs. know), proved not 
significant, F(2, 66) = 0.93, p = .40.  
 
Table 4. Proportions Remember and Know Responses for Trauma-Related, 
Positive, and Neutral Words for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) 
Patients (n = 19), Controls (n = 25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
 DID patients Controls Simulators 
Remember List A     
Trauma-related words .20 (.28) .41 (.27) .22 (.22) 
Positive words .14 (.14) .38 (.25) .16 (.21) 
Neutral words .09 (.14) .34 (.24) .10 (.13) 
    
Know List A    
Trauma-related words .17 (.24) .32 (.23) .23 (.24) 
Positive words .17 (.15) .30 (.20) .22 (.26) 
Neutral words .21 (.17) .28 (.21) .26 (.24) 
    
Remember List B    
Trauma-related words .31 (.27) .40 (.24) .41 (.23) 
Positive words .22 (.16) .45 (.26) .29 (.23) 
Neutral words .24 (.21) .43 (.27) .24 (.21) 
    
Know List B    
Trauma-related words .23 (.17) .32 (.24) .21 (.24) 
Positive words .20 (.19) .27 (.18) .28 (.26) 
Neutral words .18 (.13) .30 (.24) .27 (.23) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
  
 119
 
We thus did not find a significant difference between diagnosis groups in 
remember and know responses for information learned in the same versus 
other identity. More importantly for the question of state of awareness 
during recognition of trauma-related material, the interaction List x 
Diagnosis x Quality x Word Category also was not significant, F(4, 132) = 
1.49, p = .21, indicating that the (nonsignificant) differences in states of 
awareness during list recognition between controls on the one hand and 
patients and simulating controls on the other hand, did not differ for 
trauma-related, positive, and neutral words. Finally, the interaction 
Diagnosis x Word Category x Quality also proved not significant, F(4, 132) 
= 1.22, p = .31. 
Discussion 
The main objective of this study was to investigate interidentity memory 
performance for trauma-related material in DID. In the case of interidentity 
amnesia, patients were expected to recall no intrusions from trauma-related 
words on List A during recall of List B and not to recognize List A trauma-
related words. We found them, however, to recall the same number of 
trauma-related intrusions as normal controls and to recognize a considerable 
amount of words, that is 38%, of the trauma-related words learned by the 
other identity. The patients’ superior List B recognition for all word 
categories when compared to their List A recognition performance seems to 
indicate evidence of partial amnesia. However, this conclusion cannot be 
drawn because of the simulators’ ability to simulate this performance and 
because of the nonsignificant List x Word Category x Diagnosis interaction. 
Finally, we found that patients did not show qualitatively different ways of 
retrieving trauma-related words compared to other groups. Taken together, 
we did not find evidence of total interidentity amnesia for trauma-related 
material in DID. These findings strikingly contrast with the patients’ 
subjective reports of total amnesia for the task and material performed by 
the learning identity. 
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The patients’ memory performance did differ from normal controls 
in that they overall recalled less words and they scored significantly lower 
than normal controls and simulators on overall recognition sensitivity, i.e., 
the ability to distinguish “old” words from “new” words in recognition. A 
general impaired memory performance is often found in other psychiatric 
disorders, notably anxiety disorders like PTSD (Bremner et al., 1993) and 
depression, patients with which have been suggested to have diminished 
processing resources available for memory tasks as a result of their 
emotional preoccupation (Baddeley, Wilson, & Watts, 1995).  
One can argue about the validity of the traumatic stimuli in this study. 
The DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) speaks about 
“important personal information” (p.477) in describing the DID symptom 
of amnesia. While we cannot guarantee the material used had bearing to 
patients’ personally experienced traumatic events, the trauma-related words 
in this study were checked by two therapists treating patients with DID for 
face validity, and the rating scores of patients did indicate they regarded 
trauma-related words in this study as more negative than positive and 
neutral words. In sum, we did not find evidence of total interidentity 
amnesia for trauma-related words. The findings of lack of objective 
evidence for reported interidentity amnesia in the present study concur with 
the results of our previous studies on interidentity amnesia that deal with 
retrieval of  neutral material (Huntjens et al., 2002; Huntjens et al., 2003). 
These findings may have important implications for the conceptualization 
of DID in the future. Dissociative amnesia in DID may more adequately be 
described in the DSM as an experiental disturbance in memory functioning. 
Central to the disorder seems to be the patients’ belief of the inability to 
recall information instead of an actual, objective inability to recall. Patients 
seem to lack the acknowledgement of remembered memories of other 
identities as belonging to themselves, which seems a direct result of their 
lack of an integrated feeling of identity. Objectively, however, there is 
transfer of memories across identities in DID. 
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Chapter 
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Transfer of Newly Acquired Stimulus 
Valence between Identities in 
Dissociative Identity Disorder 
 
 
Abstract 
Patients with dissociative identity disorder (DID) frequently 
report episodes of interidentity amnesia, i.e., amnesia for 
events experienced by other identities. The goal of the 
present experiment was to test the implicit transfer of 
trauma-related information between identities in DID. We 
hypothesized that whereas declarative information may 
transfer from one identity to another, the emotional 
connotation of the memory may be dissociated, especially in 
the case of negative, trauma-related emotional valence. An 
evaluative conditioning procedure was combined with an 
affective priming procedure, both performed by different 
identities. In the evaluative conditioning procedure, 
previously neutral stimuli come to refer to a negative or 
positive connotation. The affective priming procedure was 
used to test the transfer of this acquired valence to an 
identity reporting interidentity amnesia. Results indicated 
activation of stimulus valence in the affective priming task, 
that is, transfer of emotional material between identities.  
 
 
 
Huntjens, R. J. C., Postma, A., Peters, M. L., Woertman, L., Effting, M., & 
Van der Hart, O. (2003). Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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Introduction 
Dissociative identity disorder (DID) is a psychiatric disorder that is 
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th 
ed., DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as involving the 
presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states, each with its 
own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about 
the environment and the self. The disorder is believed to originate from a 
self-protecting reaction to severe childhood abuse, which the child cannot 
escape from, nor can control or predict (e.g., Putnam, 1997; Ross, 1997). 
Essentially, DID is thought to involve the split between identities in which 
patients experience trauma over and over again and identities in which they 
experience partial or total amnesia for the abuse (cf., Nijenhuis & Van der 
Hart, 1999). The extent to which the personality becomes fragmented into 
more identities depends on the severity of the traumatization in terms of 
developmental age at trauma onset, chronicity and intensity of the 
traumatization, and factors such as the relationship to the perpetrator and 
lack of support and social recognition of the trauma (Nijenhuis, Van der 
Hart, & Steele, 2002). 
In adult DID patients, reports of amnesia between identities generally 
not only include amnesia for traumatic events, but also pertain to daily 
experiences varying from amnesia for specific events to amnesia for all 
events experienced by other identities. The number of experimental studies 
on these reported memory problems is very limited (for a review see 
Dorahy, 2001; see also Allen & Movius, 2000) and besides, only neutral 
stimulus material has been included. Results of previous studies were 
interpreted by Nissen, Ross, Willingham, Mackenzie, and Schacter (1988) 
and Eich, Macaulay, Loewenstein, and Dihle (1997) as indicating 
interidentity amnesia on explicit memory tasks and on conceptual priming 
tasks, and interidentity transfer of information on perceptual priming tasks. 
However, in a recent series of experiments on memory functioning in DID, 
including objective memory tasks on which simulation of interidentity 
amnesia was not possible, we found that patients showed evidence of 
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interidentity memory transfer equal to controls on explicit memory tasks as 
well as conceptual and perceptual priming tasks (Huntjens, Postma, Peters, 
Hamaker, Woertman, & Van der Hart, 2002; Huntjens, Postma, Peters, 
Woertman, & Van der Hart, 2003).  
It can be argued that failures to establish amnesia are due to the fact 
that all previous studies have not used emotional stimuli. Given the fact that 
dissociation is supposed to serve as a self-protective reaction to 
overwhelming traumatic experiences to ward off intense emotional feelings 
with which the individual cannot cope, interidentity amnesia would 
especially be expected to occur for negative emotional stimuli, and in 
particular trauma-related stimuli. Therefore, in a recent experiment we 
tested amnesia for trauma related words in DID patients using an explicit 
memory task in which one identity learned a set of words and the other, 
amnesic, identity was tested for knowledge of these words (Huntjens, 
Postma, Peters, Woertman, & van der Hart, submitted). Again we found no 
objective evidence for the total interidentity amnesia that subjectively was 
reported by DID patients. 
The present experiment seeks to extend our previous work regarding 
transfer of trauma-related material. It may be proposed that interidentity 
amnesia does not pertain so much to the content of material, but more to its 
associated emotional valence. Thus, whereas declarative information may 
transfer from one identity to another, the associated emotional connotation 
of the memory may be dissociated, especially in the case of negative, 
trauma-related emotional valence. In other words, we argue that patients 
may retrieve trauma-related material in a detached way in amnesic identities, 
while experiencing (the full) emotional quality in non-amnesic identities.  
Following De Houwer, Hermans, and Eelen (1998), the present 
experiment consisted of two phases, a learning phase consisting of an 
evaluative conditioning procedure, and a test phase, consisting of an 
affective priming procedure. The two phases were performed by different 
identities. In order to establish an amnesic barrier for the emotional—or 
more specifically trauma-related—valence of the words, it was essential that 
stimuli with a neutral emotional connotation were used that newly acquired 
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their emotional valence, as existing emotional material may already have a 
different valence in the different identity states.  
In the first phase, stimuli that were originally neutral were given an 
emotional connotation by repeatedly pairing them with distinctly negative, 
i.e., trauma-related, and positive words. The term evaluative conditioning 
refers to the observation that the mere spatio-temporal co-occurrence of a 
neutral stimulus X with a valenced stimulus Y may result in the originally 
neutral stimulus X itself acquiring an evaluative meaning that is congruent 
with the valence of Y. The acquired valence is not subject to extinction, as is 
the case in classical conditioning procedures (Hermans, Baeyens, & Eelen, 
in press). Nonwords (e.g., BAYRAM) served as neutral stimuli X and 
existing positive, negative, and neutral words served as valenced stimuli Y. 
The negatively valenced stimuli were chosen to refer to traumatic 
experiences of sexual or physical abuse and emotional neglect reported by 
DID patients.  
Next, it was tested whether this newly acquired emotional valence 
transferred from one identity to another identity reporting amnesia for the 
learning phase. In priming studies, the effect of one stimulus (the prime) on 
the processing of a second stimulus (the target) is determined (De Houwer 
et al., 1998). In affective priming, the priming effect of an affective 
association between prime and target is examined. Responses to target 
words are facilitated if both prime and target have the same valence, and 
inhibited if they are of opposite valence, as compared to the control trials, 
which consist of trials using primes with neutral valence. The affective 
priming procedure thus indexes the stimulus valence that is acquired by 
prior evaluative learning (see also Glautier & De Houwer, 2000; Hermans, 
Baeyens, & Eelen, 2003; Hermans, Baeyens, & Lamote, 2000). In this study, 
the stimuli with newly acquired emotional valence served as primes and the 
existing valenced words used in the learning phase as the targets. In the 
priming phase, there were four possible relations between the nonword 
(prime) and the word (target): (1) the word could have been associated with 
the nonword during the learning phase (identity congruent); (2) it could 
have the same affective connotation as the word that was associated with 
the nonword (affectively congruent); (3) it could have a different affective 
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connotation than the word that was associated with the nonword during the 
learning phase (incongruent); (4) it could have been paired with a neutral 
word in the conditioning phase and thereby act as a control trial in the 
priming phase. Affective priming is demonstrated when response times on 
affectively congruent trials are faster than on incongruent trials. The term 
“episodic identity priming” is preserved for faster responses in trials when a 
nonword precedes the specific word with which it was associated during the 
learning phase, i.e., faster response times on identity congruent trials than on 
affectively congruent trials. If patients are amnesic not for the declarative 
content but for the emotional content of the material, trauma-related primes 
should be processed as neutrally valenced, i.e., no facilitation or inhibition in 
target categorization for trials with trauma-related primes is expected. In 
other words, patients are expected to show a preserved episodic identity 
priming effect while lacking an affective priming effect. 
We included a control group matched on age and education. 
Moreover, we included a second control group instructed to simulate DID. 
Affective priming is supposed to be an automatic process in the sense that it 
can occur independently of an evaluative intention and of awareness of the 
instigating stimulus (e.g. Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001). 
Consequently, affective priming is not (easily) influenced by demand effects 
and response strategies. This makes it a suitable procedure in situations were 
demand effects might otherwise influence responding (Hermans, Spruyt, & 
Eelen, 2003). The simulators were included to ascertain that participants 
were indeed unable to actively suppress the priming effect. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-two DID patients participated. They were recruited in 18 treatment 
settings in the Netherlands and Belgium by asking clinicians to invite 
patients to participate. Conditions for participation were described as 
follows: (1) The DID diagnosis was made by the referring clinician by 
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administration of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative 
Disorders (SCID-D; Steinberg, 1993; Dutch version validated by Boon and 
Draijer, 1993); (2) at least one of the identities report a complete amnesia for 
the events experienced by the other participating identity during the 
experiment; (3) identities are able to perform the tasks without interference 
of other identities; (4) they are able to perform the tasks without 
spontaneous switches to other identities; (5) they are all able to switch 
between identities on request. Patients self-selected two identities that would 
participate in the experiment. The mean number of years since diagnosis of 
DID for patients in the present study was 6 years and DID was always the 
main reason for patients to be in treatment. Twelve patients reported one or 
more prior diagnoses: major depressive disorder (n = 6), borderline 
personality disorder (n = 4), posttraumatic stress disorder (n = 3), anorexia 
nervosa (n = 3), schizophrenia (n = 3), dissociative disorder not otherwise 
specified (n = 2), epilepsy (n = 1), obsessive compulsive disorder (n = 1), 
personality disorder not otherwise specified (n = 1), bipolar disorder (n = 1), 
and avoidant personality disorder (n = 1). Seven patients reported present 
comorbid disorders: major depressive disorder (n = 2), posttraumatic stress 
disorder (n = 2), anorexia nervosa (n = 1), obsessive compulsive disorder (n 
= 1), bipolar disorder (n = 1), personality disorder not otherwise specified (n 
= 1), and avoidant personality disorder (n = 1). 
In addition, 50 female non-psychiatric control participants 
participated. They were community volunteers and received a small 
payment. They did not report any relevant memory, visual, attentional 
problems or psychiatric disorders and no history of sexual abuse. Control 
participants were assigned randomly to either a control group or a 
simulating group. Groups were matched as closely as possible on age (M = 
39.95, SD = 8.81 for patients [n = 22], M = 36.48, SD = 8.17 for normal 
controls [n = 25], and M = 36.72, SD = 7.88 for simulators [n = 25]) and 
education, which was assessed in categories ranging from 1(low) to 7 (high) 
(Verhage, 1964), (M = 5.36, SD = 1.59 for patients, M = 5.76, SD = 1.13 
for normal controls, and M = 5.68, SD = 1.18 for simulators). Participants 
in the simulating group were instructed to mimic DID. They were shown a 
documentary about a DID patient and were given additional written 
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information about DID. They were subsequently asked to make up an 
imaginary, amnesic identity and come up with detailed characteristics of this 
identity. Following Silberman, Putnam, Weingartner, Braun, & Post’s (1985) 
procedure, they were given a 17-item data sheet for the identity on which 
they were asked to assign name, age, sex, physical description, personal 
history, and personality style. Examination of the completed data sheets 
confirmed that participants had spent considerable effort inventing an 
identity. Finally, they were asked to practice during the week preceding the 
test in switching to their “identity” and taking on its state of mind. 
Participants in the normal control group were only told that they 
participated in a memory experiment. No information was provided on the 
DID related aspects of the study. 
All participants completed both the Dissociative Experiences Scale 
(DES; Carlson & Putnam, 1993) and the Creative Experience Questionnaire 
(CEQ; Merckelbach, Rassin, & Muris, 2000). The DES is a 28-item self-
report questionnaire with scores ranging from 0 to 100. Scores above 20, or 
more conservatively, above 30 are thought to be indicative of pathological 
dissociation (Carlson & Putnam, 1993). The CEQ is a Dutch 25-item self-
report questionnaire with scores ranging from 0 to 25. High scores are 
thought to be indicative of “fantasy proneness”, i.e., the inclination to be 
immersed in daydreams and fantasies. Mean scores on the DES were M = 
52.19 (SD = 16.41) for patients [n = 22], M = 9.81 (SD = 8.11) for normal 
controls, and M = 8.11 (SD = 4.71) for simulators. Scores on the CEV were 
M = 9.70 (SD = 4.50) for patients [n = 22], M = 6.52 (SD = 3.29) for 
normal controls, and M = 6.64 (SD = 4.02) for simulators. Control 
participants did thus not show a pathological level of dissociation as 
measured by the DES. The normal control group and the simulating control 
group did not differ significantly on DES, t(48) = 0.91, p = .37. They also 
did not differ significantly on CEQ, t(48) = -0.12, p = .91. Patients on the 
other hand differed significantly from normal controls both on the DES, 
t(45) = 11.44, p < .01, and the CEQ, t(45) = 2.79, p = .01. Written informed 
consent was obtained from patients as well as all control participants prior 
to participation. 
 
 132 
Materials  
The material in the evaluative conditioning task and the affective priming 
task consisted of 10 Turkish words (e.g., BAYRAM) and 10 Dutch words. 
The Turkish words were unknown to the participants and thus can be 
regarded as nonwords. They were selected from the materials used by Yazuv 
(1963) and were also used in a study by De Houwer et al. (1998). Of the 
Dutch words, four were trauma-related (RAPE, FEAR, KNIVES, and 
INCEST), four were positive (PEACE, HUMOR, RAINBOW, and 
BEAUTY), and two were neutral (MOTOR-BUS and SOCCER). They 
were selected from a study performed by Hermans and De Houwer (1994), 
in which affective and subjective familiarity ratings of 740 Dutch words 
were determined on seven-point visual analogue scales. Scales ranged from 
negative (1) to positive (7) and from unfamiliar (1) to familiar (7). The mean 
affective rating for the trauma-related words was 1.82, for the positive 
words 6.11, and for the neutral words, 3.84. The mean subjective familiarity 
rating for the trauma-related words was 4.36, for the positive words 4.95, 
and for the neutral words, 4.84. The mean number of letters per word for 
the trauma-related words was 7.25, for the positive words 7.25, and for the 
neutral words 7.00. All words and nonwords were presented in white 
uppercase letters. 
 
Procedure 
The study consisted of an evaluative conditioning phase and an affective 
priming phase, performed by different identities. The evaluative 
conditioning phase consisted of an evaluative rating task, an evaluative 
conditioning task, a cued recall task, and a second evaluative rating task. In 
the first evaluative rating phase, the participants rated words on valence to 
provide a base rating. All 20 (nonwords as well as existing words) words 
were rated on a paper-and-pencil version of the Self-Assessment Manikin 
(SAM, see Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992), used to rate affective 
valence. The scale ranges from 1 (happy/positive) to 9 (unhappy/negative).  
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In the evaluative conditioning task, nonword-word pairs were 
learned. Participants were told that words from a non-Dutch language 
would be presented together with their Dutch translations, and they were 
instructed to memorize the translation of each word. They were told that we 
wanted to investigate how quickly they could learn the meaning of non-
Dutch words. For each participant, the computer program randomly 
assigned each nonword to a different (trauma-related, positive, or neutral) 
Dutch word. All resulting 10 nonword-word pairs were then presented six 
times in a randomized order. Each subject received a different randomized 
order. Also, the presentation of a pair could only be repeated after all other 
pairs had been presented for an equal number of times. On each trial, a dash 
was presented in the middle of the screen together with a nonword that was 
located at the left side of the dash. After 1 s, the so-called translation 
appeared on the right side of the dash. The word and nonword were 
presented together for 5 s. The inter-trial interval was 3 s. 
When all pairs were presented six times, a cued recall test was 
administered in order to see how well participants had learned the pairs. On 
each trial, a nonword was presented in the middle of the screen and 
participants were instructed to try to recall the correct translation and write 
it down. If they could not remember the correct translation, they had the 
opportunity to guess but could also proceed without giving a response. The 
next word appeared 3 s after a response had been entered. Nonwords were 
presented in a randomly determined order. 
In the second evaluative rating phase, the participants again rated the 
words on valence using the Self-Assessment Manikin to provide an index of 
evaluative conditioning. 
In the affective priming phase, the nonwords served as primes and 
the trauma-related words and positive words served as targets. The neutral 
words did not appear in the priming phase. On each trial, a nonword was 
presented, followed by an existing word with a positive or negative affective 
connotation. The task consisted of naming the affective connotation of the 
existing word as quickly as possible. For half of the subjects, the m-key on 
the keyboard was the “NEGATIVE” key and the z-key was the 
“POSITIVE” key. For the other half, the correspondence between key and 
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response was reversed. We stressed that the existing word was important 
and that the non-Dutch word was added to make the task resemble 
conditions in normal text reading. Participants were asked not to divert their 
eyes from the presentation of the prime.  
The priming phase consisted of two blocks of 80 trials, that is 32 
affectively congruent trials (of which 8 identity congruent), 32 incongruent 
trials, and 16 control trials. A brief break appeared after the first block of 80 
trials.  Presentation order was randomized separately for each participant. A 
trial consisted of the following sequence: a fixation cross (500 ms), a blank 
screen (200 ms), the prime for 200 ms, and the target. The delay between 
the onset of the prime and target (stimulus onset asynchrony; SOA) thus 
was 200 ms. The target was presented until a response was registered. Both 
stimuli were presented in the center of the screen. The inter-trial interval 
was 2 s. 
Patients were asked to switch identities between the evaluative 
conditioning phase and the test phase. The transition was initiated by asking 
the patient to let an identity “come forward” and take control over the 
patient’s consciousness and behavior. Also, the patient was asked to let the 
other participating identity “step back” and move out of consciousness. The 
switching process was assisted either by the patients’ own clinician or by one 
of the authors (R.H. or O.V.). The switching process was always 
accomplished in less than 2 min. 
Participants in the simulating control group performed the evaluative 
conditioning phase while being in their normal identity state and the 
affective priming after having “switched” to their imagined “amnesic” 
identity. Before “switching” to their other identity, they were instructed to 
pretend that they did not know their normal identity had seen foreign words 
and their translation. They were also asked not to respond faster to Dutch 
words when it was preceded by it’s translation, while still trying to respond 
as quickly as possible. Subsequently, they were given 2 min to take on the 
other identity’s state of mind. Participants in the control group performed 
the task without switching. Instead, they had a 2-min break to keep the 
length of procedures equal between groups. The study was part of a larger 
investigation on memory (dis)abilities in DID. 
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Results 
Of the 22 DID patients tested, one patient reported, after her switch to 
Identity 2, knowledge of the learning phase. This patient was not included in 
the analysis. Two patients did not complete the tasks because the procedure 
proved too taxing for them. The data thus pertain to 19 DID patients who 
subjectively reported complete one-way amnesia for the learning phase 
including the words presented. An alpha level of .05 was used for all 
statistical tests and all tests described were two-tailed. All multiple-
comparison procedures described were Bonferroni tests. 
 
Cued recall 
Patients correctly recalled 74% of the trauma-related word-nonword pairs, 
71% of the positive word-nonword pairs, and 82% of the neutral word-
nonword pairs. Normal controls recalled 83% of the trauma-related word-
nonword pairs, 86% of the positive word-nonword pairs, and 90% of the 
neutral word-nonword pairs, and simulating controls recalled 91% of the 
trauma-related word-nonword pairs, 82% of the positive word-nonword 
pairs, and 92% of the neutral word-nonword pairs. Analysis was 
accomplished by repeated measures analysis of variance with word category 
[trauma-related vs. positive vs. neutral] as within-subjects factor, and 
diagnosis [patients vs. controls vs. simulators] as between-subjects factor. 
The analysis revealed a significant word category main effect, F(2, 65) = 
3.76, p = .03, reflecting a significant higher neutral word recall when 
compared to positive words, F(1, 66) = 7.48, p = .01. The diagnosis main 
effect was not significant, F(2, 66) = 1.75, p = .18, and neither was the 
Diagnosis x Word Category interaction, F(4, 132) = 0.94, p = .45. 
 
Manipulation check 
Mean patient base ratings on the SAM of existing words were 8.34 (SD = 
0.91) for trauma-related words, 2.82 (SD = 1.60) for positive words, and 
5.03 (SD = 1.42) for neutral words. Normal controls’ mean ratings were 
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8.13 (SD = 1.07) for trauma-related words, 1.84 (SD = 1.15) for positive 
words, and 4.72 (SD = 1.60) for neutral words. Simulating controls’ mean 
ratings were 8.29 (SD = 0.75) for trauma-related words, 1.76 (SD = 0.69) 
for positive words, and 5.34 (SD = 1.40) for neutral words. An analysis of 
variance revealed a significant main effect of word category, F(2, 65) = 
407.30, p < .01. Within-subjects contrasts indicated that trauma-related 
words were rated significantly more negative/unhappy than positive words, 
F(1, 66) = 820.09, p < .01, and neutral words, F(1, 66) = 207.55, p < .01. 
Positive words were rated more positive/happy than neutral words, F(1, 66) 
= 206.81, p < .01. The diagnosis main effect did marginally reach 
significance, F(2, 66) = 3.09, p = .05, with patients rating words more 
negative/unhappy than normal controls, p = .05. The Word Category x 
Diagnosis interaction was not significant F(4, 132) = 2.02, p = .10. 
 
Evaluative conditioning  
Participants’ mean base ratings of nonwords on the SAM and mean ratings 
in the second rating, after nonwords had been paired with existing words, 
are presented in Table 1. An ANOVA on the base ratings of the nonwords 
revealed that diagnosis groups did not differ significantly in base ratings, 
F(2, 66) = 0.84 p = .43. A repeated measures analysis of variance on the 
second ratings indicated a significant main effect for word category, F(2, 65) 
= 81.17, p < .01. Within-subjects contrasts revealed that trauma-related 
words differed significantly from positive words, F(1, 66) = 156.52, p < .01, 
and from neutral words, F(1, 66) = 101.47, p < .01. Positive words also 
differed significantly from neutral words, F(1, 66) = 42.18, p < .01. This 
effect did not differ between diagnosis groups, F(4, 132) = 0.07, p = .99. 
Also, the diagnosis main effect was not significant, F(2, 66) = 1.18, p = .31. 
Evaluative conditioning thus seemed successful to an equal degree in DID 
patients, normal controls and simulators. 
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Table 1. Evaluative Conditioning: SAM (Self-Assessment Manikin) Ratings 
for Nonwords for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) Patients (n = 19), 
Controls (n = 25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
 DID patients Controls Simulators 
First rating 5.29 (0.60) 5.25 (0.86) 5.04 (0.58) 
    
Second rating    
Nonwords paired with 
trauma-related words 
7.53 (1.66) 7.11 (1.29)
  
7.37 (1.31) 
Nonwords paired with 
positive words 
3.57 (2.26) 3.23 (1.46) 3.27 (1.66) 
Nonwords paired with 
neutral words 
5.29 (1.73) 4.78 (1.25) 4.88 (1.56) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
Affective priming  
Mean errors on identity congruent, affective congruent, incongruent, and 
control trials differed between 5% and 9% for patients, between 3% and 7% 
for controls, and between 2% and 4% for simulators. An analysis of 
variance yielded no significant main effects or interactions, except for a 
significant diagnosis main effect, F(2, 66) = 4.81, p = .01, with multiple-
comparison showing that patients made significantly more errors than 
simulators, p = .01, but not significant more errors than normal controls, p 
= .56. Simulators also did not differ significantly from normal controls, p = 
.20. 
In calculating mean response times, we excluded incorrect responses 
and response times below 250 ms and response times that were three or 
more standard deviations from the mean per item and per participant from 
the data analyses. Mean response times for DID patients, controls, and 
simulators can be found in Table 2. A repeated measures analysis of 
variance on mean response times showed a significant congruence effect, 
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F(3, 64) = 7.87, p < .01. Within-subjects contrasts showed that subjects 
responded significantly faster to identity congruent trials in comparison with 
affective congruent trials, F(1, 66) = 4.38, p = .04, and significantly faster to 
affective congruent trials than to incongruent trials, F(1, 66) = 6.26, p = .02. 
Reaction times on incongruent trials did not differ significantly from control 
trials, F(1, 66) = 0.39, p = .54. Affective congruent trials also did differ 
significantly from control trials, F(1, 66) = 4.49, p = .04. 
 
Table 2. Response Times (in Milliseconds) for Trauma-Related and Positive 
Identity Congruent, Affective Congruent, Incongruent, and Control Trials 
for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) Patients (n = 19), Controls (n = 
25), and Simulators (n = 25) 
 DID patients Controls Simulators 
Trauma-related    
Identity congruent trials 725 (142) 558 (71) 610 (94) 
Affective congruent trials 739 (137) 576 (68) 625 (97) 
Incongruent trials 744 (124) 588 (65) 628 (95) 
Control trials 755 (142) 588 (66) 630 (96) 
    
Positive    
Identity congruent trials 747 (182) 573 (79) 614 (118) 
Affective congruent trials 770 (158) 570 (75) 620 (95) 
Incongruent trials 779 (160) 579 (68) 631 (98) 
Control trials 753 (155) 581 (68) 631 (107) 
Note. The values represent means (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
Most important, the three-way interaction Congruence x Valence x 
Diagnosis was far from significant, F(6, 130) = 1.17, p = .33, indicating 
patients did not show a trauma-related specific lack of affective priming, 
which would be expected in case of interidentity amnesia for emotional 
valence for trauma-related material. Also, the two-way interaction 
Congruence x Diagnosis proved nonsignificant, F(6, 130) = 0.53, p = .79, 
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indicating that the pattern of congruence did not differ between diagnosis 
groups, although response times show a lack of episodic identity priming for 
positive trials in normal controls. 
A nonsignificant interaction Congruence x Valence, F(3, 64) = 1.18, p 
= .33, indicated the congruence effect did not differ between trauma-related 
and positive trials. Also, the valence main effect was not significant, F(1, 66) 
= 1.53, p = .22, and neither was the Valence x Diagnosis interaction, F(2, 
66) = 1.53, p = .22. 
 Again, we found a significant diagnosis effect, F(2, 66) = 16.91, p < 
.01. A multiple-comparison procedure indicated DID patients were 
significantly slower than normal controls, p < .01, and simulators, p < .01. 
Normal controls did not differ significantly in mean reaction time from 
simulators, p = .31. 
Discussion 
The neutral ratings on the SAM (Self-Assessment Manikin) showed that the 
Turkish words used in this study as neutrally valenced nonwords could 
indeed be regarded as such. Furthermore, we can conclude that the 
nonwords, initially being rated as neutral by all diagnosis groups, acquired 
the valence of the trauma-related and positive words they were paired with 
in the cued recall task, as is evident from their significantly different positive 
and negative ratings on the SAM in the second rating. There was no 
difference in ratings in the second rating between diagnosis groups, so 
evaluative conditioning proved successful to an equal degree in both control 
groups as well as in DID patients. Also, participants did not differ in cued 
recall of the ‘meaning’ of the nonwords. 
Crucial for the phenomenon of interidentity amnesia in DID was the 
word categorization task performed in the affective priming phase that was 
used to determine the transfer of the newly acquired valence between 
identities. All subjects showed evidence of a significant episodic priming 
effect for trauma-related material, and patients as well as simulating controls 
revealed a significant episodic priming effect for positive material, as is 
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evident from their faster responses on identity congruent trials compared to 
their responses on affective congruent trials. All subjects had an affective 
priming effect for both trauma-related as well as positive words, as is 
evident from their faster responses on affectively congruent trials compared 
to their responses on incongruent trials. In the patient group, one patient 
reported knowledge of the learning phase, after her switch to Identity 2. All 
patients, but one, reported a complete amnesia for the words learned in the 
evaluative conditioning phase. In case of amnesia for the trauma-related 
content of the material, we expected trauma-related primes to be processed 
as neutrally valenced, i.e., no facilitation or inhibition in target categorization 
for trials with trauma-related primes. We found patients, however, not to 
differ significantly from normal controls and simulating controls in the 
congruence effect. The study thus shows evidence of patients’ transfer of 
declarative content, as evidenced by an identity priming effect, as well as of 
emotional connotation, as indicated by an affective priming effect, of 
trauma-related words between identities. Thus, in contrast to patients’ 
reports, we found evidence of intact memory functioning in DID. 
Several differences between our study and the De Houwer et al. 
(1998) study may be noted. De Houwer et al. found that responses were 
significantly faster to positively valenced targets compared to negatively 
valenced targets. The positive and negative targets used in that study were, 
however, not matched on word frequency and they argued this might have 
caused the difference in response times. In the present study, positive and 
negative target words were matched on frequency, subjective familiarity, as 
well as on number of letters per word. We did not find a significant valence 
effect in word categorization, confirming their reasoning that 
incomparability of stimuli rather than word valence caused the faster 
responses to positive targets found in their study. Other additions to the 
procedure used by De Houwer et al. (1998) were the inclusion of pre- and 
post-learning evaluative rating tasks to measure evaluative conditioning and 
the inclusion of neutral words in the cued recall task to generate neutrally 
valenced nonwords as control primes in the affective priming task. We did 
not find a significant difference between incongruent trials and control 
trials, thus no significant evidence of inhibition in target categorization, but 
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we did find a significant difference between affective congruent trials and 
control trials, reflecting facilitation in categorization.  
In conclusion, in this study not only the declarative content of the 
stimulus material transferred between identities, but also stimulus valence 
newly acquired by one identity transferred to another, amnesic identity, as 
evidenced by the presence of an affective priming effect. This occurred for 
both positive as well as negative, trauma-related, emotional valence. 
Together with observations of explicit and implicit memory transfer of 
neutral material and explicit memory transfer of trauma-related material 
found in previous studies (Huntjens et al., 2002; Huntjens et al., 2003; 
Huntjens et al., submitted), the present study clearly indicates that there is 
no objective evidence of amnesic barriers between identities. Fragmentation 
in DID seems not to have a bearing on memory functioning in DID.  
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The aim of this thesis was to provide a systematic exploration of 
interidentity amnesia in dissociative identity disorder (DID) for both neutral 
as well as trauma-related information. Based on clinical reports, amnesia on 
explicit memory tasks, i.e., memory tasks requiring conscious retrieval of 
previously learned information, was expected, and possibly also amnesia on 
implicit memory tasks, i.e., memory tasks that do not require conscious 
retrieval. However, combining the results of all the memory tests used, the 
conclusion that can be drawn is, that on the tasks on which simulation by 
instructed controls proved impossible, the patients’ results indicated 
complete transfer of information between the identities tested.  
On the episodic memory test with neutral stimulus material described 
in chapter two, the patients’ results concerning interidentity amnesia proved 
comparable to controls. Patients recognized words that had been presented 
within the same identity as well as words that had been presented to another 
identity, but incorrectly claimed the latter were presented within the same 
identity. Patients did not show significant evidence of qualitatively different 
ways of retrieving information learned by the same versus another identity, 
as indexed by the remember-know measures. No evidence was thus found 
for the idea that the retrieval of events experienced in the same state is 
characterized by an autonoetic state of consciousness, whereas the retrieval 
of events experienced in other identities is characterized by a noetic state of 
awareness or lack of personification (cf. Van der Hart & Nijenhuis, 2001). 
On the implicit priming tasks with neutral stimulus material described in 
chapter three, patients also scored equally to controls. Both on data driven 
tasks, that are relatively ‘low-level’ priming tasks, in that they do not require 
semantic interpretation of the material, and on conceptually driven tasks, 
information transferred from the identity performing the learning phase to 
the identity that claimed amnesia performing the test phase.   
The patient performance on one task, the serial reaction time task 
described in chapter four, seems to indicate evidence of interidentity 
amnesia, i.e., a lack of transfer of procedural learning between identities. 
However, the simulators’ ability to feign amnesia on the task renders it 
impossible to interpret the patients’ scores as either interidentity amnesia or 
simulation. It is important to note that if controls instructed to simulate 
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DID had not been included, the results would have been taken as evidence 
of interidentity amnesia. This study thus was important in demonstrating the 
necessity for using simulation-free memory tasks and/or including DID-
simulators in order to make definite claims about amnesia in DID. 
Although the absence of interidentity amnesia on the tasks described 
above can be ascribed to the neutral valence of the stimulus material, the 
results of the tasks discussed in chapters five and six cannot. In these tasks, 
words concerning sexual and physical abuse were included, like the words 
“incest” and “pain”. In the episodic task (chapter five), patients’ results 
revealed that they were able to consciously retrieve trauma-related 
information learned by another identity. The results of this study coincide 
with the only other study that tested interidentity memory transfer in DID 
for trauma-related material, performed by Elzinga, Phaf, Ardon, and Van 
Dyck (2003). In this study, 12 DID patients were included, who switched 
from one identity to a second identity claiming amnesia between 
presentation and memory testing, a procedure comparable to the studies 
presented in this thesis. The results indicated that, in their amnesic identity, 
patients did not show a reduced recall of emotional words relative to neutral 
words, which would have been expected if switching from one identity to 
another has the function to avoid emotionally charged memories.  
Based on these findings, it was then argued that whereas amnesia in 
DID does not seem to pertain to the declarative meaning of stimulus 
material, the transfer of emotional connotation may be blocked between 
identities. The evaluative conditioning / affective priming procedure 
employed in chapter six, however, did not support this hypothesis. The 
results of patients did not differ significantly from normal controls and 
simulating controls in the affective priming effect, indicating transfer of 
emotional connotation between identities.  
Taken together, no evidence of identity state-specific memory 
encoding and/or retrieval was found in the studies discussed in this thesis. 
Neither the memory system and memory processes involved nor the 
emotional valence of the material seem critical factors in establishing 
evidence of interidentity amnesia in DID. In terms of mood dependent 
memory, the temporary mood states characterizing identities in DID did not 
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cause any significant context dependent memory effects on all the memory 
indicators used, both on tasks of free recall and recognition and on tasks 
that are perceptually driven as well as on tasks that are conceptually driven. 
In terms of the Headed Records model (Morton, 1991, 1994), tasks that did 
require self-verification were included, as well as tasks that did not require 
self-verification. An example of a task that did require self-verification is the 
episodic task, where patients were asked to retrieve words they themselves had 
learned and assign them to their own list, whereas an example of a task that 
did not require self-verification is the word-stem completion tasks (chapter 
three), where patients were asked to complete word stems with the first 
word that popped into mind. The heading of records thus seems not 
identity-dependent, as seems the formation of descriptions that guide the 
search process.  
External Validity 
Why did we fail to find evidence of amnesia between identities given the 
consistent clinical presentation of this symptom in the DID therapists’ 
office? There are two possible answers to this question: (1) failure to find 
evidence of interidentity amnesia results from the lack of external validity, or 
generalization, of the patient sample, stimulus material, or procedure 
employed, or (2) interidentity amnesia actually is not an objective verifiable 
feature of DID. These two possibilities will now be discussed in detail, 
beginning with the possible lack of generalizability of our findings.  
One type of generalizability is population generalizability, i.e., the 
question of whether the test results of the patient samples can be 
generalized to the target population of all DID patients. The patients in the 
studies all had spent considerable time in therapy and they were able to 
switch between identities upon request, and perform tasks without 
spontaneous switches to other identities and without interference of other 
identities. It may well be the case that these abilities, partly learned in 
therapy, have lessened prior existing symptoms of amnesia.  
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A crucial issue that has to be taken into account in establishing the 
validity of the current study is that patients did repeatedly report interidentity 
amnesia during the test procedures and data of patients who reported even 
the slightest knowledge of either the material learned or the learning 
procedure itself were discarded from analyses, rendering the sample 
homogenous for reporting dense interidentity amnesia. Also, the present 
patient sample was the largest sample ever included in experimental memory 
research with this population. 
The second type of generalizability is ecological validity, i.e., whether 
the research findings can be generalized to other situations. Clearly, because 
of ethical reasons, traumatic experiences should not be induced in the 
laboratory. All experimental research in the area of traumatic stress thus is 
limited in its generalizability to real-life. The studies presented in this thesis 
are no exception in this regard and the material and procedure used may 
certainly be questioned for its generalizability. Although the trauma-related 
material included words specifically related to sexual and physical abuse, the 
use of single words might not reflect the multifaceted, highly emotional 
events of abuse reported by patients. These may be better indexed by 
trauma-scripts consisting of patients’ verbal accounts of personally 
experienced events to heighten emotional re-experiencing of the trauma 
during testing (e.g., Tucker et al., 2000). Also, the exclusive reliance on 
verbal stimuli to index transfer of trauma-related information between 
identities may have lowered the ecological validity. Pictorial stimuli of 
traumatic cues may more directly tap the patients’ experiences. Also, the 
time between the presentation and the testing of material, ranging from 
minutes to a week, may have been too short for dissociation processes to 
occur. Finally, the restricted use of anterograde memory tests in this thesis, 
testing memory for newly learned events, in comparison with retrograde 
memory tests, determining memory for events experienced in the (distant) 
past, may have lowered the ecological validity.  
Importantly, however, the use of more standardized stimuli and 
procedures in tests of anterograde amnesia instead of the use of semantically 
more comprehensive material in retrograde tests did enable us to objectively  
test amnesia in DID, an important aim given mixed results of previous 
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studies in this area and the fierce discussion in the field. Also, the material 
used was checked for face validity by two therapists treating patients with 
DID, and all trauma-related stimuli were rated by subjects for emotional 
valence.  
The Discordance between Objective Test Results and 
Subjective Patient Reports 
As noted, an alternative explanation for the failure to find objective 
evidence for amnesia between identities in the studies discussed in this 
thesis, is that interidentity amnesia actually is not an objective symptom of 
DID. But how can the discrepancy between patient’s reports of interidentity 
amnesia and the lack of objective test results be reconciled? One possible 
answer to this question is that patients were consciously feigning symptoms 
of amnesia, possibly encouraged by a need to assume a sick role [cf. the 
factitious disorder mentioned in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (4th ed., DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 
1994)]. One should be extremely careful, however, in drawing such 
conclusion, since other explanations of the patients’ behavior are possible, 
in which a more unconscious origin of the patients’ reports of amnesia is 
assumed and in which their reports of subjectively experienced amesia are 
taken as sincere. Examples of discrepancies between sincere reports about 
what subjects are experiencing, and what their objective behavior suggests 
they are experiencing, can be found both inside and outside the field of 
dissociation. Cardeña (1994) mentioned examples in the study of conversion 
disorder, in which voluntary motor or sensory function is affected which 
cannot be explained by a medical condition (see also Roelofs et al., 2001; 
Roelofs, Van Galen, Keijsers. & Hoogduin, 2002), and in the condition of  
“blindsight”, a neurological syndrome resulting from visual-cortical lesions, 
in which patients can respond to visual stimuli in the blind field without 
their conscious acknowledgement (see also De Gelder, De Haan, & 
Heywood, 2001; Schacter, 1996). More examples of the same phenomenon 
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can be found in the clinical literature, as in the case of body dysmorphic 
disorder, in which the patient is preoccupied with an imagined defect in 
appearance (Jerome, 1980, 1992), and anorexia nervosa, characterized by an 
overestimation in body image. The latter disorder will now be described in 
more detail.  
Anorexia nervosa is described in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) as a disturbance in the way in which one’s body weight 
or shape is experienced. A patient with anorexia feels and judges herself as 
fat and claims to “see” herself as fat, despite the fact that she is 
underweight. The disturbance in body image is not due to any visual 
perceptual deficit. Originally, the body is thus not perceived as fatter. 
Rather, the distorted image results from the influence of the patient’s idea of 
what an ideal body looks like, and the discontent that results from the 
comparison between her own body and this overexaggerated ideal body. It 
is thus the inaccurate cognitive-evaluative appraisal of an intact perceptual 
body size that results in the distorted body image. Needless to say, patients 
engage in harmful, further dieting based on this distorted body image 
(Gardner & Bokenkamp, 1996; Skrzypek, Wehemeier, & Reschmidt, 2001; 
Smeets, Ingelby, Hoek, & Panhuysen, 1999).  
Analogous to the intact visual perception in anorexia nervosa, the 
results of this thesis show an intact interidentity memory transfer in DID. 
This grossly contrasts, however, with the patients’ reports of interidentity 
amnesia. Akin to the process in anorexia, the DID patients’ experience of 
amnesia may result from a faulty cognitive evaluation of a recollection after 
intact memory retrieval. Although amnesia has been considered to be the 
cause of identity problems in DID, actually it may be the other way around. 
In contrast to non-patients, who experience the self as having a relative 
coherence and cohesion, a sense of I, which persists through varying and 
conflicting experiences and which has continuity over time, DID patients 
suffer from extreme identity confusion. They experience themselves as 
having multiple identities, with separate bodies, sometimes of opposite 
gender, and differing in age and predominant affect (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994; Boon & Draijer, 1993; Kluft, 1991; Putnam, 1997). 
Patients also report hearing the voices of other identities talking out loud to 
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them inside their heads, which, in a particular identity, are experienced as 
fully ego-dystonic, as not-self (Ross, 1999). Because patients are convinced 
of having different identities, they may construct an image of their 
memories being compartmentalized in these separate identities. This 
distortion may lead them not to use those retrieved memories that they are 
convinced “belong” to other identities. Deciding not to use correctly 
retrieved information then lies at the basis of the amnesia-like behaviors 
described in the DES-T (Waller, Putnam, & Carlson, 1996) and the SCID-D 
(Steinberg, 1993), like finding new things among their belongings that they 
do not remember buying, and not recognizing friends or family members. 
These behaviors may thus reflect the patient’s appraisal of retrieved 
memories as ego-dystonic or ego-syntonic rather than a memory encoding 
and/or retrieval impairment.  
There is one finding that needs explanation in the light of the 
hypothesized behavior in DID made here, and that is that patients, in the 
episodic memory task with neutral material (chapter one), assigned retrieved 
material that originated from the list learned by the other identity to their 
own list (chapter two). It is argued that patients’ beliefs might lead them not 
to use material “belonging” to other identities, whereas in this test they did 
retrieve material learned by another identity, but denied the source of the 
information. However, important to note in this regard is that the 
simulators in this study also were unable to selectively retrieve information 
learned in their “amnesic” state or discriminate the material from both lists 
on the list assignment task. Comparably, patients may have been unable to 
categorize material as ego-dystonic or ego-syntonic. Patients assigned the 
majority of retrieved words to their own list, probably reasoning that if they 
had retrieved the items, the items belonged to their own list. 
Based on the results of this thesis, some tentative recommendations 
for therapy may be provided. In psychotherapy, the patient’s subjective 
experience is the starting-point for treatment. This is not altered by the lack 
of objective findings for interidentity amnesia in this thesis. However, it 
does seem important to reckon with the evidence of an intact, shared 
functional memory system in DID found in this thesis. As explained, 
patients may decide at some point not to use information that they have 
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correctly retrieved, based on their appraisal of the material as ego-dystonic. 
In the therapeutic contact, the patient’s subjective experience of 
fragmentation and compartmentalization of memory can be acknowledged 
as an authentic, genuine experience. At the same time, however, it may be 
explained to the patients that their belief may in fact be a distortion that was 
functional in the past, but no longer is in the present. 
Evaluation of the sociocognitive model  
A question that follows from our explanation of reported symptoms of 
amnesia in DID is how our results relate to the sociocognitive model’s 
claims. As argued above, an unequivocal claim of conscious simulation 
cannot be made based on the results of this thesis. Proponents of the 
sociocognitive model would claim, however, that although role enactment is 
goal-directed, the concept does not imply that role-related behaviors are 
necessarily the products of conscious deception. Instead, they claim that 
role enactments “tend to flow spontaneously and are carried out with little 
or no conscious awareness and with a high degree of ‘organismic 
involvement’ such that the role and the ‘self’… coalesce so as to become 
essentially indistinguishable” (Lilienfeld et al., 1999, p. 508). Following this 
conceptualization of role enactment, the results of transfer of information 
instead of amnesia between identities found in this thesis could be regarded 
as evidence for the sociocognitive model. However, such a conclusion 
would not be warranted because the distinction between the sociocognitive 
model and the posttraumatic model basically is one of etiology: the 
posttraumatic model assumes dissociation to involve some kind of 
fragmentation or splitting in reaction to childhood trauma. The 
posttraumatic model considers dissociation to start in adulthood with 
patients endorsing an image of themselves having multiple identities. The 
studies presented here were not studies of etiology, but studies of symptoms 
reported by patients.  
It should be noted that some recent studies have found 
collaborative evidence for the childhood abuse reported by DID patients 
 154 
(Coons, 1994; Hornstein & Putnam, 1992; Lewis, Yeager, Swica, Pincus, & 
Lewis, 1997). An objective verification of reported childhood abuse in DID 
is, however, not sufficient to falsify the sociocognitive model. To name but 
one reason, patients with factitious disorder simulating DID are also 
thought to have suffered from severe caretaker dysfunction and possibly 
childhood trauma (Brown & Scheflin, 1999; Putnam, 1999). This lead 
Marmer (1999) to postulate the possibility of factitious identity disorder 
itself being a trauma disorder. Ultimately, the sociocognitive model can only 
be falsified by demonstrating that dissociation, in the sense of a 
fragmentation of dissociative identities, is a reaction to abuse and that 
identities do not emerge as a consequence of iatrogenesis or exposure to 
other knowledge concerning the expected features of DID available to 
patients.  
Conclusion and future research 
The studies assembled in this thesis all provide evidence of an intact, shared 
functional memory system in DID. Reported amnesia between identities in 
DID thus seems not to be an impairment in encoding and/or retrieval of 
information, but may rather reflect the patient’s distorted beliefs about her 
memory functioning. Based on the appraisal of material as ego-dystonic, 
patients may decide not to use information that they have correctly 
retrieved. Future research might focus on the patient’s faulty appraisal of 
retrieved events in DID. Instruments should be developed that assess the 
patient’s conscious evaluation of retrieved memories in more depth 
clarifying their meta-memory and their awareness thereof. Both the nature 
and degree of cognitive distortions should be addressed.  
 Furthermore, although no evidence was found of separate 
functional memory systems in DID in this thesis, this does not preclude that 
in future research, objective evidence may be found for other memory 
disturbances in DID. Putnam (1997) mentioned DID patients’ deficits in 
source amnesia, i.e., the difficulty in determining whether a given memory 
reflects an actual event or information acquired through a nonexperiential 
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source (e.g., reading or hearing about the event), and deficits in retrieval of 
retrograde autobiographical knowledge. On the latter subject, some case-
studies have been performed (see Bryant, 1995; Schacter, Kihlstrom, 
Kihlstrom, & Berran, 1989), but since these studies do not qualify as 
objective memory studies, additional research is required. 
 What do the results of this thesis learn us about the process of 
dissociation? Steinberg (1995) distinguishes five core dissociative symptoms: 
amnesia, depersonalization, derealization, identity confusion, and identity 
fragmentation. She describes depersonalization as feeling detached from the 
self, feeling that the self is strange or unreal, feeling detached from your 
emotions, or feeling that you are an automaton or robot. Derealization 
includes feelings of estrangement or detachment from the environment, or a 
sense that the environment is unreal. Identity confusion is defined as a 
subjective feeling of uncertainty, puzzlement, or conflict about one’s own 
identity. Finally, identity alteration is described as a patient’s shift in identity, 
which is observed by others through changes in the person’s behavior.  
The results of this thesis predominantly bear on the symptom of 
amnesia. The symptom of amnesia is, however, intrinsically linked with the 
symptom of identity alteration, since shifts in identity often involve amnesic 
episodes in which a person is unable to remember events that occurred 
before undergoing an identity switch (Steinberg, 1995). Moving the 
discussion a bit further, it can be argued, that observed separate functional 
memory systems would be supportive of the existence of separate, 
fragmented identities. The results of transfer found in this thesis then 
indicate the reverse, namely that possibly, DID patients are not 
characterized by a fragmentation of identity. This is not to say that patients 
do not suffer from severe identity confusion. Indeed, the subjective 
experience of identity confusion may lie at the root of their experienced 
memory problems, as discussed above. Raising doubts about the existence 
of identity fragmentation also does not preclude these patients to have 
experienced severe childhood abuse and/or neglect. Rather, it is questioning 
their (dissociative) reaction. While their reaction to childhood trauma may 
involve experiences of depersonalization, derealization, and may result in 
identity confusion, it may not involve dissociation in the meaning of actual, 
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objective splitting of identity into separate functional systems with patients 
alternating between these separate systems.  
It seems wise to use the terms “compartmentalization”, 
“fragmentation”, and also “dissociation” with caution since they imply a 
literal “splitting” of mental contents, whereas it may actually be cognitive 
distortions that guide subjective experience of patients with DID. Also, the 
label “amnesia” may be best set aside for memory problems which have 
been confirmed in objective memory tests. Finally, it seems wise not to limit 
our understanding of DID as either the result of a process of dissociative 
fragmentation or the result of role-enactment, as there are other ways of 
elucidation of the experiences and behavior reported by these patients.  
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Samenvatting 
De Dissociatieve Identiteitsstoornis (DIS) is de meest ernstige vorm van de 
dissociatieve stoornissen. De stoornis wordt gekenmerkt door de 
aanwezigheid van twee of meer van elkaar te onderscheiden identiteiten of 
persoonlijkheidstoestanden die het gedrag van de patiënt/cliënt bepalen. De 
stoornis wordt verder gekenmerkt door het onvermogen om belangrijke 
persoonlijke informatie te herinneren en is niet het gevolg van de directe 
fysiologische effecten van een middel of een somatische aandoening (DSM-
IV, APA, 1994). Voorstanders van het zogenaamde“posttraumatische” 
model van DIS, veronderstellen dat DIS een reactie is op lichamelijk en 
seksueel misbruik ervaren op jonge leeftijd. Het kind stelt zich voor het 
misbruik als het ware niet zelf mee te maken. In plaats daarvan stelt het zich 
voor dat iemand anders het misbruik ondergaat. De dissociatieve “splitsing” 
in DIS wordt dan ook gezien als een splitsing tussen identiteiten die wel 
weet hebben van ervaren traumatische gebeurtenissen en identiteiten die er 
geen of weinig weet van hebben en/of er geen gevoel bij hebben. Deze 
zogenaamde “amnestische barrière” tussen identiteiten is functioneel in die 
zin, dat deze het kind in staat stelt om het dagelijks leven weer op te pakken 
en vol te houden zonder weet van bedreigende ervaringen.  
Bij zeer langdurig en ernstig misbruik wordt het “afsplitsen” van 
dissociatieve identiteiten veronderstelt een habituele strategie te worden, 
waardoor er meerdere identiteiten ontstaan met ieder hun eigen 
herinneringen die (soms) niet gedeeld worden met andere identiteiten. Dit 
betreft niet alleen traumatische ervaringen maar ook meer neutrale 
ervaringen uit het dagelijkse leven. Op volwassen leeftijd rapporteren tussen 
de 95% en 100% van de patiënten met DIS periodes van amnesie voor 
ervaringen opgedaan in andere identiteiten. Zo kunnen patiënten 
bijvoorbeeld rapporteren dat vreemden er blijk van geven hen te kennen of 
dat ze kleren of andere spullen vinden bij hen thuis die ze zich niet 
herinneren gekocht te hebben. De gerapporteerde amnesie tussen 
identiteiten kan symmetrisch zijn, in de zin dat  twee identiteiten geen weet 
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hebben van elkaars kennis, of asymmetrisch, in de zin dat één identiteit wel 
weet heeft van de kennis van een ander, maar dat dit andersom niet geldt.  
Het hierboven geschetste posttraumatische model van DIS, wat dus 
veronderstelt dat DIS een reactie is op misbruik ervaren in de kindertijd 
heeft kritiek gekregen van voorstanders van het zogenaamde 
“sociocognitief” model, dat veronderstelt dat DIS pas op volwassen leeftijd 
ontstaat en niet als reactie op trauma, maar dat de patiënt zichzelf het 
ziektebeeld DIS eigen maakt als zingeving voor de eigen conflicterende 
ervaringen en gevoelens. Dit beeld zou gebaseerd zijn op verschillende 
bronnen zoals verhalen van andere patiënten, beelden in de media en “hulp” 
van therapeuten die zelf geloven in het posttraumatisch model. 
Omdat clinici en onderzoekers het niet eens zijn over of en welke 
geheugensystemen en processen de amnesie in DIS betrekking heeft, 
hebben we in dit proefschrift gepoogd de gerapporteerde amnesie in DIS 
systematisch in kaart te brengen. Centraal stond de vraag of er objectief 
bewijs kan worden verkregen voor de gerapporteerde amnesie tussen 
identiteiten door DIS patiënten. We hebben gekeken naar amnesie voor 
neutraal en traumagerelateerd materiaal, verbale en pictorale stimuli, en ook 
naar de kwaliteit van herinneringen. De kwaliteit van bewuste herinneringen 
kan ofwel meer “noetisch” zijn, dat wil zeggen dat iets wel bekend 
voorkomt maar zonder zelfbewustzijn, ofwel meer “autonoetisch”, waarbij 
er een subjectief gevoel is iets persoonlijk meegemaakt te hebben met kennis 
van allerlei specifieke aspecten van de originele situatie. Om simulatie van 
amnesie uit te schakelen zijn taken geselecteerd waarop simulatie 
verondersteld werd moeilijk of onmogelijk te zijn.  
Aan de experimenten die in de hoofdstukken twee tot en met vier 
van dit proefschrift beschreven zijn, hebben 31 patiënten deelgenomen. Aan 
de experimenten die in de hoofdstukken vijf en zes beschreven zijn, hebben 
22 patiënten meegedaan. Daarnaast hebben aan alle experimenten twee 
groepen controles meegedaan: een groep van 25 proefpersonen die de taken 
“als zichzelf”gedaan heeft en een groep van 25 proefpersonen die gevraagd 
is te doen alsof ze DIS hadden en dus ook om een imaginaire identiteit met 
amnesie te bedenken. Specifiek werd hun gevraagd om de gebruikelijke 
gemoedstoestand van deze identiteit aan te nemen en te doen alsof ze niets 
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wisten van wat ze net geleerd hadden. Deze laatste groep is meegenomen ter 
controle op de mogelijkheid om te simuleren op de geselecteerde taken. Alle 
deelnemers—patiënten en controleproefpersonen—waren vrouwen. De 
proefpersonen in beide controlegroepen hadden gemiddeld dezelfde leeftijd 
en opleiding als de patiënten.  
In de hoofdstukken twee en vijf staat het episodisch geheugen 
centraal, het bewust herinneren van eerdere episoden die iemand zelf heeft 
meegemaakt, met daarbij een tijds- en plaatsbesef. In hoofdstuk drie worden 
taken beschreven die zowel betrekking hebben op het semantisch geheugen, 
de algemene, feitelijke kennis die we hebben over de wereld in brede zin, en 
op het zogenaamde perceptueel-representatie systeem (PRS), dat een rol 
speelt bij het herkennen van de vorm van woorden en objecten. In 
hoofdstuk vier kijken we naar het procedurele geheugen, verantwoordelijk 
voor het leren van motorische en cognitieve vaardigheden zoals autorijden 
en puzzels leggen, en in hoofdstuk zes tenslotte kijken we naar evaluatief 
conditioneren waarbij voorheen neutrale stimuli een positieve of negatieve 
waarde krijgen. 
De procedures in alle taken waren vergelijkbaar: voorafgaand aan het 
onderzoek koos de patiënt zelf twee identiteiten die zouden deelnemen aan 
het onderzoek, waarvan tenminste één identiteit amnesie rapporteerde voor 
ervaringen van de andere deelnemende identiteit. Tijdens het onderzoek 
vroegen we aan de patiënt om eerst een van de identiteiten naar voren te 
laten komen (bij asymmetrische amnesie de identiteit zonder amnesie). Deze 
identiteit leerde een set stimuli, bijvoorbeeld woorden. Vervolgens werd aan 
de patiënt gevraagd of deze identiteit zich wilde terugtrekken en of de 
andere identiteit (bij asymmetrische amnesie de amnestische identiteit) naar 
voren wilde komen. Op dit moment werd altijd nogmaals gevraagd aan de 
patiënt of de amnestische identiteit iets wist van wat de ander net gedaan 
had. Daarna werd de kennis van de amnestische identiteit van het geleerde 
getest. Controles die gevraagd waren om te doen alsof ze DIS hebben, 
leerde de set stimuli “als zichzelf”en werden daarna gevraagd zich in te leven 
in hun imaginaire amnestische identiteit. Nadat ze een paar minuten de tijd 
hadden gekregen om zich in te leven, werden ze getest op het geleerde 
materiaal waarbij ze steeds moesten blijven doen alsof ze niets geleerd 
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hadden. De andere controles voerden de leer- en testfase uit met een pauze 
van twee minuten om de procedure gelijk te houden in alle groepen. 
Bij de patiënten bleek dat per taak tussen de één en acht patiënten 
rapporteerden toch iets te weten van ofwel de stimuli ofwel de instructies 
die de andere identiteit gezien had. Data van deze patiënten zijn verder niet 
meegenomen of apart geanalyseerd. De andere patiënten rapporteerden dus 
ook tijdens het onderzoek complete amnesie te hebben voor de leerfase die 
uitgevoerd was door de andere deelnemende identiteit. De resultaten van de 
procedurele taak (hoofdstuk vier) leken bewijs te leveren voor amnesie 
tussen identiteiten. Echter, juist op deze taak bleek ook simulatie van 
amnesie door de geïnstrueerde controles mogelijk, waardoor het onmogelijk 
is de scores van patiënten te interpreteren. Wel laten de resultaten van deze 
taak zien dat het belangrijk is om simulanten mee te nemen in het 
onderzoek naar amnesie in DIS teneinde onderbouwde conclusies te 
kunnen trekken over het bestaan van amnesie in DIS, iets wat nog in weinig 
ander onderzoek is gedaan. 
Op alle andere taken bleek het voorwenden van amnesie door 
simulerende controles niet mogelijk. Ze bleken niet in staat om kennis die ze 
tijdens het onderzoek geleerd hadden, te onderdrukken in hun 
“amnestische” identiteit. Uit de resultaten van deze  geheugentaken waarop 
simulatie van amnesie niet mogelijk was, kwam een eenduidig beeld naar 
voren: in tegenstelling tot de rapportages van de deelnemende patiënten, 
gaven ze in hun amnestische identiteit wel blijk van kennis van het geleerde 
in de andere deelnemende identiteit. Er was dus geen sprake van amnesie 
maar juist van overdracht van informatie tussen de deelnemende 
identiteiten. Patiënten herkenden materiaal geleerd door de andere identiteit 
bewust of gaven blijk van herkenning op een meer impliciete (onbewuste) 
wijze. Zelfs de kwaliteit van de herkenning van stimuli geleerd door de 
andere identiteit was vergelijkbaar met de kwaliteit van herkenning van 
materiaal geleerd in dezelfde identiteit, dus woorden geleerd in dezelfde 
identiteit stonden de patiënt niet meer “levendig” voor ogen dan 
vergelijkbare woorden geleerd in de andere identiteit.  
Hoe kan deze tegenstrijdigheid tussen de amnesierapportages van 
patiënten en de objectieve bevindingen van overdracht tussen identiteiten 
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geïnterpreteerd worden? In de discussie van dit proefschrift wordt 
verondersteld dat de overtuiging van patiënten dat ze niet kunnen weten wat 
andere identiteiten meemaken en weten een centrale rol speelt. In 
tegenstelling tot wat men eerder dacht, lijkt de geheugen-retrieval, het 
ophalen van herinneringen, intact bij deze patiënten. Mogelijk besluiten 
patiënten echter na het ophalen van een herinnering dat deze in een 
bepaalde toestand niet egosyntoon is, dat wil zeggen behorend bij de 
identiteit die op dat moment aanwezig is. Omdat ze ervan overtuigd zijn niet 
te kunnen weten wat andere identiteiten hebben meegemaakt en weten, 
gebruiken ze dus op sommige momenten niet alle informatie waarover ze 
beschikken. Patiënten zullen dus mogelijk informatie niet gebruiken als ze 
beseffen dat deze geleerd is door een andere identiteit. Als ze niet op de 
hoogte zijn van de herkomst van de herinnering, zullen ze deze wel 
gebruiken en mogelijk vaker ervaren als egosyntoon. Concluderend lijkt er 
dus geen sprake te zijn van objectief verifieerbare amnesie in DIS, maar 
lijken de gerapporteerde geheugenproblemen eerder samen te hangen met 
het niet gebruiken van informatie die correct is opgehaald. 
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